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Soldiers and Societies in Revolt:
Military Doctrine in the Arab Spring
Nicholas J. Lotito
This dissertation explores civil-military relations in democratizing contexts, specifically
how the historical relationship between the military and the broader public shapes re-
sponses to political crises such as riots and revolutions. I develop a novel theory, rooted
in civil-military relations literature from political science and sociology, for how an army’s
historical interactions with the population and with foreign sponsors create doctrine by
shaping organizational culture and practices toward the population. Doctrine, in turn,
influences the military’s response to a popular uprising. The foundations of military
doctrine are historical and include themilitary’s institutional origins, role in national inde-
pendence, and relationship to the ruling party. Subsequently, doctrinal innovation occurs
as a result of interacting with the domestic population and foreign military sponsors. The
dissertation features qualitative case studies of Tunisia, Egypt, and Syria during the Arab
Spring and a quantitative data analysis of major uprisings worldwide since 1950. Both
qualitative and quantitative evidence demonstrate that the nature of military doctrine
explains soldiers’ behavior during popular uprisings better than alternative arguments
based on capacity, patronage, and ethnicity.
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e Puzzle of Military Responses to Uprisings
In Tunis, then Cairo, and across the Arab world, armored personnel carriers rolled into the
central gathering places whose names would fill newspaper headlines in the first months
of 2011: the Kasbah, Tahrir Square, Pearl Roundabout. Swarms of black-clad riot police,
plainclothes toughs, and armed soldiers staked out positions of authority to face down the
exuberant crowds calling for radical change. As the unprecedented popular mobilization
gained strength across North Africa and the Middle East, rulers and their security forces
were defiant but fearful. During the uprisings, authoritarian regimes looked to their
militaries to restore order when anti-regime protests overwhelmed the normal repressive
capacity of the state police. Subsequently, divergent military responses were instrumental
in creating varied political outcomes across the region: Tunisia’s army remained neutral,
enabling a nonviolent political transition, while Egypt’s forced out the president and
eventually seized power itself, and Syria’s launched military operations against demon-
strators, starting a conflict that devolved into a devastating and still ongoing civil war. The
uprisings proved that even if protesters shared similar symbols, slogans, and aspirations,
the military’s dissimilar responses could lead to either social transformation or human
tragedy. Until now, soldiers’ decisions in these critical moments have remained a black
box to outside observers. When andwhy domilitaries intervene to repressmass uprisings,
and under what conditions is revolution possible without violence?
1
In this dissertation, I investigate the causal underpinnings of military intervention
in revolutions through the divergence in the uprisings across the Arabworld in 2010–2011.
Existing theories for both the outcomes of the Arab Spring generally and the military role
in particular offer explanations based on characteristics of the military, such as profes-
sionalism, patronage or ethnicity. Instead, I argue that the primary variable in military
behavior during revolutions is doctrine: the set of rules and understandings through
which military planners conceptualize and prepare for future engagements.1 Doctrine
is shaped by the military’s relationships with the general population and with the foreign
armies that provide armaments, training and military education. An army’s doctrine for
domestic intervention provides the guidelines by which soldiers perceive uprisings as
either threats or opportunities and governs the nature their response.
This dissertation develops a novel theory rooted in civil-military relations litera-
ture from the disciplines of political science and sociology. The theory holds that doc-
trine first emerges during the formative years of a military’s development under colonial
rule. In the former territories of the Ottoman Empire, the creation of modern armies
was heavily influenced by the interests of European colonizers, and foreign influence
continued into the early post-independence period. Later, as domestic political regimes
consolidated power, native sons (and occasionally daughters) filled the ranks of the mil-
itary hierarchy, establishing a new military-society relationship in line with nationalist
principles. Over time, the armed forces’ emergent doctrines became institutionalized and
routinized, calcifying into a stable organizational culture and set of established practices.
In the development of military doctrine, the most edifying moments come when an army
is tested operationally, whether in foreign combat or domestic intervention. Across the
Middle East, the 1970s and 1980s were a time when public approbation for post-colonial
regimes was faltering, as economic crisis, social unrest, and the rise of Islamism as a
popular political movement shook the foundations of the Arab state. In one country after
1. My definition mirrors standard definitions (e.g. Zisk 1993, 4) but broadens its scope to encompass
military missions other than warfighting, i.e. domestic crisis response.
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another, mass demonstrations led to bloodshed, as protesters overwhelmed the police and
rulers ordered the army to intervene. The varied experiences of domestic intervention and
its consequences at this critical juncture established lasting legacies in military organiza-
tions, with important implications for the institution’s behavior when faced with later
mass uprisings.
1.1 The Arab Spring
A wave of protest, popularly known as the “Arab Spring” (Arabic: al-rabīʿ al-ʿarabī )2
began in Tunisia in December 2010. Protests continued to escalate until President Zine
el-Abidine ben Ali fled the country on January 14. Due to the strength of Middle Eastern
regimes’ coercive apparatuses (Bellin 2004, 2012), few previous protests had achieved
high levels of mass mobilization, but precedents can be found in smaller, often regional-
based protest movements, as well as national strikes, riots, and other mobilizations often
classified, somewhat dismissively, as “social unrest” (Le Saout and Rollinde 1999; Chomiak
and Entelis 2011; Khatib and Lust 2014). The Arab Spring filled public squares with
many first-time protesters, alongside experienced social, religious, and political activists
and organizations (Anderson 2011; Larémont 2013; Gerges 2014). The success of this
mobilization can be attributed to the development of a negative coalition that “bridged
the diverse goals and interests of different groups, thus pitting society as a whole against
the regime and its loyalist supporters” (Goldstone 2011, 457). Fueled by international
media coverage, notably on the Qatar-based Al-Jazeera satellite television network, anti-
regime protests spread to nearly every country in the region, although only some protests
escalated to revolutionary proportions. Egypt, Libya, Syria, and Bahrain each experienced
dramatic revolutionary scenarios, leading to regime change in the former two countries
and brutal crackdowns in the latter. TheArab Springwas unprecedentedwithin the region
2. For formal Arabic, I follow the style guidelines of the International Journal of Middle East Studies
(IJMES). Colloquial Arabic phrases are transliterated according to local convention. Personal and place
names use accepted English or French spellings where available.
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in terms of spontaneous, cross-class, nationwide anti-regime protests; in the previous
three decades, only the Iranian Revolution of 1979 and Algeria’s “Black October” riots of
1988 saw comparable mobilization. This makes these uprisings a particularly good test
for how militaries act under particularly tough circumstances.
A few months after the uprisings began, Gregory Gause (2011) posed the question
many were asking: Why did Middle East studies miss the Arab Spring? More specifically,
why did observers fail to predict the collapse of the alliance between ruling autocrats and
the military apparatuses supporting them? By 1980, exceptionally stable authoritarian
regimes were entrenched across the Middle East and North Africa, and the study of the
military in politics in the region began to suffer neglect (Kamrava 2000; Barak and David
2010). Researchers’ lack of access to Arab national security circles and the rarity of
coups d’état and domestic military interventions in the region reinforced this inattention.
Moreover, once consolidated, Arab regimes employed large and mostly effective police
and intelligence services to handle internal and regime security, including the repression
of political opposition and suppression of public protests. As a result, scholars of the
period focused on the everyday apparatuses of authoritarian rule, especially electoral
institutions (Lust-Okar 2005; Blaydes 2010; Masoud 2014), and occasionally the visible
elements of police and intelligence services responsible for routine repression (Wedeen
1999). Thus, despite the previously dominant role of themilitary in historical Arab politics,
contemporary scholars of the Middle East politics focused on other political actors in their
work on authoritarian stability and breakdown. Suddenly, in 2011, the “defection” of
several armies away from long-ruling presidents created an epochal shift in Arab politics,
rekindling an urgent interest in the region’s civil-military relations.
As protests continued through the spring of 2011, it became increasingly evident
that the response of each country’s military to the uprising would have a defining effect
on the political success or failure of the revolutionary moment (Bellin 2012; Lutterbeck
2013; Brownlee et al. 2014). Where national armies did not engage in repressing the
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protests (Egypt and Tunisia), old political leaders were swept from power. But where
national armies brought to bear their full military might against civilians (Bahrain and
Syria), existing regimes remained in power. Even where the military split apart (Libya
and Yemen), and mutinous troops joined the ranks of armed rebellion, military repression
kept leaders in power until foreign intervention tipped the balance.3 This was certainly
not the first time that the region’s military forces played a decisive political role. Follow-
ing the decolonization of the Middle East after World War II, armies rapidly established
prominence in new authoritarian political systems (Richards and Waterbury 2008, chap.
13). Coups d’état, a classic indicator of military involvement in politics, were common
in the region through the 1970s, after which they became less frequent. However, the
reduced incidence of coups does not mean that the role of the military in Arab politics
had diminished. After 1980, authoritarian leaders in the region remained just as likely to
have their rule ended by military coup as before (Albrecht 2015b). On the eve of the Arab
Spring, military forces continued to play a major role in regional politics. Rather than
seizing power directly, the region’s most politically powerful militaries “ruled without
governing,” using their influence to coerce civilian governments (Cook 2007). Most Arab
leaders had a military background: of the six countries most affected by the uprisings,
five were led by former career military officers.4
The Arab Spring cases demonstrate how influential the armed forces are during
popular uprisings. They also demonstrate how diverse and seemingly unpredictable these
military responses can be. Table 1.1 presents the largest sustained anti-regime uprisings in
the Middle East and North Africa in 2010–11. In all six cases, the armed forces intervened
on the ground as part of the government response to popular protests. In most cases, the
3. Libya’s Muammar Gaddafi lost power only through external military intervention by NATO, which
overwhelmed the government’s remaining military forces. Yemen’s Ali Abdullah Saleh relied on military
repression to survive one year in office after protests began. He was forced out under Saudi pressure while
receiving medical treatment in the United States.
4. These were Bahrain, Egypt, Libya, Tunisia and Yemen. The exception, Syria, was led by Bashar al-Asad,
was training as an ophthalmologist when his elder brother, Basil, died suddenly in 2004. He then served six
years as a military officer before taking power.
5




Tunisia Zine el-Abidine Ben Ali None Regime change
Egypt Hosni Mubarak Low Regime change
Yemen Ali Abdullah Saleh Extreme Executive change
Bahrain Hamad bin Isa Al Khalifa Extreme Government victory
Libya Muammar Gaddafi Extreme Regime change
Syria Bashar al-Asad Extreme Civil war
* Original data. Collection procedure detailed in Chapter 6.
military used large-scale violence against civilians. Nonviolent political transitions were
possible only where soldiers limited their use of force.
1.2 The Military’s Critical Role in Revolution
I define popular uprisings as sustained, broad-based, primarily nonviolent protest move-
ments demanding regime change. My definition is similar to Beissinger’s (2013, 574n1)
concept of urban civic revolts, which involve “the rapid concentration of protesters in
urban spaces and the articulation of demands for political and civil freedoms and/or free-
and-fair elections.” While mass mobilization is notoriously difficult to predict, even the
most rapid and unexpected uprisings have antecedents. The coalitions of protesters and
social groups that come together to push authoritarian leaders from power are not spon-
taneous creations of the revolutionary Zeitgeist, but rather constellations of social groups
united by common interests and aspirations.5 Mass mobilization is difficult to predict
because, in an authoritarian context, most individuals will refrain from any form of protest
– and even express a false preference for the regime – unless and until they believe regime
5. For example, Laryssa Chomiak (2014, 23) demonstrates that the “creation myth” of the Arab Spring –
that the immolation of a Tunisian street vendor sparked not only that country’s revolution but the entire
wave of uprisings across the region – holds little explanatory power. In reality, the uprising “emerged
from seemingly scattered activism in pre-revolutionary Tunisia and certain moments of resistance under
dictatorship that were closely interconnected.”
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change is imminent; however, once a critical mass is reached, mobilization can escalate
rapidly and sweep regimes from power (Granovetter 1978; Kuran 1991). In focusing on
military behavior, I do not intend to discount the agency of the opposition movement
itself, as illuminated by scholars of contentious politics and revolution (Beissinger 1998;
Tilly and Tarrow 2006); protest movements can sometimes coordinate to act strategically,
and it would be a mistake to think of them as mindless mobs (Nepstad 2011).
Because themilitary generally has the physical capacity to violently disperse demon-
strations, the military often becomes a de facto arbiter between protesters and the regime.
For would-be rebels, the brutality of modern warfare and the low odds of success in a
protracted civil war raise the attractiveness of nonviolent methods of resistance. When
citizens opt for nonviolent protest, repression becomes only one of several less-costly tools
regimes may use to counter their demands, along with concessions and even ignoring
(Bishara 2015). For political leaders, countering with physical repression relies on the
cooperation of the security forces. In most cases, the police are up to the task of basic
repression, dispersing crowds and restoring calm. But if protests escalate beyond the re-
pressive capacity of police and other internal security forces, leaders must choose whether
to resort to the most severe form of physical repression: military force against unarmed
citizens. In these cases, the armed forces are the state’s last resort to halt protesters. Tilly
(1993, 241) argues that a revolutionary outcome is marked by a loss of the monopoly of
force, which results when the regime or the military is unwilling to use (sufficient) force
against protesters. In this way, the military determined the success or failure of the great
European revolutions:
the organization of military force [has] mediated effectively between revolu-
tionary situations and revolutionary outcomes: challengers to existing rulers
who actually lack the capacity to seize power often produced revolutionary
situations… but no one seized state power without gaining effective control
over military force.
Likewise, Brinton (1938) documents this key moment of defection in his comparison of
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the English, American, French, and Russian revolutions. He argues that in any revolution,
there is at least onemoment inwhich constituted authority is challenged and the authority
responds with the force of its police or military. Brinton concludes that the regime’s
continued existence depends on success during this moment: “no government has ever
fallen before revolutionists until it has lost control over its armed forces or lost the ability
to use them effectively,” and “conversely that no revolutionists have ever succeeded until
they have got a predominance of effective armed force on their side” (111). Military force is
usually effective against civilians: themilitary firepower available tomost states today can
disperse even the largest mass mobilization, if the consequences in civilian casualties are
deemed acceptable (Chorley 1943; Barany 2016b). Furthermore, the comparative politics
literature provides empirical evidence of the military serving as a gatekeeper to regime
change, especially in cases of popular revolution (Stepan 1988; Bellin 2004; Svolik 2012).
In their study of nonviolent protest movements, Stephan and Chenoweth (2008) find that
“People Power” revolutions are 46 times more likely to result in regime change when the
military defects from the government. Ultimately, Barany (2012) concludes, no process
of political liberalization can go forward without the support, or at least tolerance of the
armed forces.
This central role of the military in revolution has long been observed, but not well
explained. Most existing research frames the question in terms of defection and points to
various factors believed to influence the military’s loyalty to the political regime. As Lee
(2015) argues, the critical question for military officers is whether to “defect or defend.”
Loyalty is an appealing explanation because it fits cleanly into a rational choice, politi-
cal economy framework. Whether loyalty stems from officers’ values (professionalism),
material interests (patronage) or identity ties (ethnicity), it is assumed that soldiers will
refrain from challenging the political regime, and will even fight to defend it, as long as
they remain faithful to its leader. In this dissertation, I argue that this scholarly focus
on loyalty is misplaced. The loyalty paradigm assumes that the armies most likely to
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carry out a coup d’état are also the most likely to defect from the regime during a popular
uprising. In fact, armies with no history of coup-plotting have nevertheless “defected”
from regimes facing popular revolts. Despite its potential political influence, the military
is not a primarily political actor in most countries. Its central mission, national defense,
occupies most of soldiers’ day-to-day energies. For soldiers, a popular uprising represents
exceptional circumstances, not business-as-usual, and their responses to events can have
exceptional, long-term consequences.
Military responses to revolution can encompass an array of behaviors besides
mass defection or loyal defense of the regime. In a crisis, the military might also split
into rival factions (Albrecht and Ohl 2016), remain quartered in their barracks (Pion-
Berlin and Trinkunas 2010), or attempt a coup d’etat (Casper and Tyson 2014). As such,
officers’ loyalty to the political leadership is insufficient to explain thewide variety of roles
they play in revolution. Many discussions of the Arab Spring have framed the military
response as a binary: defend the regime or support the revolution. However, when
soldiers confronted the Arab Spring, they responded not only with loyalty or desertion,
but with a variety of strategies to manage and restore public order. The Egyptian armed
forces took an active role in the crisis from the beginning, but with mixed intentions:
first, they used force to quell protests, but later they delivered an ultimatum for Mubarak
to resign. In Tunisia, the army’s restraint toward protesters allowed the revolution to
succeed, regardless of officers’ political preferences. Meanwhile, mass defections in Syria
were not enough to topple the regime, because the remaining forces applied warfighting
tactics to kill and punish civilian demonstrators. In the next chapter, I offer a theory of
military doctrine to explain this diversity of responses to popular uprisings, illuminating
the varied roles played by soldiers in the Arab Spring.
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1.3 Existing Explanations
Observing the critical role of the military in the success or failure of the Arab uprisings,
researchers have produced a growing body of work seeking to explain these responses
(Albrecht and Bishara 2011; Barany 2011; Lutterbeck 2013; Nepstad 2013; Taylor 2014;
BouNassif 2015a; Albrecht andOhl 2016). In this section, I survey the theoretical literature
to identify the most prominent competing arguments. While the literature on the subject
is large and growing, most scholars have repeated the same few explanations, which are
based on capacity, professionalism, patronage, or ethnicity. However, I argue below that
they do not offer a convincing explanation of military responses to revolution.
A Word on Coup-Proofing Since Quinlivan (1999) applied the label “coup-proofing”
to Middle Eastern politics, these strategies have been a popular explanatory variable in
studies of military behavior. Coup-proofing is an intentional effort by a political leader to
increase military loyalty through the use of patronage or ethnic linkages. As the term
suggests, coup-proofing is designed to discourage coups d’état, not to ensure loyalty
during mass challenges. Numerous studies have pointed to this phenomenon to explain
the diverse outcomes of the Arab Spring (Gaub 2013; Louër 2013; Makara 2013; Albrecht
2015a; Bou Nassif 2015a). Coup-proofing is not a single variable, but rather a catchall
for the multifaceted efforts of civilian leaders to control the military. In the discussion
below, I disaggregate coup-proofing strategies based on patronage (i.e. material interests)
or ethnicity and consider each as an alternative explanation in its own right. A third coup-
proofing strategy is institutional counterbalancing, which proliferates rival organizations
within the coercive apparatus to make successful coup plotting more difficult (Quinlivan
1999; Belkin and Schofer 2005; Böhmelt and Pilster 2015; De Bruin 2017). In this formula-
tion, counterbalancing matters because it reduces patronage to the military, or creates a
situation of relative deprivation vis-à-vis the police. While I find the rivalry explanation
unconvincing, I address it below along with other patronage arguments.
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Capacity
A first set of explanations focuses on capacity, or the military’s ability to repress the
uprising by force, which depends on the size of the protests, the size and ability of the
armed forces, and foreign intervention. Because internal security forces almost always
respond to protests before the military, the question at hand pertains to the subset of cases
where demonstrations surpass the repressive capacity of the regular police and necessitate
military intervention.6 In responding to an uprising, the military’s first consideration
must be its ability to subdue protesters by force. Officers rightly worry that the appli-
cation of insufficient force may generate a backlash of increased popular mobilization
(Koopmans 1997; Francisco 2004; Carey 2006). In theory, the military should refrain
from violence if it is too small, poorly trained, or ill-equipped to confidently confront
demonstrators. However, no modern army is weak enough to be incapacitated by an
unarmed crowd (Chorley 1943, 243). It is this basic capacity to repress which makes the
military a perennial gatekeeper to revolution (Barany 2016b, 4-5).
Despite the brute strength of the armed forces, some have argued that raw ca-
pability can be undermined by the absence of force cohesion. In this view, disunity
or factionalism within the military creates a lack of capacity to respond to uprisings,
regardless of senior officers’ will to repress. If a military faction breaks away to stage
a coup d’état, or junior commanders (i.e. those tasked with carrying out the order to
repress) refuse to obey orders, military repression can fail (Lee 2015). Cohesion may fail
because of ethnic stacking (McLauchlin 2010), generational gaps within the officer corps
(BouNassif 2015a) or social cohesion (Lehrke 2014). If cohesion is too low, themilitarywill
be unable to act against protesters, resulting in effective military neutrality. Accordingly,
these scholars argue that less cohesive militaries will be less likely to use violence against
protesters. Ultimately, these theories of cohesion rest fundamentally on soldiers’ loyalty
6. In other words, it is beyond the scope of this dissertation to investigate whether larger or more highly
skilled police and intelligence apparatuses are able to prevent protests from reaching a critical mass.
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to the regime (Albrecht and Ohl 2016). However, even severely divided armies are often
capable of dispersing unarmed protesters.7 These sources of force cohesion help explain
why armies have more or fewer defections while confronting a popular uprising, but not
why the military organization as a whole responds with violence or restraint.
Regardless of the military’s strength and intentions, foreign intervention can be
decisive either for or against the regime, but foreign powers usually wait for events to
develop in one direction or another before intervening directly. McKoy and Miller (2012)
argue that mere signals of support or disapproval from a foreign patron can determine
state responses to uprisings, even claiming that the Egyptian revolution strongly supports
their theory (923). But the empirical record shows military violence against protesters
often occurs despite foreign condemnation and even threats of intervention. For example,
the Libyan army employed force against protesters despite an impending international
military intervention, which came in the form of a NATO air campaign that annihilated
the Libyan armed forces. Actual military intervention by a stronger foreign power can of
course determine the outcome of a revolution, but it does not explain the prior military
response.
Professionalism
A second prominent explanatory variable for military responses is the professionalism
of military officers. Professionalism is drawn from traditional civil-military relations
theory and has been widely embraced despite suffering from conceptual problems that
undermine its explanatory power. A substantial majority of the contemporary civil-
military relations literature identifies professionalism as a primary cultural factor which
explains military behavior in various security and political contexts (Moskos 1976). Pro-
fessionalism is generally believed to improve combat performance inwar (Biddle and Long
2004; Brooks and Stanley 2007; Talmadge 2015; Narang and Talmadge 2017). However, the
7. For example, the armed forces in Syria, Libya, and Yemen saw large-scale defections during the Arab
Spring, but still suppressed protests with violence.
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evidence on whether professionalism deters or encourages political intervention is mixed.
Among the most influential arguments is the claim that military professionalism, or the
inculcation of professional values, encourages depoliticization and submission to civilian
control (Huntington 1957; Janowitz 1964; Feaver 1999; Barany 2012). In the Arab Spring,
scholars have claimed that professionalism either increased or decreased the likelihood of
defection. For those who focus on the military’s institutionalization, professionalism is
associated with pro-revolutionary responses (Lutterbeck 2013; Bellin 2012); but for others,
professionalism instead implies submission to civilian control (Gause 2011; Barany 2011).
Classical civil-military relations theory focused on the question of military obedi-
ence to the political leadership, and offered primarily ideological rationales for military
officers to obey their civilian leaders. Huntington’s (1957) e Soldier and the State is
the best-known formulation of the hypothesis that professionalization, or the inculca-
tion of professional values in the officer class, is the ideal means of establishing military
respect for civilian authority. He argues that an officer corps, “to the extent that it is
shaped by functional rather than societal imperatives,” will adhere to a common world-
view (Weltanschauung) and professional ethic (61–62). Universal military values, atti-
tudes, and perspectives “inhere in the performance of the professional military function
and… are deducible from the nature of that function” (61). Janowitz’s (1964) own classic
text of civil-military relations theory challenges Huntington’s proposed division of labor
between military and civilian elites, but ultimately echoes the belief that civilian control
is a question of professionalism.
Classic theory proposes a dichotomy between a professional army, in which sol-
diers are bureaucratic agents of the political regime, and a praetorian army, which op-
erates as an independent political power (Perlmutter and Bennett 1980, 3-4). Profes-
sional armies are prevalent in the developed world, and praetorian ones in developing
countries. The relationship between professionalism and apoliticism is causal, classical
theorists argue, so military interventionism in developing countries can be reduced by
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professionalizing the armed forces. However, classical theories were developed in the
context of consolidated Western democracies, where citizens and soldiers share a near-
universal belief that the duly-elected civilian government is a legitimate representative of
the people, which in turn is the ultimate source of the authority to rule. In authoritarian
systems, or in weak democracies, the relationship between civilian authority and popular
legitimacy – critical to a classical conception of military professionalism – breaks down.
Countering the view of professionalism as a recipe for civil-military harmony,
Finer (1962, 25) argues that, instead of assuring apoliticism, military professionalism “in
fact often thrusts the military into collision with the civil authorities.” Echoing Finer,
Stepan (1973, chap. 2) argues that professionalism encourages political interventionism
when state interests, as perceived and defined by the officer corps, are threatened.8 Simi-
larly, Böhmelt et al. (2018) find that, because it strengthens the cohesiveness of the officer
corps, professionalism also increases the risk of coups d’état. In sum, professionalism
alone does not predict the military’s political stance. Worse still, professionalism has
suffered conceptual stretching,9 becoming a catchall for normatively preferred attributes
in any given context, whether abstention from coups, support for democracy, or combat
effectiveness. To clarify the concept, I distinguish two distinct uses of the term profes-
sionalism, which capture separate characteristics: capability and values. Military analysts
use the term professionalism quite differently from most social scientists. The military
itself views professionalism as a measure of capability and rigorous training, what we
might call technical professionalism. Political scientists, however, are chiefly concerned
with soldiers’ embrace of professional values, most critically the supremacy of civilian
authority.
Following the assertions ofHuntington and Janowitz, many scholars of civil-military
8. Similarly, Kamrava (2000) argues that in the Middle East, professionalization tends to increase the
military’s corporate identity and institutional autonomy, thereby increasing its politicization.
9. Sartori (1970, 1035-36) coined the term as follows: “In order to obtain a world-wide applicability the
extension of our concepts has been broadened by obfuscating their connotation.… It appears that we can
cover more—in travelling terms—only by saying less, and by saying less in a far less precise manner.” See
also Collier and Mahon (1993).
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relations, have assumed a tight link between technical and political professionalism with-
out exploring how these dimensions may vary independently from one another. I argue
that these dimensions are largely independent factors, with different effects on military
responses to uprisings. Counter to Huntington’s predictions, professionalization does not
automatically instill the values of civilian supremacy and political non-intervention. In
fact, the opposite relationship may hold; a recent study finds that enhancing technical
professionalism actually increases the likelihood of military-led coups d’état, even when
they are trained by a democratic state, because increased capabilities make it easier to
overthrow the government (Savage and Caverley 2017). In fact, the two factors operate
independently: advanced technical training and modern organization improve capacity,
while political values and institutionalization influencewill. Therefore, I exclude technical
professionalism as an explanatory variable more liked to capacity and focus instead on
values.
Although professionalism, or professional values, is themaster variable of classical
civil-military relations theory, it has overstretched its conceptual boundaries and become
a placeholder for a wide array of desired liberal values, as well as military competence,
efficacy, and efficiency. In this application, it is often non-falsifiable. For example, a
large body of work addresses the military’s willingness to cede power to civilians during
a political transition to democracy. Stepan (1971, 1988) and others recognized long ago
that establishing civilian control over the armed forces was a necessary component of
democratic consolidation. Geddes’ (1999) well-known contribution to the democratiza-
tion literature frames the military as a central actor in authoritarian breakdown. By the
late 1990s and 2000s, scholarship on civil-military relations had come to focus almost
exclusively on the problem of democratic transitions (Diamond and Plattner 1996; Cottey
et al. 2002; Bland 2001; Croissant et al. 2010; Bruneau and Matei 2008; Barany 2012). Much
of this literature focuses on the inculcation of liberal values, which are assumed to be
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inherent to military professionalism.10 Yet with its narrow focus on civilian control, this
literature contributes little to our understanding of military responses to crises. When
an autocrat faces a popular uprising, which is the more professional military response:
to interfere in politics by supporting the revolution or to submit to civilian control by
repressing demonstrators? A universal concept of professionalism cannot resolve this
contradiction.
Patronage
A third set of explanations rests on patronage. The fundamental problem of civil-military
relations has often been framed as a principal-agent or moral hazard problem, and both
political scientists and economists have produced countless formal models of the strategic
interaction between a ruler and his military (Hurwicz 2008; Besley and Robinson 2010;
Svolik 2013; Casper and Tyson 2014; Leon 2014; McMahon and Slantchev 2015; Amegashie
2015). In thesemodels, themilitary considers its collective political and economic interests
before deciding whether to strategically support or overthrow the political regime. In this
constant strategic game, the regime, ever fearful of a coup d’état, tries to buy the loyalty
of the armed forces by satisfying its material (economic and political) interests. Various
forms of military intervention in politics, from policy pressure to coups d’état, result
when the regime fails to adequately compensate the military for its continued support.11
Generally, these theories do not distinguish between plotting a coup d’état during a period
of normal politics and abandoning a regime besieged by mass protests. Instead, both
are termed “military intervention in politics.” In this way, patronage arguments conflate
political interventions led by the military, on the one hand, and political crises to which
10. In the broader civil-military relations literature, professionalism has also been related to
democratization. Because civilian control is considered a “sine qua non for democratic consolidation”
(Croissant et al. 2010, 960), some assume that increasing professionalism will cause democratization,
committing a cum hoc ergo propter hoc fallacy. In fact, military professionalism has also been used to sustain
imperialism and authoritarianism (Stepan 1988; Luckham 1994; Kamrava 2000).
11. The simplest, and perhaps simplistic, version of this model is Besley and Robinson (2010). More
complex models provide better intuition about the circumstances under which this bargaining breaks down,
resulting in military intervention (e.g. Svolik, 2013; McMahon and Slantchev, 2015).
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the military must react, on the other. Anti-regime public opinion and mass mobilization,
when included as variables, are seen to strengthen the military’s bargaining position vis-
à-vis the regime.12
On the political side, revolution can reduce the military’s status and influence
under a new government, particularly if officers are closely associated with the previ-
ous regime. Many political scientists assume that the military desires both institutional
autonomy and influence over policy, and argue that defection occurs when the political
benefit of continued loyalty to a civilian regime is lower than the expected reward from
seizing power directly (Geddes 1999; Svolik 2012). On the economic side, many focus
on the payoffs a regime provides to buy the military’s loyalty. Accordingly, rentier states
(e.g. where government revenues derive from oil wealth, not domestic production) should
more easily purchase support, while regimes facing severe economic crises may be unable
to maintain these payouts (Haggard and Kaufman 1995; Smith 2004; Bellin 2004).
A subset of the patronage theory argues that the military’s institutional auton-
omy determines the cost of regime change to the military organization. The military’s
organization is patrimonial if it depends on personal rather than formal networks and
hierarchies. In this view, a patrimonial military will resist revolution in order to protect
the privileges, status, and material benefits conferred by their ties to the regime. Con-
versely, well institutionalized armies are less averse to regime change because they will
not be “ruined by reform” (Bellin 2004, 2012; see also Stepan 1988). Institutionalization
increases the organizations autonomy from the regime, improving the odds that soldiers
will abandon the dictator during a revolution, confident in their ability to defend the
military’s corporate interests under a new regime. Collectively, this research suggests
that institutional autonomy leads military officers to value internal cohesion over other
political and economic interests, but neither theory explains how the military develops
institutional autonomy ex ante. Since the military often survives intact after civilian
12. Alternatively, Casper and Tyson (2014) argue that protests are merely an informational mechanism,
which facilitates elite coordination.
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regime change, while other institutions can be changed or eliminated, structural argu-
ments cannot predict what the revolution’s impact will be on the military.
In a rational choice framework, the behavior of the military is commonly assumed
to follow directly from the orders of its highest commanders. Because economic payoffs
and political clout accrue disproportionately to the upper echelons of the military hier-
archy, most scholars focus narrowly on the loyalty of the most senior military officers
(Barany 2016b). However, some recent scholarship focuses on the loyalty of junior of-
ficers, rather than the top brass, pointing to mutinies by enlisted soldiers (Albrecht and
Ohl 2016) or divisions between junior and senior officers (Bou Nassif 2014). Even the
wealthiest states cannot afford to buy the loyalty of an entire army, and a lack of support
or loyalty from junior officers can force senior officers to back down from supporting the
regime (Bou Nassif 2013, 2015a).
Ethnicity
A final variable, ethnicity, is the focus of a significant school of thought, which treats on
the ethnic composition of the armed forces relative to society at large as a primary causal
variable (Enloe 1977; McLauchlin 2010). Scholars have argued that ethnicity determines
military behavior in both war (Posen 1993; Castillo 2014) and revolution (Makara 2013;
Lehrke 2014; Bou Nassif 2015a). According to this school, armies are less prone to violent
repression when their own ethnic or ideological composition mirrors that of society at
large, and more violent when “ethnic stacking” fills the upper echelons of the military
hierarchy with “co-ethnics” of the embattled leader (Lutterbeck 2013). With its violent re-
sponse to protesters, the Syrian Armed Forces have become a paradigmatic example of the
power of ethnicity to determine military behavior.13 However, a closer look at the history
of the Syrian military reveals inconsistencies in this neat, monocausal explanation. My
case study of Syrian political-military development (chapter 5) finds that the politicization
13. For example, Barany (2016b, 152) writes of Syria, “sectarian identity was the critical factor affecting
the military leadership’s decision to stand firmly behind Assad’s Ba’ath Party dictatorship and to inflict
massive violence in its defense.”
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of ethnic bias in the military, not the ethnic composition of the military relative to society,
shaped the military’s doctrine and response to the 2011 protests. More broadly, ethnicity
primarily affects military cohesion, rather than political loyalty or operating procedures
(Albrecht and Ohl 2016). Because cohesion is not a direct cause of military responses,
the “direct” effect of ethnicity is small. In sum, the ethnic composition of the armed
forces relative to that of society at large does not reliably predict the military response
to uprisings. On the other hand, politicized ethnicity sometimes features prominently
in a military’s doctrine, which in turn shapes soldiers’ interactions with the population.
Therefore, I do not deny that ethnicity is not a critical factor in some cases, but I argue
instead that existing theory fails to explain the conditions under which ethnicity will play
a role in the military response.
1.4 A New Theory: Military Doctrine
This section introduces an alternative theory, which holds that military doctrine is the
main determinant of soldiers’ responses to domestic crises. Doctrine provides a roadmap
of the military’s political and strategic orientation, and it can be more precisely defined
and measured than the broad patterns of civil-military relations identified in previous
work. In my attention to military doctrine, I diverge from the political science liter-
ature’s focus on loyalty and defection. Instead, my theoretical framework is based on
organizational learning, the process of development and change in an organization’s be-
havioral modes and cultural values (Levitt and March 1988; Huber 1991). In addition to
organization theory, I draw from the interdisciplinary fields of civil-military relations and
security studies, with their emphasis on the processes of military decision making. Even
in moments of crisis, officers typically act as they have been prepared to act (Allison
and Zelikow 1999). When we assess military performance on the battlefield, we think of
soldiers as hamstrung by doctrine and culture. But when domestic politics are involved,
we assume a rational choice calculus. To reconcile these contradictory views of military
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behavior, I rely on theories of organizational culture and military innovation.
In the developing world, doctrine began to take shape when a modern military
was first established, during the colonial or early independence era. Based on historical
evidence from theMiddle East andNorth Africa, I argue that colonial institutions provided
the basis for early military doctrine, which also responded to defining events like national
independence and consolidation of the post-colonial political order. I also identify two
critical factors that can shift the development trajectory of military doctrine: military-
society relations and foreign influence. First, the military’s social and strategic inter-
actions with the population generate organizational culture and practices which, once
institutionalized, influence the military’s response to later uprisings. Doctrine does not
emerge spontaneously, but rather is developed historically through multiple interactions.
In addition, foreign powers shape the organization, ideas, and practices of armies in the
developing world. Foreign influences often date to the military’s creation during the
colonial era, and they continue throughout the twentieth century in the form of military
training and aid relationships. In this way, wealthier and more powerful states, especially
the United States and the Soviet Union, had a significant effect on the military doctrine
that developed in authoritarian regimes in the postcolonial era.
When popular uprisings surpass the repressive capacity of the internal security
forces, the military often becomes the final authority capable of restoring public order
(Barany 2016b, 4-5). In this situation, soldiers face a difficult choice whether to employ
violence to disperse and control protesters (McLauchlin 2010; Pion-Berlin et al. 2014;
Albrecht and Ohl 2016). The use of violence by the military is most likely when its
domestic security doctrine frames citizens as enemies of the state and prescribes combat
in the state’s defense. In many cases, military violence is short-lived because military
force is quickly decisive against unarmed protesters. Many military officers are either
conservative by nature or socialized to be more conservative through their indoctrination
into the military (Caforio 2018, 291). As a result, officers may favor the stability of the
20
status quo over the uncertainty of political change. In authoritarian regimes, senior mil-
itary leaders are typically appointed by the president on the basis of political loyalty. At
the same time, military officers resent performing functions which conflict with their
understanding of “proper” military missions and roles, including police functions like
crowd control and political repression (Barany 2016b, 32). While loyalty is a universal
military value, soldiers might be trained to serve the nation or party, rather than the ruler
himself. Therefore, political loyalty is not sufficient to explain military responses globally.
The civil-military relations literature reminds us that the military, more so than
other political actors, is influenced by cultural norms and codes of conduct specific to the
military profession and organization. Soldiers’ motivations for service vary, ranging from
impoverished youth seeking a stable income to ethnic minorities striving for recognition
as citizens (Krebs 2006). Moreover, soldiers worldwide are subjected to strict control over
their personal lives and expression, and indoctrinated into the organization’s doctrine
during countless hours of training and education throughout their careers. Therefore,
military behavior cannot be fully explained by a rational decision making process.
In sum, adversarial relationships between state security forces and the popula-
tion develop over decades, not days, and the preexisting relationship between these two
groups should condition each side’s behavior during an uprising. On one side, public
opinion concerning the army’s trustworthiness and complicity in regime abuses influ-
ences whether protesters view the army as an adversary (i.e. defender of the status quo
regime against which they are protesting) or a potential ally in the fight for change. On
the other side, soldiers adhere to previously established tactics and rules of engagement
when confronting a mobilized public. Their decision making and individual behaviors are
guided by the organization’s doctrine, which has developed from the historical military-
society relationship and been shaped by foreign influences as well. The goal of the fol-
lowing chapters is to understand how military doctrine shapes soldiers’ behavior when a
mass uprising threatens to topple an authoritarian leader, leaving the armed forces as the
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regime’s last line of defense.
1.5 Research Design and Case Selection
This dissertation employs a comparative case study methodology designed to trace the
causal processes of popular revolt and military response to develop new theoretical in-
sights into the strategic dynamics of regime overthrow through popular uprising. Middle
Eastern militaries and political regimes have long been studied as a distinct universe of
cases, owing to shared political, linguistic and religious bonds (Hurewitz 1969; Cook 2005).
In particular, the region is notable for its relative absence of democracy, which has been
attributed to the strength, coherence, and effectiveness of Middle Eastern states’ coercive
apparatuses (Bellin 2004). At the same time, coercive apparatuses in the region are notable
for their hybrid nature: police forces are militarized while military forces sometimes
perform internal policing roles (Sayigh 2011). Despite the importance of the military to
Middle Eastern politics, studies of the military in the Arab Spring have been “exercises
in curve-fitting, divining officers’ intentions from their actions” (Brownlee et al. 2014,
38). The varied outcomes of the 2011 uprisings represent a novel opportunity to compare
states with comparable political histories but divergent outcomes. As discussed above in
Section 1.1, the largest uprisings occurred in Tunisia, Egypt, Yemen, Bahrain, Libya, and
Syria. In each case, a popular uprising threatened regime survival, and in most cases the
military responded by defending the regime, leading to either government victory or a
violent escalation into civil war. In three cases (Tunisia, Egypt, and Yemen), the military’s
response led to the replacement of a long-ruling authoritarian president.14 Along with a
diversity of outcomes, the cases also exhibit the variety of causal mechanisms influencing
military decision-making during revolutions.
My selection of a primarily qualitative research design is motivated by two factors.
First, my initial review of the literature in the areas of civil-military relations, coups
14. Ali Abdullah Saleh, who had served as president (first of North Yemen, then of unified Yemen) since
1978, survived in office for more than a year after protests began.
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d’état, military loyalty and defection, and military responses to revolution uncovered a
serious lack of theoretical innovation. Most studies available were case studies of one
or a few cases of military response, but the theoretical basis for their claims relied on a
small number of sweeping generalizations “discovered” in the 1960s. I noted a troubling
tendency to repeat the same claims of previous studies despite a lack of original evidence,
and to list a kitchen sink of explanatory variables without any means of testing whether
they had any causal effect on the outcome. As a result, I embarked on a single deep-dive,
theory-building case study (Tunisia) rather than surveying multiple cases for high-level
generalizations, as previous scholars had done. Second, I realized that most civil-military
relations studies do not involve any meaningful fieldwork. This is understandable, due to
the extreme difficulty of accessing data sources, interview subjects, and official documents
in heavily securitized authoritarian context. But the upshot is that very few primary
sources ends up providing all of the data for countless secondary studies. The overreliance
on a limited number of sources has also led to basic factual errors: as I began learning
about the Tunisian military’s response to the 14 January Revolution, I noticed major
inconsistencies between the narratives offered in published research, which relied on
Western media sources, and those found in primary documents, original interviews and
the local media. For example, many scholars’ explanations of events depend crucially on
whether Ben Ali ordered the army to shoot protesters or not, but no scholarly consensus
existed on whether the event had ever taken place.15 In fact, it had not! My qualitative
fieldwork provided the opportunity to collect new and better data on the Tunisian armed
forces and the major events of its historical evolution.
This dissertation relies on a case study methodology (Gerring 2004; George and
Bennett 2005; Van Evera 1997; Gerring 2007; Bennett and Elman 2006). My qualitative re-
search design relies on the case of Tunisia, where the Arab Spring’s least violent and most
successful regime transition took place, for inductive theory generation. Tunisia is an
15. See chap. 56, n. 4.
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excellent theory-building case because it witnessed the most successful revolution, with
the lowest level of violence, of any Arab Spring country. Tunisia offers an ideal setting
for process tracing because the independent and dependent variable values are strongly
positive.16 In other words, it is the exemplar of the phenomenon under study and is
therefore the best case in which to identify the causal mechanisms at work (Mahoney and
Goertz 2006). Tunisia also exhibits historical, within-case variation in military responses.
The military used violence against protesters in 1978 and 1984, before shifting its doctrine
away from domestic intervention. A comparison of these incidents provides additional
insight into the causal process. I also employ process tracing within each of the case
studies. The process tracing method identifies the causal chain and mechanisms which
connect explanatory (independent) variables to outcome (dependent) variables (Bennett
and Elman 2006; Beach and Pedersen 2013). Causal inference using this method does not
rely on comparisons across cases, but on identifying the effect of the causal mechanism
within a single case.
Interview research was essential to the main case study because Tunisia’s military
had rarely been studied prior to the Arab Spring, and hardly any information was publicly
available from abroad. During five months of fieldwork based in Tunis, Tunisia, between
2014 and 2017, I conducted dozens of semi-structured interviews with military and polit-
ical elites, as well as collecting primary and secondary documentary evidence to support
my case narratives. Interviews are also an important source of data in politically sensitive
areas, like military intervention in politics, where developing trust with a network of
interview subjects is the best way to gain access to further interviewees (Rathbun 2008;
Mosley 2013).
After developing the theory through the case study of Tunisia, I conduct two
comparative case studies from the region of Egypt and Syria, where similar uprisings led
to different outcomes. The pre-2011 regimes in Tunisia, Egypt, and Syria bore a striking
16. This accords with Van Evera’s (1997) suggestion to “select cases with extreme high or low values on
the [dependent variable] and explore them for phenomena associated with it.”
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resemblance: all three were led by civilian presidents-for-life, with military training, who
centralized decision making, employed their hegemonic ruling parties to distribute priv-
ileges rather than generate policy, held power through pervasive police surveillance and
repression of dissent. Moreover, political scientists usually classified the three countries
in the same regime type category, whether “sultanistic” (Chehabi and Linz 1998; Barany
2011), “neopatrimonial” (Brownlee 2002), or “mukhabarat” regimes (Kamrava 2000).17 Al-
though the short-term outcomes of the Tunisian and Egyptian uprisings were superficially
the same (i.e. the fall of the regime), a closer look reveals significant differences in the
role played by the two armies. (These differences, in turn, help explain why Tunisia’s
transition stayed on track while Egypt reverted to military rule.) As in Tunisia, I first
trace the development of relevant military doctrine prior to 2011, then assess the effect
of this doctrine on the military response in each case. Compared with Tunisia, there is
a wealth of secondary materials available on the armed forces of Egypt and Syria, where
the military has played a far more prominent role in politics in the post-colonial era. One
goal of the study is to address the conceptual slippage endemic in studies of civil-military
relations and military professionalism (Collier and Mahon 1993). By studying two cases
with similar values of the dependent variable (military response), I am able to identify the
variation that does exist between these cases in order to refine the variable itself (Mill’s
[1843] method of agreement). I next include the dissimilar case of Syria to avoid the
pitfall of “selecting on the dependent variable” (Geddes 1990). As with the Tunisia case,
I also take advantage of within-case variation in military responses to further test my
hypotheses. The Egypt and Syria cases are also particularly informative because they
are prominent examples of the use of patronage and ethnicity, respectively, to establish
17. Geddes et al. (2014b) code Tunisia as a “party-based” regime, but Egypt and Syria as “party–personal–
military” (see Table 1.1). Whether the personalism of Ben Ali matched the level of Mubarak or al-Asad
may be debated, but all three regimes were deeply associated with the individual president-for-life. For
example, protesters called for Mubarak’s ouster, not the abolition of the RCD (although both resulted from
the revolution). In any case, strongman leaders and hegemonic parties featured in the ruling strategies of
all three regimes. The Geddes et al. typology does not address the role of intelligence and police forces in
regime maintenance.
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control of the military. In both cases, the conventional wisdom proves inadequate to
explain the military response to the Arab Spring.
Finally, I also conduct quantitative data analysis to assess the generalizability of the
theory beyond the Arab Spring. The dissertation’s theory of military responses to popular
uprisings is not in any way specific to the Middle East context, but is instead a general
theory of military behavior. To expand the theory beyond the Middle East, I created a
new data set of military repression during popular uprisings. My data measure the use of
violence by the armed forces against civilian protesters during large, anti-regime protests
worldwide from 1950 to 2013. The new data are fully compatible with the NAVCO data
set on nonviolent campaigns, a large project offering numerous variables on mass mobi-
lization (Chenoweth and Lewis 2013). My cross-national statistical analyses, presented in
chapter 6, provide preliminary evidence that both colonial legacies and foreign military
relationships condition military responses to mass protests globally. I also incorporate
available data to empirically test the three major alternative arguments – capacity, pa-
tronage, and ethnicity – and find no evidence of an effect on military responses.
1.6 Plan of the Dissertation
In the following chapters, I will argue that none of these factors adequately explain the
variation observed in the Arab Spring. Instead, military doctrine established prior to the
Arab Spring had a powerful influence over military responses to the uprisings. Chapter 2
outlines a theory of organizational culture. The main argument is that military responses
to uprisings are best understood through the lens of doctrine, a largely overlooked aspect
of military organizational culture. I describe two causal mechanisms through which doc-
trinal change (i.e.military innovation) occurs: an army’s interactions with the population
and foreign military training and education generate binding organizational culture and
practices vis-à-vis the population. This doctrine in turn influences the military’s response
to popular uprisings in moments of domestic political crisis. In the following chapters, I
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employ qualitative process-tracing and a cross-national quantitative test to demonstrate
that doctrine explains military responses to revolution better than competing theories
rooted in capacity, professionalism, patronage, and ethnicity.
Chapter 3 develops the theory with evidence from Tunisia, where I find that the
historical development of a non-interventionist doctrine was critical in making possible
the “revolution of dignity” of 14 January 2011. Since independence in 1956, the Tunisian
military cultivated a doctrine of restraint, which enabled protesters to make common
cause with the military during the Arab Spring. When soldiers deployed to protect public
buildings during the revolution, they did so with restraint and without violence, opening
a pathway for citizens to topple the Ben Ali regime through nonviolent protest. Draw-
ing on dozens of interviews with senior military officers and political leaders, as well
as other documentary evidence, I document how the Tunisian army’s past experiences
with domestic intervention and foreign military education influenced its response to the
revolution.Following a series of high-profile incidents in the 1970s and 1980s, the army
valorized its relationship with Tunisian society and developed specialized doctrine and
policy for dealing with the public to protect its republican image. The army’s proactive
commitment to serving as a positive force in society were instrumental to its role in the
2011 revolution.
My assessment challenges the view that the peaceful outcome in Tunisia resulted
from the professionalism and small size of its military. Counter to the conventional
wisdom, I find that the small Tunisian armywas still capable of suppressing the revolution
with force had it chosen to do so. Moreover, the professional officer corps had used
violence to suppress past uprisings, and it did not proclaim its support for the goals
of the revolution until aer Ben Ali had fled the country. Tunisia’s democratic transi-
tion resulted not from the democratic bona fides of the nation’s military commanders,
but from their commitment to restraint and nonviolence. This commitment held even
when protesters mobilized in great numbers to call for revolutionary change, allowing
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the political contest between the government and the people to play out without military
interference.
Next, chapters 4 and 5 test the theory through case studies of the 2011 uprisings in
Egypt and Syria. In each case, the military played a markedly different role in responding
to the popular protests of the Arab Spring. The Egyptian military’s doctrine of control
led the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces (SCAF) to precipitate Mubarak’s departure
from office and seize power directly. By contrast, the Syrian army’s doctrine of combat
resulted in the use of methods of warfare against the civilian population, giving rise to a
devastating civil war. Through these cases, I assess two popular alternative explanations
for military response: patronage and ethnicity. These arguments hold that where material
or identity ties bind the military to the political regime, it is virtually guaranteed that
soldiers will repress any anti-regime challenge. Patronage and ethnicity represent the
conventional wisdom on Egyptian and Syrian civil-military relations, respectively, but
both arguments fall short of explaining the outcomes of the Arab Spring uprisings in
those countries.
Chapter 6 explores generalizability of the argument beyond the Middle East. To
test the argument globally, I collected original data on military responses to uprisings
worldwide from 1950 to 2013. I find that the historical sources of military doctrine (e.g.
role in the independence movement, relationship to the ruling party, and receipt of Amer-
ican foreign military education) predict the use of violence against protesters. Chapter 7
completesmy discussion of the Arab Spring. I apply the theory to the uprisings in Bahrain,
Libya, and Yemen and discuss the diverse political outcomes witnessed across the region.
The chapter concludes with implications of the theory for the study of military behavior
and directions for future research on military intervention in politics.
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Chapter 2
Military Doctrine in Popular Uprisings
In light of the critical role of themilitary in shaping the outcomes of attempted revolutions,
this dissertation offers a novel explanation for the surprising and diverse forms of military
responses to popular uprisings. To understand soldiers’ behavior in these moments of
political crisis, many scholars rely on rational choice or strategic explanations. Instead, I
take a new approach to explaining military responses to uprisings which focuses on the
military’s behavior as a complex organization. Beginning with theories of organizational
behavior, I ask: how do militaries make decisions? Like any organization, armies respond
to events based on their existing practices and knowledge. In military organizations,
doctrine plays a central role in determining behavior, whether in fighting wars against
other states or nonstate actors or in responding to domestic crises. I hypothesize that
during a popular uprising, when the potential collapse of the political regime thrusts
soldiers into a central decision making role, the military’s response is guided by doctrine,
not material or political interests. To the contrary, military behavior is constrained by
organizational factors which limit, determine, and shape the rational and strategic pursuit
of military interests. In particular, I explore how processes of organizational learning,
both from historical experience and foreign influences, prepare the ground for future
decisions (see figure 2.1).
The chapter proceeds as follows. First, I explain how military doctrine guides mil-
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Figure 2.1: Diagram of Causal Process
Formation Innovation Adoption Behavioral 
Response
itary responses to popular uprisings. Rather than rational choice or strategic bargaining,
the theory takes an organizational view of behavior (Levitt and March 1988). Second,
I explore how military organizations learn from experience and innovate through the
diffusion of ideas, adapting and modifying their routines, standard operating procedures,
and orientations towards specific targets or goals. I investigate two principal sources
of military learning and innovation that are particularly important for domestic crisis
response: direct interactions with society and foreign military training. Both of these
influences have the potential to spur innovation in military doctrine. Third, I discuss the
processes by which a military adopts the particular values, routines, and formal rules that
institutionalize a given doctrine prior to a crisis. Finally, I characterize three ideal-type
military doctrines, each with different effects on military responses to popular uprisings.
2.1 Explaining Military Behavior
To explain state responses to popular uprisings, it is first necessary to identify the identity
and interests of the relevant actors. Bendor and Hammond (1992) provide three criteria
for classifying theoretical models of organizational behavior: (1) is the state a unitary
actor or better understood as a collection of independent actors, and do those actors have
the same or conflicting goals? (2) are actors perfectly or imperfectly rational? and (3) do
the actors have full or partial information? A revolutionary scenario involves countless
political actors with divergent interests. Because of the military’s role as the gatekeeper of
revolution (see section 1.2), the regime and the military are the two principal actors on the
government side. From an analytical perspective, the police and other internal security
forces can be treated as an extension of the regime, because their interests and political
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fates are closely linked. The armed forces, by contrast, are not an integral part of the
political regime in most authoritarian systems.1 In some cases, the military is much less
tied to the regime than are the police, who engage in the routine practice of authoritarian
repression. Unlike the police, military officers may not have an existential stake in the
status quo;2 therefore, the relationship between military and regime interests should be
treated as variable.
The potential for the military to act independently of the regime is evident in
the classical view of military intervention in politics. This view – expressed in the oft-
cited phrase, quis custodiet ipsos custodes3 – implies that the military, once empowered
as guardian of the nation, may shirk from this mission in pursuit of its own goals. In
comparative politics, the dominant political economy approach mirrors this view: the
military is an independent and unitary political actor, acting as an agent of the regime,
which must constantly fear being overthrown by a military putsch. The long history of
independent political action by the armed forces worldwide, whether by coup d’état or
less direct forms of influence, strongly supports a dual-actor model (Svolik 2013). The next
question, then, is whether the military’s interests are divergent from or consistent with
those of the regime.
If the military often acts independently from other elements of the state, what are
its motivations as a collective actor? In particular, how do military interests differ from
regime interests, and to what extent do these institutions have conflicting goals? Political
economy models of civil-military relations generally assume divergent interests, and the
strategic dynamic between regime and military takes the form of a principal-agent or
1. The exception is military regimes, in which a group of high-ranking officers exercises direct control
over the dictator’s decision making (see Geddes et al. 2014a).
2. The wealth of research on how to democratize civil-military relations in post-authoritarian states
demonstrates that, in reality, military reform is usually quite limited after regime change (Diamond and
Plattner 1996; Trinkunas 2006; Bruneau and Trinkunas 2008; Serra 2010; Barany 2012). In addition, public
opinion research demonstrates that the armed forces in the authoritarian states of the Middle East are
significantly more trusted and respected than other government institutions (Lotito and Miles 2018).
3. Who will guard the guardians themselves? (Juvenal, Satire VI, lines 347–8). For a broad discussion of
the problem, see Leonid Hurwicz’s (2008) Nobel Prize acceptance speech.
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moral hazard problem. Because the military has no intrinsic motivation to defend the
regime, civilians must effectively purchase the loyalty of officers to stave off rebellion
(Besley and Robinson 2010; McMahon and Slantchev 2015; Svolik 2013; Amegashie 2015).
Another patronage argument holds that the military pursues its corporate, or collective,
material interests, which range from salaries and equipment from the national budget to
profit-sharing through corrupt business dealings (Thompson 1973; Pion-Berlin 1992).4
Conversely, I argue that military behavior is drivenmore by soldiers’ identities and
cultural values than by material interests. This alternative explanation for military inter-
vention in politics is based on organizational culture rather than strategic motivations.
In this view, soldiers’ behavior is driven by their professional identity and values, which
we observe as military doctrine. Identity-based theories of civil-military relations date
back at least to Plato, who recognized the risk of soldiers’ using their physical strength
to overthrow the political order. To avoid this, Plato suggests indoctrinating the army
with a “noble lie,” that soldiers are born to protect and not to profit, and denying them all
personal property to eliminate incentives for material accumulation (e Republic, Book
III [2013]). By virtue of the values instilled in each soldier, he argues, they will serve their
mission without any external check on their power. Modern theorists have interpreted
Plato’s noble lie as a call for military professionalism: in a highly professionalized army,
they argue, soldiers will uphold military values, including apoliticism, even at the expense
of their personal political or material ambitions (Huntington 1957).
In my view, the political values often associated with professionalism are better
understood as a multidimensional component of military doctrine. Values can exert a
powerful influence onmilitary behavior, but the effect is not constant or easily predictable.
As described in the previous chapter, professional military values cannot be universally
defined or agreed upon. Still, these values are the aspect of military culture most closely
associated with the military’s political behavior. Apoliticism, or a commitment to dif-
4. See also Lee (2008) for a critical review of this literature.
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ferentiating the political from the military sphere, and to non-intervention in politics,
has been described as a cornerstone of professional military values (Huntington 1957).
In practical terms, apoliticism amounts to an assertion of civilian supremacy, which is
considered a sine qua non of democratic civil-military relations. However, the concept
of apoliticism is problematic in authoritarian regimes, where regime challengers may
have a greater claim to democratic representation than the existing civilian authorities,
presenting a direct contradiction. If professionalization does in fact encourage military
officers in authoritarian regimes to support democracy, rather than civilian supremacy,
we should not expect authoritarian leaders to encourage or authorize such indoctrination
of their officers (Miles 2018).
Organization theory recognizes the influence of institutional process on the de-
cisions and actions of organizations, especially during crises. Graham Allison’s founda-
tional text, Essence of Decision (1999), infused the study of foreign policy with a concern
for the role of bureaucratic decisionmaking in producing outcomes. This focus on bureau-
cratic or organizational decisionmaking has helped scholars understand actions that seem
to defy rational choice theory, and largely improved the explanation of discrete events
such as crisis outcomes. Further research has demonstrated the influence of military
culture on decision making curing crises (Snyder 1984).
Although these literatures demonstrate the influence of organizational memory
and organizational culture in other contexts, discussions of revolution have overlooked
the role of organizational factors in military behavior. Previous work has emphasized
the strategic interests of military leaders in explaining military responses (e.g. Lee 2009;
Pion-Berlin et al. 2014; Bou Nassif 2015a). But research on organizational decision making
may be more useful in explaining the response of the whole military organization to
a revolution or other political crisis. Crises such as popular uprisings also differ from
other decision making scenarios in terms of the constraints placed on decision makers.
Research on naturalistic decision making has explored how real world conditions affect
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decision making. When military officers make decisions under crisis conditions, high
pressure, time sensitivity, and limited information environments reduce their ability to
make fully rational strategic calculations. The theory emphasizes the role of situation
assessment in decision making, arguing that most decisions are not deliberated over at all,
but instead are the natural response to a given situation (Zsambok and Klein 1997).5 The
main contribution of this research is to highlight the extent to which an initial assessment
and classification of the situation determines the overall decision (Lipshitz et al. 2001). In
revolutions, soldiers’ first step in responding is to decide which class of situation they find
themselves in, whether a harmless demonstration, a riot, or a revolution.
Military doctrine provides soldiers with a repertoire of action for crisis scenarios
(Swidler 1986). Organizational learning influences which courses of action are perceived
by soldiers as possible. This approach recognizes the role of factors like culture and
routine in shaping behavior, rather than assuming a fully rational, strategic decision
making process. In his seminal work, Bureaucracy, JamesWilson (1989) highlights the role
of bottom-up processes in determining the success of various organizational behaviors.
Similarly, during a popular uprising, the military bureaucracy’s lowest rungs, the soldiers
on the ground, create organization-level outcomes. In this case, the military’s repertoire
of action comes into confrontation with protesters’ repertoire of contention in streets and
public squares across the country (Tilly 1978, chap. 5; 2006, chap. 3). The interaction
between the dynamic processes of contestation on both sides can generate outcomes far
outside the control of military planners in the Ministry of Defense or presidential palace.
Existing scholarship recognizes the importance of military doctrine in shaping
organizational behavior. The organizational cultures of armed forces are widely acknowl-
edged to influence both combat performance (Posen 1984; Snyder 1984; Zisk 1993; Kier
1997; Long 2016) and political intervention (Huntington 1957; Finer 1962; Janowitz 1964;
5. Naturalistic decision making theory was originally developed for the explicit purpose of enhancing
military effectiveness. The United States Army was the first major backer of this research, which began in
the mid-1980s (Klein 2008).
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Stepan 1971; Barany 2012). In the literature on combat performance in war, doctrine is a
crucial explanatory variable (Pollack 2002; Talmadge 2013). Doctrine, however, has not
been proposed as an explanatory variable for political intervention or crisis response, and
the role of doctrine in determining military responses to domestic political crises remains
unexamined. I contend that organization theory explains the crisis behavior of military
organizations better than the strategic, rational actor models prevalent in the literature. In
my view, military behavior during uprisings is not primarily strategic and interest-based,
but rather a routine-based organizational response, similar to all other tasks the military
performs.
In the heat of a crisis, military behavior will be highly dependent on organizational
beliefs and routines established prior to the crisis. Officers’ initial course of action in
a crisis draws on the military’s doctrine for domestic intervention. Doctrine provides
an understanding of their mission (as it relates to internal security) and guidelines for
carrying out that mission vis-à-vis the population. Although senior military officers
also consider the political consequences of their actions as a crisis unfolds, much of the
military’s actual response hinges on how the military conceives of its role in the crisis,
how officers view the restive population, and how regular soldiers interact with protesters.
When commanders are sent into the streets to defend public institutions, for example, they
must rely on the training they have received and the culture of the military organization
to guide their decisions.
2.2 The Origins of Doctrine
As defined previously, doctrine is the set of rules and understandings through which mil-
itary planners conceptualize and prepare for future engagements. Doctrine includes the
army’s understanding of its roles and missions, the professional values soldiers embrace,
and the operating procedures and routines they establish to pursue their organizational
mission. To explainmilitary responses to popular uprisings, I focus onwhat I call domestic
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security doctrine, the subset of military doctrine which relates to internal or domestic
security. Domestic security doctrine guides military behavior in areas such as protest
response, public order maintenance, and political repression. I argue that doctrine deter-
mines which forms of political activity the military engages in, what level of commitment
officers have to values like civilian supremacy and democracy, and which routines and
standard operating procedures they rely on when intervening domestically. If the military
doctrine favors political intervention, commanders will be likely to use violence against
protesters. If, on the other hand, the military has established a doctrine of restraint, the
standard procedures for handling an emergency will favor nonviolence and restraint.
In my reading, doctrinal development in Arab militaries has followed a consis-
tent temporal pattern consisting of four phases: formation, innovation, adoption, and
response. First, each military formed an initial doctrine during the colonial and early
independence eras, from the late nineteenth to mid-twentieth century. Early doctrine
was influenced by the design of colonial institutions, as well as the army’s relationship
to the national independence movement and ruling political party. Second, these doc-
trines evolved through a process of innovation, as officers gained experience in military
interventions and received foreign military training. By the late 1970s and 1980s, as post-
colonial regimes stabilized across the region, the military became institutionalized within
this political order. Consequently, the region’s militaries completed the adoption of their
unique doctrines, through processes of internalization, routinization, and formalization.
Occasionally, mass protests put these initial doctrines to the test, and soldiers used their
experiences to develop new ways of responding to uprisings, riots, and other crises of
public order. Finally, when popular challenges to the post-colonial, authoritarian order
erupted across the region during the Arab Spring, armies responded to the popular upris-
ings on the basis of their established doctrines.
The initial origins of a particular military doctrine coincide with the foundation of
the military institution in that country. The formative period of military development in
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the Middle East extends from the colonial era through the first decades of independence.
The first source of doctrine is the military institution’s colonial origins. When an army
is established, often at the moment of national independence, a foundational doctrine is
established which draws heavily from the unique circumstances and historical precursors
of its founding. As the European colonies of theMiddle East and North Africa gained their
independence, they established national armies which drew heavily from their colonial
precursors. The new armies inherited much of their doctrine, and often their officers,
from the colonial-era military, and followed many of the same patterns of behavior after
independence (Nugent 2017, chap. 3).
The second major source of doctrine is the armed forces’ relationship to the na-
tional independence movement. The role that the army played in fighting for national
liberation strongly shapes its understanding of its role and purpose. For example, Alge-
ria’s People’s National Army is a direct descendant of the National Liberation Armywhich
fought the war of independence. As a result, the army’s doctrine draws heavily on its im-
age as guardian of the nation. Moreover, the modern states of Algeria, Egypt, and Turkey
were each founded by military officers: Houari Boumédiène, the Free Officers (including
both Gamal Abdel Nasser and Anwar Sadat), and Mustafa Kemal Atatürk, respectively.
This military-led national liberation established the guardianship of the military over the
nation from the first days of independence, creating a powerful nationalist narrative to
support this unique military role (Cook 2007, 28-31). To the contrary, Tunisia’s indepen-
dence was won through diplomacy, not war, so the newly constituted Tunisian National
Army could make no nationalist claims to supragovernmental legitimacy.
Finally, where the military has a close relationship with the ruling party, political
considerations will play a greater role in the military’s approach to domestic security.
Where the military is more autonomous,6 military doctrine is more insulated from politi-
6. Confusingly, Bellin (2004, 2012) uses the terms “institutionalization” and “autonomy” interchangeably,
and contrasts them with patrimonialism. Here, I focus specifically on the military’s independence from the
ruling party (i.e. autonomy).
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cal control. In most Arab countries, the minister of defense is a military officer and there is
little civilian oversight of the defense establishment. Officers possess technical expertise
which civilian commanders do not have, and this informational advantage allows them
greater control over the content of doctrine (Feaver 2005, 69-70).7 Second, doctrine can
be difficult to change because it consists in and of the combined beliefs and practices of
an entire organization. As a result, changing doctrine from the outside is not as simple
as signing an order (Posen 1984). Nevertheless, the regime’s efforts to shape military
doctrine do have a tangible effect, which I trace in my case studies.
2.3 Doctrinal Innovation
A military rarely faces a situation for which it has no prior planning or training what-
soever, and large-scale protests are no exception, particularly when they occur decades
after independence. Interactions between the military and civilians have been previously
overlooked as a source of military innovation, and one that is essential to understanding
military responses to popular uprisings. My argument is built around a theory of military
innovation in response to mass protests and other domestic crises. The theory is grounded
in literatures on organizational learning and military innovation, which indicate the pro-
cesses through which militaries change their doctrinal approaches to various classes of
threats and determine the operational and tactical approaches they use to respond to
future crises. First, I outline the fundamental insights of sociological research on organi-
zational learning. Then I interpret recent findings on military innovation and apply these
insights to the question of military responses to mass protests.
The study of organizational learning has yielded several important insights. My
approach draws from a seminal paper by Levitt and March (1988), who describe orga-
nizational learning as routine-based, history-dependent, and target-oriented. Each of
these elements has implications in the military context. From an organizational perspec-
7. The exception is often the authoritarian leader himself, who usually has a military background.
However, his background does not guarantee the military institution will share all relevant information.
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tive, routines are the cornerstone of behavior. They provide individuals (soldiers) with
a playbook of appropriate actions for a wide range of scenarios. Most often, decision
makers stick to tried-and-true routines that been effective in the past. Organizational
memory is transmitted through routines, which “maintain and accumulate” the lessons of
experience, “despite the turnover of personnel and the passage of time” (327). Routines
are developed and modified through the retrospective evaluation of past successes and
failures, and transmitted to new generations within the organization. History is critical
to future behavior, because “routines are based on interpretations of the past more than
anticipations of the future” (320). In other words, strategic thinking in organizations tends
to be retrospective rather than prospective. When evaluating past experience, “people in
organizations form interpretations of events and come to classify outcomes as good or
bad” (323). This is because organizations draw sharper distinctions “between success and
failure than among gradations of either” (320). In making these judgments, individuals
suffer from common perceptual biases (e.g. availability bias and disregard for sample size),
which lead organizations to learn lessons imperfectly (Tversky and Kahneman 1986).
These insights about organizational learning yield several theoretical propositions.
The historical context of a military’s development is a critical factor in its future actions.
Existing theories based only on the military’s interests at the moment of crisis fail to
account for history-dependent, routine-based behavior. Instead, the military organiza-
tion’s collective interpretations of past interventions generate and update routines to
guide future responses. These routines persist in the doctrine taught to new recruits in
their military education and training. When responding to an uprising, military officers
are more likely to follow these established routines than to spontaneously diverge from
the existing doctrine. When officers evaluate an engagement or intervention, they will
tend to judge the mission sharply as a success or failure. Therefore, the lessons learned
from an intervention depend primarily on whether the overall outcome is judged as good
or bad, not a granular estimation of points of success and failure. In turn, definitions of
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success and failure depend on how themilitary understands its primary roles andmissions
(i.e. the organization’s target). Therefore, a theory of military behavior during uprisings
should account for how the military interprets and learns from past interventions, how
the organization comes to define its primary roles and missions, and how these routines
and objectives are codified and transmitted through military doctrine.
A large and distinct field of research has studied the process of military inno-
vation (Griffin 2016). Although these studies have almost exclusively focused on mil-
itary’s warfighting activities, and these mostly within the United States military, the
insights from how militaries learn to fight their wars are broadly applicable across the
full spectrum of military roles and missions. Traditional theories of military innovation
focus on changes initiated by political and military leaders, rather than the corps as a
whole (Posen 1984; Zisk 1993; Avant 1994; Rosen 1994; Katzenstein 1996; Farrell and
Terriff 2002). However, a seminal article by Adam Grissom (2006) introduced a focus
on bottom-up learning originating in field formations. This observation is germane to the
context of mass protests, where soldiers’ experiences on the ground translate into broader
organizational understandings and routines that shape future interventions.
Traditionally, the study of military innovation has been limited to the domain of
interstate conflict, to the exclusion of the military’s role in domestic crises (Huntington
1957; Avant 1993; Rosen 1988; Horowitz 2010). While a focus on interstate war makes
sense in the West, it is less obvious in developing countries, where military intervention
in domestic politics has been the rule, not the exception. How then do militaries learn
and innovate in their responses to domestic crises and uprisings? Keller (2017) describes
rebel groups’ shift from violent to nonviolent tactics as a form of innovation. Unsur-
prisingly, while militaries have never undergone wholesale nonviolent innovation, as the
use or threat of violence is the inherent purpose of a military organization, they have
nevertheless introduced nonviolent tactics and restraint as doctrinal elements of their
crisis response. Significant shifts to more restrained and less violent modes of action are
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a category of innovation that has been overlooked by scholars of the military.
What are the sources of innovation in military doctrine? Military organizations
are often accused of “fighting the last war,” implying they are stubbornly resistant to
innovation (Sloan 2012, 252). In reality, military history offers examples of both successes
and failures in adapting to the changing security environment.8 Moreover, historical
experience is often the military’s best guide for future planning. As Wilson (1989, 43)
argues, the lessons of the past are critical even in the fast-changing landscape of modern
war:
Generals are often accused of preparing to fight the last war. That is not a
fair criticism. Since no general, at least in modern times, can know with any
certainty what the next war will be like, all he has to draw upon in making
his preparations are experience and conjecture. Since conjecture is, after all,
conjectural, experience inevitably will play a large and proper role in guiding
his plans. Successful generals do not ignore the lessons of the past. No one
knows in advance what the lessons will be, but some people guess better than
others.
Scholars of military innovation have identified three major sources: defeat in war, civilian
intervention, and internal innovation, i.e. conscious efforts by senior military leaders.
Generally, past successes and failures shape officers’ beliefs about future conflicts (Khong
1992). Historical experience at the organizational level in turn drives the process of self-
evaluation and organizational learning that generates change in military culture and doc-
trine over time. However, Rosen (1988, 136) finds that neither military defeat nor civilian
intervention are necessary causes of innovation, and that internal innovation depends
mainly on the committed support of senior military leaders. Innovation, in this view, is
not an automatic response to the failure of past doctrine, but rather the intended outcome
of a purposeful struggle for change within the armed forces. Historical experience is the
grist of innovation, but not its direct cause. For doctrine to change, the senior leadership
8. For example, Germany’s stubbornly offensive doctrine helped to cause the strategic disaster of World
War I (Snyder 1984). During the war, however, Germany was more adaptive than the Allied powers in
overcoming the stalemate of trench warfare by developing the “modern system” of force employment
(Biddle 2004).
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must endorse and carry out the course correction (Avant 1994).
Past Interventions
A branch of research known as image theory describes how values, goals, and plans influ-
ence personal and organizational decisions . Researchers find that self-image is a salient
factor guiding organizational behavior during crises (Zsambok and Klein 1997, chap. 7).
Therefore, the military’s concern for its image should directly influence its response to an
uprising. Expressions of the military self-image can be found in official military histories,
which offer collective interpretations of past events, and the procedures. The armed forces
rely on strong internal and external identities (e.g. infantryman, soldier, or warrior), as
well as cultural indoctrination, more than civilian organizations (Franke 1999; Woodward
and Neil Jenkings 2011; Caforio 2018). When it comes to doctrine for domestic security,
the military’s most important historical experience comes from past interventions, in
which soldiers interacted with the population. In the aftermath of domestic interventions,
soldiers are aware of the public condemnation or praise that results from their actions, and
sensitive to perceptions of glory or shame.
The academic field of civil-military relations offers an interdisciplinary framework
emphasizing the deep linkages between the military and broader society. When political
scientists draw from this literature, we tend to focus on formal institutions at the ex-
pense of sociological factors (e.g. Huntington 1957; Bland 1999; Belkin and Schofer 2005;
Hurwicz 2008). Similarly, formal theories of civil-military relations often simplify the
problem down to a bilateral relationship between the military and a civilian government
(Besley and Robinson 2010; Svolik 2012; McMahon and Slantchev 2015). On the other
hand, a sociological approach considers the trilateral relationship between military, state,
and society (Schiff 1995; Feaver 1999; Cottey et al. 2002). This literature does not limit
its definition of “civilian” to the state or political regime, as political science work often
does, but emphasizes the military’s place in society and the social identity of soldiers and
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officers. One of the few studies of the military’s public relations comes from the United
States, where major historical shifts have occurred in public perceptions of the military
leadership, even in the absence of domesticmilitary intervention (Kemble 2007). Although
it is beyond the scope of this dissertation to study public attitudes toward the military in
depth, they may be an important but overlooked factor shaping civil-military relations
(Lotito and Miles 2018).
I view military-society relations as a fundamental pillar of broader civil-military
relations. Diffuse interactions between soldiers and citizens shape the military ethos
within the armed forces towards civilians. The military’s orientation towards the popu-
lation, codified in military doctrine, and popular attitudes toward the military, determine
the course of these groups’ interactions during a political crisis. When intervening during
moments of severe political crisis, the military must confront a mobilized public in order
to restore order. A critical question in this moment is whether the military and the public
see each other as fellow citizens or as adversaries. If protesters mount a direct challenge
to the army’s political status, a nonviolent protest movement will likely develop into
a violent one. On the other hand, if protesters and the army do not view each other
as adversaries, a peaceful pathway remains open wherein both soldiers and protesters
eschew violence, enabling a nonviolent change of power. In this scenario, the ultimate
outcome is nonviolent revolution.
Foreign Influence
Thefield of military innovation research also recognizes the role of international diffusion.
In the case of mass uprisings, learning occurs through two main channels. First, profes-
sional military education has become deeply internationalized, with soldiers from around
the world receiving training in foreign military academies and especially concentrating
their learningwithin a fewWesternmilitary establishments, especially those of the United
States and France. Education and socialization in these systems generates a diffusion
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of ideas regarding responses to political crises, including mass protests. Second, more
immediate learning occurs when political crises in neighboring countries require military
responses. Reinforced by the strong identification among soldiers in different armies, the
diffusion of ideas can occur rapidly when soldiers confront a crisis and the outcomes of
their interventions are known to soldiers in neighboring countries. Therefore, the lessons
learned from successful or failed responses to mass protests in one country diffuse rapidly,
especially within the geographic region, where context is considered relevant. I argue that
foreign powers can exert a significant influence over military doctrine through a diffusion
mechanism.
Previous studies on the role of foreign actors in popular uprisings focus on coercive
pressure by a strong outside power (Yeo 2006; McKoy and Miller 2012). For example, Lee
(2009) argues that disgruntled senior officers may defect if they receive direct foreign sup-
port, and Nepstad (2013) argues that a loss of foreign support may encourage defections
among junior officers. Counter to these arguments, I maintain that foreign powers influ-
ence crisis responses primarily through historical relationships, not direct threats. Over
time, foreign sponsors shape the organizational cultures of developing militaries through
doctrinal diffusion, which conditions their responses to future uprisings. This argument
draws on a tradition of theory in international relations linking system-level variables
to domestic political outcomes (Gourevitch 1978; Putnam 1988). Except in rare cases,
where foreign powers are willing to undertake direct military intervention themselves,
the course of revolutions is determined by domestic actors, not foreign governments.
In contrast, I argue that motivated great powers can influence military organiza-
tional culture ex ante, potentially affecting unforeseen revolutions when they eventually
arise. Although direct intervention by foreign powers can be decisive, it is more often the
domestic military’s response which determines revolutionary outcomes. When protest
movements reach a critical mass, attracting international media attention, major powers
often issue statements on the events and may even propose or threaten intervention.
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Regime change threatens a state’s existing alliances, so foreign powers are often con-
cerned to maintain the status quo. In most cases, such statements are ignored as cheap
talk because the foreign power is unwilling to intervene directly. There are important
cases, however, when a foreign patron’s interest is strong enough tomake coercive threats
credible. For example, Yeo (2006) argues that popular uprisings in South Korea and Poland
were made possible by policy changes by their superpower patrons, the United States and
Soviet Union. In these cases, the foreign sponsor has effective veto power over regime
concessions (McKoy and Miller 2012). Foreign support for the opposition can also push
dissenters within themilitary to openly break from the regime (Lee 2009), while the loss of
foreign sponsorship may signal impending regime collapse, thereby hastening defections
and bolstering resistance (Nepstad 2013). However, despite the power of coercion to shape
military responses to uprisings, it is rarely a significant factor because foreign powers are
usually unwilling to intervene directly in the conflict. Instead, I consider the long-term
diffusion of military values and practices, especially through foreign military training, to
be the most important form of foreign influence on military responses.
Diffusion differs from coercion because it is based on long-term, repeat interac-
tions. The primary pathway of diffusion from one military to another is through interna-
tional military education and training programs, a form of vertical diffusion from trainer
to trainee. Run by Western powers and formerly the Soviet Union since decolonization,
these programs have helped educate the officer corps of virtually every developing coun-
try. Military diplomacy and military-to-military relations are an influential, yet often
overlooked, form of international engagement (Blair 2013). In the long term, foreign
military training (FMT) may facilitate the transfer of norms, for example against using
military force to suppress protests. A number of studies have investigated the effects of
foreign training on military behavior. Some have searched for unreasonably large direct
effects (for example, American training causing democratization) and predictably found
no consistent effect (Taylor 2014, ch. 8). But other recent studies have pushed the theory
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beyond an implied contact theory (i.e. “Westernizing” foreign officers’ behavior by putting
them in a Western classroom for a while) to specify causal pathways connecting FMT to
military behavior. Savage and Caverley (2017) study the effect of FMT on coup propensity
and find that FMT actually increases coup risk by strengthening the military relative to
the regime. Soeters and Van Ouytsel (2014) argue that FMT can lead to significant change
in the organizational culture of the target military, but only when intergenerational shifts
occur. Both of these studies greatly advance the literature on this question by defining the
causal process connecting FMT to changes in military behavior. In the following chapters,
case studies of the armies involved in the Arab Spring trace the process of persuasion
qualitatively, seeking to determine the conditions under which doctrine is transferred
between trainers and trainees. I find that relatively short training experiences of 1–2 years
in France or the United States can instill an understanding and appreciation of Western
military doctrine and civil-military relations. In military organizations where a majority
of ranking officers share a common background of substantial Western training, notions
of civilian control and concern for human rights reach a critical mass and begin to change
the organizational culture, as reflected in doctrine.
A second form of influence, what might be called horizontal diffusion, occurs when
officers observe events in foreign countries and update their own doctrine to incorporate
lessons from the experience of other militaries. Organizations everywhere learn by ob-
serving the experience of others, and this particular pattern of diffusion has been shown to
influence military innovation in warfighting (Horowitz 2010). Similar to the way officers
learn from their own past interventions, uprisings abroad can trigger a process of analogy
formation, wherein decision makers select which foreign regimes and uprisings serve
as useful examples for their own situation and adapt their own beliefs and behaviors
(i.e. doctrine) accordingly (Khong 1992; Reiter 1996). Horizontal diffusion provides an
additional source of organizational learning beyond the more limited national experience
of revolution. When considering the subject of revolution, military officers are no less
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likely than civilians everywhere to consider major historical examples like the Tiananmen
Square protests or the fall of Ceaușescu. At the same time, organization theory suggests
that the military’s own historical experience will be the most influential source of inno-
vation.
2.4 Adoption of Doctrine
The adoption of doctrine is a process of internalization, routinization, and formalization.
Military organizations establish a particular doctrine through their values, routines, and
formal rules. I describe this I then elaborate a typology of domestic security doctrines.
The first aspect of doctrine is the military’s internalization of its central missions
and roles. According to Huntington (1957, 11), military roles are universal and inher-
ent, derived from the “vocation” of officership. He cites Weber’s concept of vocation to
describe military officership:9
The vocation of officership meets the principal criteria of professionalism. In
practice, no vocation, not even medicine or law, has all the characteristics
of the ideal professional type. Officership probably falls somewhat further
short of the ideal than either of these. Yet its fundamental character as a pro-
fession is undeniable. In practice, officership is strongest and most effective
when it most closely approaches the professional ideal; it is weakest and most
defective when it falls short of that ideal.
In Huntington’s view, the primary military roles are guaranteeing the national defense
and protecting the national interest. The latter mission may motivate intervention to
suppress protests, riots, or other disturbances to the peace, creating an alignment in
regime andmilitary interests, but such an alignment cannot be assumed in all cases. Many
scholars assume that victory inwar is the principal and universalmilitary interest, because
defeat in war is so catastrophic, risking soldiers’ lives and honor. The primary interests
of the military do not necessarily include regime maintenance or political repression. On
paper, the missions and roles of armies worldwide are remarkably similar: national de-
9. See Weber (1994), “The Profession and Vocation of Politics,” 309–69.
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fense, internal stability, disaster response, and occasionally other humanitarian functions
such as peacekeeping. In practice, however, there is considerable cross-national variation
in how the armed forces define these missions.
The organization must embrace a given mission in order to perform it effectively.
Themilitary’s role can be defined as its “broad and enduring purpose,” and it must be must
be clearly defined in order for the armed forces to operate effectively (Shemella 2006, 122-
23). When soldiers are ordered to perform missions that conflict with established roles
and missions, performance, internal cohesion, and morale fall into steep decline (i.e. role
dissonance). Compared with other professions, military officership critically relies on
professional socialization, so the selection of officer trainees (cadets) is designed to iden-
tify individuals who are well-suited to this socialization (Caforio 2018, 274). An officers’
inclination to embrace military values and attitudes is essential to the cohesion of the
force. Moreover, his or her embrace of professional values is a vital ethical consideration,
because the military is authorized to kill on behalf of the nation (Gal 1990). At the same
time, the social status of military officers varies widely across countries, and for many
middle- and lower-class recruits, the military is a rare opportunity for social mobility.
Thus it is necessary to consider the social background and motivations of the military
officer corps not with a universal, one-size-fits-all model, but on a case-by-case basis
(Moskos 1976).
The second aspect of doctrinal adoption is routinization. Wilson (1989, 25) argues
that an organization’s behavior is driven by its “critical task.” Many public bureaucracies,
including the military, do not have clear and specific goals. Even a seemingly unambigu-
ous objective, such as national defense, might be interpreted and pursued in countless
ways. Because an organization is unable to precisely define its ultimate goal, it instead
identifies the critical task it must accomplish to solve the problem it faces. For an army
at war, that problem is the enemy’s firepower, and the task is to find a way to overcome
it. For an army responding to a domestic uprising, the problem is public disorder, and
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the task is to restore and maintain order. In other words, military officers thrown into a
situation of mass demonstrations respond to those circumstances, which dictate the task
of order maintenance. In this way, the circumstances that soldiers face on the ground –
whether an enemy battalion, a natural disaster, or a rioting crowd – determine which
task the organization pursues. Once defined, the central task – whether overcoming
an enemy’s firepower or restoring order – might be pursued in several different ways.
Each military interprets its role within a given context to create routines and standard
operating procedures. Given the impossibility of perfectly centralized decision making,
officers from platoon leaders to brigade commanders rely on established routines to guide
their individual decisions.
The final aspect of doctrinal adoption is formalization. In addition to values and
routines, soldiers rely on formal rules and guidelines, which constitute a third component
of military doctrine. Military operations require some level of delegation, wherein junior
officers must interpret specific orders from their superiors according to changing condi-
tions on the ground, while complying with broader rules of engagement, general orders,
and military procedures. As a result, military organizations can be highly legalistic, ex-
hibiting an increased reliance on formal, standardized rules and procedures. According to
the sociologists Sitkin and Bies (1993, 346), a “legalistic organization” adopts the trappings
of the legal process in its internal processes because “legalistic characteristics confer an
institutional legitimacy on otherwise ambiguous acts to preserve access to critical organi-
zational resources.” Legalism, they note, “is a cornerstone of Weber’s legal-rational form
of authority, [but] it can be dysfunctional to the organization, as Weber himself noted”
(347). Militaries in authoritarian states are especially prone to legalism because it provides
external and internal legitimacy (i.e. bureaucratic cover) for officers’ individual decisions.
Bellin (2004, 145) notes that the level of institutionalization of the armed forces is variable.
In her definition, “An institutionalized coercive apparatus is one that is rule-governed,
predictable, and meritocratic.” Where institutionalization is less developed, patrimonial
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modes of organization predominate.
In addition to internal rules, the armed forces operate within an external legal
framework at the national level. Constitutional or statutory law often codifies military
roles and missions, and may also authorize or proscribe specific military actions. In
any given state, no higher power exists to force the military to comply with a formal
legal framework. Moreover, authoritarian regimes are characterized by poor rule of law,
meaning that violations of written law are less likely to be punished (Weingast 1997). Nev-
ertheless, legal frameworks offer military decision makers a set of boundaries to consider
when responding to exceptional circumstances. For example, if the military is legally
prohibited from arresting civilians, a commander must be exceptionally motivated during
a crisis to violate this restriction on his own. Conversely, an officer may employ an
otherwise toothless prohibition as an excuse not to carry out orders he deems personally
or professionally risky. On the other hand, if the legal framework dictates a responsibility
to assure a given mission, commanders must violate the law in order to avoid the mission.
In both cases, the law serves as a framework or plan from which to deviate, not a hard
constraint, but may still condition military behavior.
Unfortunately, military secrecy largely prevents researchers from accessing mil-
itary documents and internal rules from the Middle East. Unlike in the United States,
where Army training manuals and operational plans are often declassified after a few
decades, no declassification procedures exist in the Arab countries studied in this dis-
sertation. Therefore, it is impossible for an outsider to observe the internal rules and
orders written to implement military doctrine. Instead I rely on officers’ firsthand ac-
counts (where available), as well as secondary sources documenting similar firsthand
accounts, and make inferences about unobserved rules from observed behavior. While
not a completely satisfactory substitute, I endeavored in my research to separate post
hoc justification from accurate historical narrative. In each case, my version of events is
corroborated by multiple independent sources.
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Table 2.1: Typology of Domestic Security Doctrines
Doctrine Central Task Response to Uprising Examples
Restraint Defend borders Nonintervention Tunisia
Control Defend nation Order maintenance Egypt, Algeria, Turkey
Combat Defend regime Warfare Syria, Bahrain, Libya
2.5 Typology of Doctrinal Responses
By accounting for the military’s relationship to the population, my theory improves on
existing typologies of civil-military relations, which focus instead on the military’s rela-
tionship to the political regime.10 Kamrava’s (2000, 71) widely-cited typology of Middle
Eastern civil-military relations highlights the limitations of the regime-focused approach:
Syria, Egypt, and Tunisia are all classified in the same, narrow sub-category (“Autocratic
officer-politicians: Mukhaberat states”), yet their militaries had strikingly different re-
sponses to the Arab Spring protests. To address this, I develop a typology based on the
military’s doctrine for domestic intervention, which characterizes the military’s approach
to dealing with the population during moments of unrest. Domestic security doctrine
encompasses themilitary’s understanding of its roles andmissions during domestic crises,
as well as relevant routines and procedures for accomplishing these roles. In my study of
the Arab Spring, I identify three doctrinal ideal-types, which indicate the military’s stance
toward the population: restraint, control, and combat. These ideal-types are exemplified
in the cases of Tunisia, Egypt, and Syria, respectively.
The use of violence against unarmed civilians is the most visible element of the
military’s response. Maximum military repression, pursued by armies with a combat
10. The most widely-cited typologies come from Nordlinger (1977) and Perlmutter (1977). Nordlinger
distinguishes between ruler (military actively dominates state institutions), guardian (military takes control
temporarily when necessary), and moderator regimes (military vetoes government decisions but does not
take power). Perlmutter collapses the latter two categories into “arbitrator” regimes, and uses the umbrella
term “praetorian armies” to describe both types. On classifications of Egypt, see Perlmutter (1974); Harb
(2003, 270n2).
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doctrine, relies on heavy weapons, heavy armor, and combat tactics to kill protesters
and destroy their property. Where a combat doctrine predominates, soldiers interpret
protesters as enemies of the state and respond using the tactics of warfare. At the other
extreme, total nonviolence requires a complete withdrawal of military forces to the bar-
racks, where they play no role in the ongoing crisis. A nonviolent outcome results when
the army follows a doctrine of restraint and refrains from intervention. Mild or moderate
levels of military violence result when soldiers try to assert a minimum level of control
using deterrent force, demonstrations of force, or limited direct violence. Under a doctrine
of control, soldiers respond to uprisings by working to re-establish and maintain order,
but mass mobilization that does not threaten the military’s core interests, including na-
tional security, is allowed to proceed with little military violence. When citizens breach
the limits of military tolerance, however, re-establishing order can escalate to extreme
repressive violence.
At the tactical level, restraint can be difficult to implement, because it depends
on capable junior officers and well-trained soldiers employing both their training and
their good judgment to implement what amounts to a wait-and-see strategy until the
outcome of the political contest between regime and popular demands becomes clear.
Difficult or complex crises raise serious concerns about splits or fractures developing in
the military organization. As mentioned previously, existing scholarship has established
that military officers are particularly concerned with maintaining cohesion within the
ranks. Because unity of action is essential to military action, and because any mutiny
or defection could quickly result in operational failure, organizational collapse, or even
civil war, military leaders may consider a split in the ranks even worse than defeat or
surrender (Stepan 1988; Geddes 1999; Geddes et al. 2014a). Because neutrality requires
restraint and judgment rather than decisive action, it is a riskier strategy for maintaining
military cohesion; therefore, neutrality is both less likely and more puzzling.
An army can establish neutrality over time by defining its doctrine, missions,
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and operating procedures accordingly, and training its officers and soldiers with con-
flict avoidance in mind. Absent advance preparation, neutrality can be difficult—even
impossible—to achieve because confronting crowds of protesters with armed soldiers will
usually result in bloodshed if, for example, even one provocateur riles a scared conscript
into discharging his weapon. The theories of organizational learning described in the
previous section help explain why somemilitaries develop nonviolent, noninterventionist
doctrines, while others do not. Despite downstream risk that the military will join with
protesters in revolution, the political regime will likely encourage these doctrines because
military apoliticism reduces the risk of a coup d’état. It should be noted that some regimes
nevertheless rely on an explicit politicization of the military for their political purposes, in
which case any attempt to develop a neutrality doctrine would be limited to low-profile,
internal military efforts shielded from regime oversight. In some countries and periods,
this will be not be feasible, and the military will remain highly politicized vis-à-vis the
population regardless of military officers’ incentives to the contrary.
The remaining two doctrines, control and combat, assign themilitary amore active
role in domestic security. In a doctrine of control, the military envisions guardianship of
the state as its primary role. During an uprising, the military will use force to maintain
public order and control the population, with the primary goal of assuring national secu-
rity, not the survival of the political regime. This doctrine emerges in military-dominated
political systems in which “The officers seek to rule but not to govern” (Cook 2007, ix).
In these cases, the military adopts a supervisory role that is superior to either political or
popular authority, and accountable to neither. This system has been described as praeto-
rian, because “the military class of a given society exercises independent political power
within it by virtue of an actual or threatened use of military force” (Perlmutter and Bennett
1980, 199). In their defense of the state, praetorian armies arrogate unto themselves the
right to unilaterally interpret the national interest, regardless of the demands of either
the ruler or the ruled. As a result, a doctrine of control compels neither a pro- nor an
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antirevolutionary response to an anti-regime uprising. Military officers might refuse to
defend an unpopular leader facing mass protests, but if they believe the will of the people
is misguided, they will not hesitate to use violence against civilians to restore military
control.
The final doctrine, combat, frames the protesting population as enemies of the
state. Whereas a doctrine of control authorizes the military to act independently of the
political regime, a doctrine of combat requires subservience. In this doctrine, the mil-
itary’s critical task is preserving the existing regime, because the identity of the state,
regime, and military are identical. This is not to say that officers share objective identity
traits with political leaders, but rather that officers internalize a common identity with the
regime, while othering nonconformist segments of society. Procedures in this doctrine
will emphasize deterring mobilization to preserve stability, and will encourage the use of
violence to achieve these ends. A doctrine of combat is likely to emerge where there are
close personal and institutional linkages between the military and the ruling party.
The following chapters test the doctrinal theory of military responses to revolution
against the popular uprisings in Tunisia, Egypt, and Syria in 2011. Protests in these
countries shared many commonalities: demonstrations were initially nonviolent; they
brought together a broad coalition representing political and socio-economic diversity;
and demonstrators made nearly identical demands, often recycling the same slogans, like
the famous “the people wants the fall of the regime” (al-shaʿb yurīd isqāṭ al-niẓām). In each
case, the military’s response to the mobilization was critical to the outcome However, the
outcomes of these revolutionary moments varied widely. the diversity of possible military
responses. Historical narratives of the Tunisian, Egyptian, and Syrian armed forces reveal
major differences in the historical origins of the three armies, their past experiences of
domestic intervention, and the role of foreign sponsors in the education and training of
their officers. Through process-tracing and comparisons among these cases, I find that
these factors (historical origins, past intervention, and foreign influence) caused these
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militaries to develop in opposing directions. As a result, on the eve of the Arab Spring, the
three countries represented exemplars of the three doctrinal types: restraint, control, and
combat. When the moment of decision came in early 2011, these doctrinal orientations
defined both the meaning of a successful intervention, and the means, via violence or
restraint, of achieving that objective.
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Chapter 3
Tunisia: A Doctrine of Restraint
For the 338 killed and 2,174 wounded, their families and friends, and those who stood
beside them terrorized as the police gunned down protesters, Tunisia’s 14 January rev-
olution was not peaceful. Yet on that day, the revolutionaries succeeded in ousting the
country’s autocratic president of twenty-three years without the force of arms. The key
to their success was the restraint of the army, which did not join the police in suppressing
the anti-regime protests that would topple Ben Ali and lead to the country’s first free
and fair elections in history. This military response – unique in the Arab world – defies
simple explanation, yet it played a critical causal role in the success of the revolution.
Tunisia is an ideal case to study the role of the military in non-violent revolution because
it is the only still ongoing democratic transition to result from the wave of popular, pro-
democratic uprisings. The national army’s political neutrality throughout the revolution
and transition has been critical to Tunisia’s democratization. Not only did the army refrain
from intervening to suppress the 14 January revolution, but it also remained unified and
capable enough to restore order in the aftermath of Ben Ali’s fall.
In this chapter, I develop my argument that the Tunisian Army’s doctrine for
domestic crises, which was shaped by both historical experience and foreign military
training, influenced officers’ ultimate decision not to suppress anti-regime protests in
2010–2011. The Tunisian military’s response to the uprising represents not defection
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or incapacity, but an exercise of restraint when faced with anti-regime protests. The
seeds of this neutral orientation were planted during the era of French colonialism and
Tunisia’s first years of independence, nourished by decades of Western military training,
and solidified after fateful interventions in 1978 and 1984. Tunisian officers’ commitment
to restraint was established long before protesters took the streets in December 2010, and
without it, Tunisia’s peaceful “revolution of dignity” would likely have failed.
Since the Arab Spring, scholars have worked to make sense of the Tunisian army’s
surprisingly positive role in the revolution. Most explain the army’s response as a result of
either incapacity or disloyalty, motivated by professionalism (Bellin 2012), organizational
interests (Brooks 2013), or personal grievances against the civilian regime (Bou Nassif
2015b). Upon closer inspection, however, we see that the army was neither disloyal nor
incapacitated, but genuinely neutral. As late as mid-January, the military still had the
strength to crush the revolution by force, had it chosen to defend Ben Ali at all costs.1
Instead, soldiers stood impassively in front of government buildings, leaving demonstra-
tors and rioters to clash with the police. At the same time, the Tunisian military did not
force Ben Ali from office, and senior military officers never sought power for themselves
during the revolution, despite ample opportunity to take advantage of the situation.2 Nor
did the army refuse orders to fire on protesters, because explicit orders to do so never
came. Instead, the army consistently followed a strategy of political neutrality, limiting
its order maintenance operations and avoiding confrontations with protesters until after
Ben Ali fled Tunis on January 14.
The chapter proceeds as follows. First, I discuss the foundation of the Tunisian
armed forces at independence and the initial sources of its doctrine. I identify three
primary sources: the design of coercive institutions during the colonial era, the role of
1. Brigadier General Mohamed Ali El Bekri (former Inspector General of the Armed Forces), interview
by the author, December 3, 2015. All ranks refer to retired officers of the Tunisian Army unless otherwise
noted. See Table 3.1 for a hierarchy of Tunisian Army ranks.
2. “General Ammar: I refused the coup in Tunis [rafiḍtu al-ʾinqilāb ī tūnis]”, Al-Jazeera, November 6,
2015. Ammar even claimed afterward that Ben Ali’s cabinet had implored him to seize power himself, but
that he refused.
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the military in securing national independence, and the relationship between the military
and the hegemonic, postcolonial political party. Next, I explore how historical interven-
tions and foreign influence generated innovation in the military’s doctrine for domestic
security. Tracing the army’s history in each of these areas, I describe how soldiers’ ideas
about neutrality and restraint were reinforced by their experience, and how these ideas
were internalized, routinized, and formalized prior to 2010. Finally, I establish the role
of doctrine in the army’s response to the revolution, which promoted nonviolence and
enabled the peaceful transfer of power on January 14 and afterwards.
A Note on Sources
Most scholars of civil-military relations have relied exclusively on secondary sources to
assess the role of the Tunisian army in the revolution.3 Unfortunately, the existing litera-
ture on Tunisian civil-military relations prior to the revolution was extremely limited.
As a result, studies have tended to repeat similar claims about the Tunisian military,
emphasizing its professionalism, political marginalization, and heroic refusal to fire on
protesters. The limited information available about the Tunisian military also led to some
factual errors; for example, initial reports that the Army Chief, General Rachid Ammar,
had refused a direct order from Ben Ali to fire on protesters turned out to be false.4 Given
these limitations, and despite the difficulty of accessing military elites in what was, until
recently, a deeply closed and authoritarian system, qualitative interview research was the
best methodology available to study civil-military relations in Tunisia.
To dig beneath the clichéd arguments and better understandwhy the Tunisianmil-
3. Tomy knowledge, three other researchers have done fieldwork interviewingmilitary officers in Tunisia
since the revolution (Jebnoun 2014; Bou Nassif 2015b; Grewal 2016).
4. The claim that BenAli gave the order to fire, which the chief of the army then refused, spread in both the
national and the international press (Azzeddine Neffati, “Gloire à notre armée nationale,” La Presse (Tunis),
February 19, 2011; David Kirkpatrick, “Chief of Tunisian Army Pledges His Support for the ‘Revolution,’”
New York Times, January 24, 2011). Most academic sources repeat the claim, citing media reports (Barany
2011, 26-27; Bellin 2012, 134; Lutterbeck 2013, 35; Pion-Berlin et al. 2014, 242; Barany 2016b, 136). A Tunisian
blogger, Yassine Ayari, later admitted to creating the false rumor to push the army to defect from Ben Ali
(Mehdi Farhat, “Yassine Ayari: ‘L’armée n’a jamais reçu l’ordre de tirer’ [The army never received the order
to shoot],” Slate Afrique, July 20, 2011, http://www.slateafrique.com/15009/yassine-ayari-revolution-
tunisie-blogueur-rachid-ammar-armee). See also Bou Nassif (2015b, 77-78).
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itary became politically neutral prior under the Ben Ali regime, I undertook five months
of fieldwork in Tunis, Tunisia. I interviewed mainly retired, senior military officers,
many of whom had served in the highest positions of authority under the old regime.
Most held the most senior army ranks, general or major colonel.5 Table 3.1 shows the
commissioned officer ranks of the Tunisian Army. In addition, I interviewed two former
Ministers of National Defense, one former Minister of the Interior, senior officials in
these ministries, and members of parliamentary committees engaged with the military
and security policy. The ranks and positions of my primary interview subjects are broken
down in Table 3.2. For background, I spoke with several local journalists and security
experts, as well as a handful of American embassy employees responsible for U.S.-Tunisia
security cooperation. Almost all interviews were conducted in French, with an interpreter
present in case the subject was more comfortable expressing him or herself in Arabic.
Translations are my own. A few of my interlocutors requested anonymity, which was
granted, in accordance with IRB directives, due to the sensitive nature of security and
political issues in Tunisia. Active soldiers and current employees of security ministries
are forbidden by Tunisian law from giving interviews, severely curtailing both Tunisian
and foreign researchers’ access to interview data regarding military and security policy.6
Indeed, the lack of transparency in Tunisia’s security sector has itself become an object
of significant policy importance and debate (Hached and Ferchichi 2014; Meddeb 2015b;
Jebnoun 2017). Despite these limitations, the historical documents and original interviews
uncovered in my fieldwork provide a compelling narrative of the Tunisian Army since
independence, and especially of soldiers’ historical interactions with the public and with
foreign military education.
While Tunisian MoI and MoD archives remain inaccessible, the United States has
5. “The rank of major colonel (ameed in Arabic) was created by Ben Ali to ease the backlog of colonels
waiting to become generals. In the Tunisian armed forces, the rank of general is generally granted only to
those occupying one of the top five positions: the chiefs of staff of the army, air force, or navy; the director
general of military security; or the inspector general of the armed forces” (Grewal 2016, 4n18).
6. Following official channels and procedures, I formally requested an interview with the external affairs
department of the Ministry of National Defense. My requests remain unanswered several years later.
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Table 3.1: Tunisian Military Ranks
Rank (in Fren) NATO
General Officers
Corps General (Général de corps d’armée) OF-7Major General (Général de division)
Brigadier General (Général de brigade) OF-6
Senior Officers
Colonel Major (Colonel-major) OF-5Colonel (Colonel)




First Lieutenant (Lieutenant) OF-1Second Lieutenant (Sous-Lieutenant)
declassified many government documents from the Cold War era, most created by the
Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) or the Department of State. The “Kissinger Cables”
(1973–1976) and the “Carter Cables” (1977–1979), collections of diplomatic cables which
were declassified by the US government, were released by the National Archives and
Records Administration, and published by Wikileaks in April 2013 and April 2014.7 A
second useful collection is CREST,8 which provides access to CIA documents which have
been declassified following a statutory 25-year review under the Freedom of Information
Act (FOIA). This collection features intelligence reports from embassies and analysts in
Tunisia and Washington. Thanks to the close diplomatic relationship between the United
States and Tunisia, American diplomats had excellent access to political and military
officials, reflected in the detail and inside knowledge in the reports.
3.1 Foundations of Doctrine
When a new postcolonial military is created, its initial doctrine derives principally from
three sources: the design of coercive institutions under colonial rule and in the first years
7. Wikileaks, Public Library of United States Diplomacy, https://wikileaks.org/plusd/. Government
documents may be accessed using record locators provided in notes.
8. CIA Records Search Tool: 25 Year Archive, https://www.cia.gov/library/readingroom/collection/
crest-25-year-program-archive.
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Other senior officials 3
Members of parliament 6
of independence, the role of soldiers in obtaining and securing national independence, and
the relationship between the military and the ruling political party. From the French pro-
tectorate, Tunisia inherited a small and powerless conscription army alongside a robust
civilian bureaucracy, establishing a civil-military balance that persists to this day. Armed
resistance played little role in securing Tunisia’s independence, so civilians like Habib
Bourguiba, considered the founding father of the Tunisian Republic, and his Neo-Destour
party monopolized the postcolonial political scene. As president, Bourguiba established
a personalistic, single-party regime – asked about Tunisia’s political system, he once
remarked, “The system? What system? I am the system!”9 – and banned soldiers from
the Neo-Destour, enforcing a separation of military and civilian roles in the new regime.
Together, these foundations established an initial military doctrine that tended toward
nonintervention, but was not yet fully committed to restraint.
Institutional Origins
The Tunisian Armed Forces (al-wwāt al-Musallaḥa al-Tūnisiyya) were established by
decree on June 30, 1956, as the country was released from French colonial “protection.”10
While technically a new organization, the national army was built on the institutional
foundations of the conscription-based army France had built to contribute Tunisian troops
to its foreign wars (Hartnett et al. 2018). The new army incorporated not only the Beylical
Guard, but also some soldiers transferred from the FrenchArmy. Beginning in the colonial
9. Cited in Moore (1965, 41).
10. “Décret du 30 juin 1956 portant institution de l’Armée Tunisienne,” JORT 1956, N° 52.
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era, the national service (i.e. conscription) has formed a fundamental tie between the army
and society. National service was formally established in 1830 under Ahmad Bey, but was
rarely enforced until the 1880s, under the French protectorate, when a standing army was
finally established (Anderson 1987, 142-143). French authorities then leveraged Tunisia’s
de jure conscription policy to provide auxiliary infantry to assist in the twoWorldWars in
Europe and in the Rif War in Morocco.11 Casualty rates among Tunisian conscripts were
enormous, and Tunisian families came to equate military service with virtually certain
death. Long after independence, the Tunisian population continued to view conscription
in these colonial terms, as the sacrifice of a son, not as an act of citizenship.12
Since independence, every Tunisianmale citizen has been subject by law tomanda-
tory military service. Although only a small percentage of eligible young men actually
perform their required military service, one-year conscripts comprise the majority of the
country’s armed forces. Due to high levels of evasion, authorities occasionally struggle
to recruit enough young men to fill the ranks. In such cases, the army organizes spot
checks in the country’s towns and villages to identify eligible recruits (Meddeb 2015a). Yet
because manpower requirements are so low, and the unemployment rate has been so high,
the system has been generally effective in maintaining the armed forces at an acceptable
strength (Anderson 1987, 236). Those who serve are typically poor people with limited
means, since evading conscription is trivially easy for more prosperous citizens (Ware
1985, 39). Thus, beyond the professional officer corps, the army consists of average young
men from across the country, performing a civic duty often out of lack of better options.
Despite the somewhat coerced nature of national service, this influx of young citizens into
the army’s ranks each year creates a shared identity between the army and the public, in
a way that voluntary service—whether in a professional army or police force—does not.
Officers, too, represented a diverse cross-section of Tunisian society. After an
11. Kamel Morjane (Former Minister of Defense), interview with the author, May 26, 2016.
12. Colonel Major Fawzi Aloui (Former Director General of Prisons and Rehabilitation), interview with
the author, May 25, 2016.
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open, nationwide call for applications, a group of young men was selected in 1956 to train
at the prestigious French Special Military School at Saint-Cyr Coëtquidan.13 The initial
class, who would become the core of the military elite for a generation, was known as the
“promotion Bourguiba.” The nickname, an homage to the president, reflected the cadets’
devotion to both the man and his nationalist politics (Ben Kraïem 2009, 51-52). Members
of this class played an enormous role in the development not only of the army, but also of
the civilian state. The class included, among other military and civilian leaders, one future
governor, seven ambassadors, and three government ministers: Generals Habib Ammar,
Abdelhamid Escheikh, and Zine el-Abidine Ben Ali (206-207). From its first class of cadets,
the officer corps represented the country’s socioeconomic and regional diversity, which
has helped the army to foster its public image as a representative of the Tunisian people
(12).
Following the model of the French administration, Tunisia’s political leaders relied
on a pervasive, centralized system of surveillance to control political dissent (Hibou 2011).
Consistently high unemployment rates throughout Tunisia’s modern history have facil-
itated recruitment into the ranks of the domestic national guard and national security
police, which converted this surplus of inexpensive labor into a massive and pervasive
surveillance and policing apparatus Anderson (1987, 236). Organized under the Min-
istry of Interior (MoI), Tunisia’s internal security forces include national and local police,
National Guard (a paramilitary gendarmerie), political police (abolished in 2011), and
several civilian intelligence services. Since the Ministry of Interior (MoI), not the military
and Ministry of Defense (MoD), has primary responsibility for both internal and regime
security, both domestic intelligence and political repression were dominated by the police,
to the exclusion of the armed forces (Jebnoun 2017, chap. 3). In addition, the MoI was also
explicitly tasked with implementing government policy, including both economic and
political initiatives, at the local level.14 To this end, the MoI was granted direct control
13. Founded by Napoleon Bonaparte in 1802, Saint-Cyr is the most prestigious military school in France.
14. “Décret N° 75-342 du 30 mai 1975, fixant les attributions du Ministère de l’Intérieur,” Journal Officiel
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over local governance: regional governors15 were appointed by the president but worked
under the direction of the MoI. Each governor was in direct control of all government
functions within his territory, from the police and national guard to the tax service.16 As
a result, the military has never played a role in day-to-day security operations in Tunisian
cities and towns.
Under the constitution of Tunisia, the president is the commander-in-chief of the
armed forces,17 but his authority over the military is generally exercised through the Min-
ister of National Defense, a civilian who legally directs the activities of both the MoD and
the service branches. At the top of themilitary hierarchy sit the chiefs of staff (chefs d’état-
major des armées), who are tasked with commanding the service branches and advising
the MoD on “the doctrine of use of the armed forces.”18 From 2002 to 2013, the general
staff of the army was led by General Rachid Ammar, whose personal role eclipsed that
of the civilian Minister of Defense. Officially, the army’s missions were national defense,
disaster response, and occasionally contributing to economic development projects and
infrastructure. The army’s only operational experience has come from rare domestic
interventions at home and from peacekeeping missions abroad. Bourguiba contributed
Tunisian troops to United Nations peacekeeping operations as early as July 1960, just
four years after establishing the new army.19 The primary rationale was to enhance the
country’s international standing and earn goodwill from allies who might one day need
to rescue Tunisia from invasion, but UN contributions may also have served to distract
de la République Tunisienne (JORT) 1975, N° 39. This and other issues of the JORT may be consulted
online at the Centre National Universitaire de Documentation Scientifique et Technique (CNUDST), http:
//www.cnudst.rnrt.tn/.
15. Tunisia was first divided into fourteen governorates (wilayāt) by royal decree on June 21, 1956 (JORT
1956, N° 50). There are now twenty-four.
16. Béchir Mejdoub (Former Governor of Ke), Interview with the author, Tunis, November 24, 2015.
Regional bureaucrats reported directly to the governor, even before government ministers. This system
ended after the revolution.
17. Constitution of 1959, article 44; Constitution of 2014, article 77.
18. “Décret N° 75-671 du 25/09/1975 fixant les attributions du ministere de la défense nationale,” JORT
1975, N° 64.
19. United Nations, “First Report by the Secretary-General on the Implementation of Security Council
Resolution S/4387 of 14 July 1960,” 7.
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military officers from domestic politics (Albrecht 2018).
In sum, the Tunisian Armed Forces were designed from their creation to serve
clearly delineated roles and missions, which did not include domestic intervention. The
institutional design and colonial legacies of the nation’s robust police and surveillance
organizations further distanced the military from domestic politics. Despite this, popular
uprisings blur the lines between national security and regime security and inevitably
raise the specter of military intervention. From a legal standpoint, early Tunisian laws
designated the armed forces as a backup to the internal security forces in cases of extreme
need. Order maintenance, as such missions are described, has always been a secondary
role for the Tunisian military.20 By law, “TheMinister of National Defense is responsible…
to participate in the maintenance and the restoration of order by the employment of the
Armed Forces, when it is legally required by the competent civil authorities.”21 Accord-
ingly, domestic interventions by the army have been rare, occurring only a handful of
times before 2011, and require the president to declare a state of emergency and explicitly
request military intervention (Ben Kraïem 2009, 195-198). Nevertheless, Tunisian law has
always left the question of military intervention up to the president, leaving open the
possibility of using soldiers to repress anti-regime protests.
Role in National Independence
At independence the national myth, or common story of how independence was won,
plays an important role in legitimating the institutions of the protean state (Moore 1970,
chap. 2). Thus, the role the army played in winning national independence helps de-
termine the army’s initial level of political legitimacy. Unlike in neighboring Algeria,
“Tunisian independence was not won by an army, but by politics, so the army had no
legitimacy except by the constitution.”22 What armed resistance did take place came at
20. As used in Tunisia, the term “maintien de l’ordre” also encompasses the broader idea concepts of law
enforcement and the policing of public space.
21. “Décret N° 75-671,” JORT 1975.
22. Colonel Major Mahmoud Mzoughi, interview with the author, November 4, 2015.
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the hands of non-state militia groups called fellagha, but these organizations were not
members of the leading Neo-Destour wing of the nationalist movement. Since few, if any,
soldiers could claim to have fought for Tunisia’s independence, the new armed forces had
no political legitimacy of their own. On the other hand, Habib Bourguiba won enormous
personal legitimacy for his role in securing independence via negotiation, and he quickly
consolidated power in a “presidential monarchy,” backed by the hegemonic Neo-Destour
Party.23 When Bourguiba assumed the presidency in 1956, he faced armed insurrection
from some members of the fellagha, who supported his principal political rival, Salah Ben
Youssef.24 Tunisia’s protean indigenous military, numbering only a few thousand troops
with very limited training, were powerless to stop the revolt, and Bourguiba soon invited
the French police and army to intervene to put down the rebellion (Perkins 2014, 135-136).
Naturally, their reliance on Tunisia’s former colonial master to provide security further
weakened soldiers’ legitimacy as political actors on the national stage.
The circumstances of Tunisian independence therefore empowered Bourguibawith
a deep personal legitimacy, while depriving the military of any claim to political author-
ity. Bourguiba’s political philosophy focused on modernization, meaning he directed
the state’s limited resources toward education and economic development, rather than
military power (Moore 1965, 41-45). From independence, the military budget was and
remained unusually low by regional standards (Anderson 1987, 236). Bourguiba spurned
the purchase of expensive weapons systems and other military hardware, and directed
the armed forces to invest in education and training. The army also took full advantage
of opportunities to train its officers abroad at no cost to the Tunisian state. Many officers
23. The name for this political current, destour (constitution), is an homage to Tunisia’s constitution of
1863, the first in the Arab world. The Constitutional Liberal Party (al-Ḥizb al-Ḥurr al-Dustūrī ), founded
in 1920, advocated liberation from French colonialism and was widely lauded for its role in negotiating
Tunisia’s independence. Its successor, the Neo-Destour (formally the New Constitutional Liberal Party),
was renamed the Destourian Socialist Party (PSD) in 1964. Upon seizing power in 1987, Ben Ali replaced
the PSDwith a new ruling party, the Rassemblement Constitutionnel Democratique (RCD), which remained
hegemonic until the revolution of 2011.
24. Along with Bourguiba, Ben Youssef was a key leader of the Tunisian national movement. After
independence, he became Bourguiba’s main political nemesis and was forced into exile in 1958 (Moore
1965, 68-69).
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considered their treatment – “ridiculously low” pay and insufficient equipment25 – part
of a persistent strategy on the government’s part to “marginalize” the army (Ware 1985,
39). Nevertheless, Bourguiba’s emphasis on training rather than equipment encouraged
professionalization in the officer corps and set a precedent that continues to the present
day.
Moreover, France’s early intervention against the fellagha became emblematic of
Bourguiba’s foreign policy and defense strategy, which relied heavily on foreign military
assistance. Nevertheless, Tunisia has faced few external threats since independence, and
the army surmounted its only major challenge, the Gafsa affair of 1980, despite its low
budget. Bourguiba justified his government’s low military budgets with the conviction
that Tunisia’s strong friendships with Western powers would provide adequate defense
in case of foreign invasion. Accordingly, independent Tunisia charted a neutral course in
international diplomacy and equipped its military only to slow down a potential invasion
temporarily while waiting for backup from the international community. Throughout the
ColdWar, Tunisia was a steadfast American ally, yet Tunisia’s diplomats nurtured friendly
ties with virtually every country it could.26 For example, Tunisia hosted the headquarters
of the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) from 1982 to 1991 without a breakdown in
relations with the Western powers.
As a result, the Tunisian army remained small, but highly professional and well-
trained by regional standards. Although Tunisia has never published an explicit national
defense strategy document,27 the country has continued to follow Bourguiba’s basic prin-
ciple of national security: make friends, not enemies. In practical terms, the military’s
25. Interview with a senior army officer, November 2015.
26. Ambassador Ali Hachani (Former Permanent Representative of Tunisia to the United Nations),
interview with the author, May 24, 2016.
27. Since 2011, members of Tunisia’s defense community, with encouragement and assistance from
foreign military partners, have argued in favor of developing an explicit national security strategy. For
example, the United States allocated $99,205 in FY2014-15 to “engagements related to development of a
strategy and policy white paper” (Department of Defense, “1211(a) Report to Congress,” August 1, 2016).
The project has been discussed in parliament but has not been adopted into law (Dr. Souheil Alouini [Vice
President, Defense and Security Commission, Assembly of the Representatives of the People], Interview
with the author, Tunis, May 15, 2016).
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designated role is to repel any attack on the national territory – relying in part on a popular
defense, meaning the participation of all Tunisian citizens, especially those trained during
their national military service – until a diplomatic solution or United Nations intervention
can be organized.28 The strategy explicitly recognizes Tunisia’s limited military capacity,
and aims to supplement this weakness with diplomatic strength. Tunisia’s key allies,
especially the United States, have expressed direct support of this strategy. Assessing
this strategy, a top aide to Secretary of State Henry Kissinger wrote in 1975, “We do not
believe that [the Government of Tunisia] has been wrong in the past to devote the great
bulk of its resources to social and economic development… Tunisia’s moderate policies
have earned her many friends both within the Arab world and in the wider international
community, a factor which by itself enhances Tunisian security.”29
Soon after independence, Tunisia’s military humiliation against French forces in
the Battle of Bizerte served to reinforce the domination of political over military forces in
the new state. At the time, the northern port city of Bizerte was home to both French and
Tunisian naval bases. In order to pressure France to withdraw, Tunisia imposed a blockade
against a much stronger French navy. From amilitary standpoint, the battle was a decisive
defeat: inside three days, 630 Tunisians had been killed but only 25 French, and France
had extended its control to the entire town of Bizerte. However, at the conclusion of the
Algerian War some three months later, France finally withdrew from Bizerte, offering
Tunisia a diplomatic victory. Despite the military embarrassment and significant loss of
life among soldiers and civilians alike, neither the army nor the government responded
to the crisis by demanding an urgent increase in the size and equipment of the armed
forces. Instead, President Bourguiba held up the French withdrawal as a validation of his
28. This strategy was described to me in numerous interviews with military officers and was stated
succinctly in a 1979 US diplomatic cable: “Tunisia’s basic defense strategy is two-fold. First, it is to
possess sufficient ground capability to conduct a delaying action against an invasion from either Libya
or Algeria, and secondly, to use the time gained to organize international support in the United Nations and
elsewhere.” (Embassy Tunis, “Annual Integrated Assessment of Security Assistance to Tunisia,” Wikileaks
Cable: 1979TUNIS03534_e, dated April 30, 1979.)
29. Department of State, “Tunisian Request for Military Assistance,” Wikileaks Cable:
1975STATE043531_b, dated February 26, 1975.
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hold-and-negotiate defense strategy. The experience of the Bizerte Crisis demonstrated
to Tunisia’s young officers that diplomacy is a key part of strategic success, and further
increased Bourguiba’s influence over the nascent military’s doctrine.30
Relation to the Ruling Party
Under the edicts of Habib Bourguiba, the military was disenfranchised and banned from
membership in any organization. In particular, soldiers were banned outright from all
political activities and memberships, even within the ruling Neo-Destour Party (Ware
1985, 37). The military elite maintained some links to civilian politics, and were occasion-
ally appointed to civilian positions in the MoI or as regional governors, but not a single
military man was appointed to a cabinet-level position until Ben Ali in 1987, who had by
then spent the majority of his career in the civilian security administration (Bellin 2012,
146n32). Thus, Bourguiba imposed a policy of apoliticism that effectively discouraged
political engagement by the military elite, and even private political discussions became
rare within the officer corps.31 With these efforts, the Bourguiba regime largely succeeded
in removing the military as an actor in elite politics. The “republican ethos,” a nationalist
ideology propagated within the armed forces, encouraged soldiers to define their role and
mission as defending the republic instead of encouraging loyalty to a particular leader
or political party. Soldiers were and are completely banned from joining political or
religious associations of any kind, and they are discouraged from expressing political
opinions either within the military hierarchy or in public. Despite this formal apoliticism,
however, the military remained active supporters of the government in power and were
at the president’s disposal to maintain the internal security of the country. Moreover,
the Tunisian armed forces remained heavily dependent on political elites to approve their
promotions, budgets, and operations, thus weakening their institutional autonomy from
the regime (cf. Bellin 2012).
30. Interviews with senior officers.
31. Interviews with senior officers.
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The non-political model of Tunisian civil-military relations was consolidated in
the 1960s, at a time when coups d’état were a common feature of Arab politics. Regional
leaders like Nasser in Egypt, Qasim in Iraq, the Baʿthists in Syria, and Boumédiène in
Algeria had all come to power by coup d’état, and coups were occurring more frequently
in the Middle East than in any other region (Picard 1990, 190). Bourguiba was deeply
concerned with avoiding a similar fate, especially after the Free Officers’ Revolt in Egypt
in 1952, as he admitted in a 1962 speech:
Unless we take, as of today, the necessary measures [for economic develop-
ment], the country in a few decades will experience serious convulsions. The
disinherited will find leaders to express their grudges. Their children, brought
up in hatred, will infiltrate the ranks of the army. Then one day at dawn, they
will try to seize power and arrest the Head of State, Sovereign or President of
the Republic with his ministers.32
His concerns soon found justification. In 1962, a small group of soldiers attempted to
overthrow Bourguiba, but the plot was discovered in the planning stages and the plot-
ters were harshly punished: most were executed within a month.33 Both followers of
Salah Ben Youssef and Communists were implicated in the plot, providing Bourguiba
ample justification to eliminate his last remaining political rivals. The plot did not enjoy
widespread support within the army, and did not indicate a broader politicization in the
ranks – to the contrary, most military officers remained uninvolved in politics. Neverthe-
less, the coup attempt hardened the regime’s approach to depoliticizing the military and
repressing political dissent more generally. To reinforce the military’s depoliticization,
the government cracked down hard on the 1962 coup attempt, sentencing the plotters to
death, strictly controlling the training and education of military officers, and establishing
a deep intelligence apparatus within the military.
32. Public speech, March 12, 1962, quoted in Moore 1965, 197n46.
33. Demonstrating the value of elite status in Tunisian society, one particularly well-connected plotter
escaped this fate. Moncef El Materi, a member of the Promotion Bourguiba, had his sentence commuted
to ten years’ hard labor after an appeal by Bourguiba’s wife. He was later pardoned, founded a successful
pharmaceutical company, and saw his son marry the daughter of President Ben Ali. Since the revolution,
however, he has been in exile fighting extradition on money laundering charges. His memoir of the coup
attempt offers a rationale for opposing Bourguiba in 1962 (El Materi 2014).
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Conventional wisdom holds that the lack of military coups in Tunisia is a direct
result of Bourguiba’s distrust of the military, for which reason he kept the army too
underdeveloped and ill-equipped to undertake a coup. Yet inaction does not demonstrate
incapacity, and the dual plots of November 1987 underscore how little strength of arms is
actually required to unseat a civilian leader. Historically, coup-proofing in authoritarian
regimes has served to lengthen the incumbent’s average time in office, but not to reduce
the likelihood that he will eventually fall to a coup d’état (Albrecht 2015b). True to this
pattern, a coup d’état eventually did take place in Tunisia, ending Bourguiba’s presidency
on November 7, 1987 – but it was the interior security services, not the military, which
organized the transfer of power. Eighty-four years old and in poor physical and mental
condition, Bourguiba had become increasingly erratic in his decision making. As his cab-
inet became a revolving door, popular dissatisfaction mounted and the national political
situation became untenable (Ammar 2016, 79). As a result, when Prime Minister Ben Ali
and an elite group of civilian security forces moved to depose the president-for-life, they
enjoyed near-universal public support.34 Incredibly, the date of Ben Ali’s coup was fixed
for November 7 to preempt a second coup plot – this one headed by the Mouvement de la
tendance islamique (MTI, later renamed Ennahda) and involving the cooperation of a small
number of mid-rank army officers – that his secret services had unmasked (Ammar 2016,
94).35 However, the military as a whole was not active in either plot, and Ben Ali received
only tacit support from the chief of staff of the army, while the rest of the officer corps was
not informed.36 As such, the incident is actually a striking case of military nonintervention,
and offers an informative “dog that did not bark” counterfactual: the political situation in
Tunisia had reached a crisis point, prompting separate coup plots, one within the Islamist
34. “The transfer of power elicited no protests on behalf of a restoration; nor were there jubilant
celebrations. Rather, the prevailing mood was one of gratitude that the transition had occurred
constitutionally, peacefully, and seamlessly” (Perkins 2014, p. 188).
35. See also Fathi Amdouni, “Interview exclusive : J’ai fait avorter le coup d’État islamiste du 8 novembre
1987,” December 25, 2012, https://www.tunisie-secret.com/Interview-exclusive-Fethi-Amdouni-J-ai-
fait-avorter-le-coup-d-Etat-islamiste-du-8-novembre-1987_a251.html.
36. Mzoughi, interview, 2015.
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movement and another within the civilian elite, led by Prime Minister Ben Ali. In the
end, Ben Ali’s coup went off without a shot fired, and even the small Islamist conspiracy
had posed a serious threat of succeeding. The lack of an army-led putsch even in these
highly favorable circumstances demonstrates how apolitical the officer corps had already
become. Together, these incidents suggest that the military’s inaction was the result of
its political orientation and doctrine, not its weakness.
When Ben Ali, a career security officer and former brigadier general in the army,
took power, observers in Tunisia and abroad believed that the army was poised to play a
much greater role in Ben Ali’s new regime (Ware 1988). But despite starting his career as
a military officer, Ben Ali took office with a wary eye turned toward his former comrades.
Rather than bringing the military closer to the ruling party (now rebranded as the Rassem-
blement Constitutionnel Démocratique, RCD), Ben Ali’s rise to power heralded a turn for
the worse in officers’ fortunes. In 1991, hundreds of military officers were suddenly ar-
rested and accused of illegally supporting the Islamist Ennahda movement. The incident,
known as the Barraket Essahel affair, marked a turning point in the army’s estrangement
from the regime, reinforcing the army’s political neutrality prior to 2010 (Jebnoun 2014,
302). The case involved the sudden arrest of 264 soldiers accused of organizing an Islamist-
leaning coup d’état against the president. In the words of the accused, the charges were
purely political.37 Ben Ali planned to “pillage” the country but knew he had two potential
threats: the army, which he distrusted in spite of his own military background after
decades in the MOI, and the Islamist Ennahda party, which was positioned to take a
sizable portion of the vote if open elections were held as promised.38 The Barraket Essahel
accusations implicated both the military and Islamists in a plot against the state, allowing
Ben Ali to strike against both threats at once.39 The arrests corresponded with a period
37. The government’s allegations were improbable at best. A senior officer in charge of military security
at that time told me that the supposed planning meeting simply could not have occurred. The sleepy town
of Barraket Essahel, he said, did not have a building large enough to hide 200-some conspirators.
38. Colonel Amor Ben Romdhane (Vice President, INSAFAssociation), interviewwith the author, October
28, 2015.
39. After the revolution, Ben Ali was convicted in absentia for his role in the torture of military officers
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of excluding Army officers from top political appointments – such as positions in the
civilian MoI, to which Ben Ali had appointed military officers during the first years of
his presidency – indicating his desire to diminish the Army’s political influence within
the regime (Bou Nassif 2015b, 70-71). Some military officers who were uninvolved in the
affair described an atmosphere of fear in the officer corps, fueled by concerns about guilt
by association or false accusations.40
If Barraket Essahel was indeed a political effort to marginalize the Army, it may
have been intended to provide cover for Ben Ali’s associates, especially the family of his
wife, Leila Trabelsi, to ramp up their corrupt business dealings without inciting challenges
from state institutions. In the 1990s, the Ben Ali regime became increasingly tarnished
with a reputation for corruption (Schraeder and Redissi 2011, 9). Yet while the regime’s
corruption was seen to extend to the police forces, the military was not directly implicated
in any form of corruption.41 The relative absence of corruption in the military may be
interpreted as a sign of its political professionalism, but it also indicates military officers’
distance from real political power during this period. Widespread allegations of ram-
pant corruption within Ben Ali’s family and associates also contributed to some military
officers’ desire to distance themselves from the president and his political circles.42 In
consequence, the armed forces became increasingly estranged from the RCD and the
political leadership during the Ben Ali period (Bou Nassif 2015b). While the Tunisian
military, unlike highly political armies elsewhere in the region, was relatively apolitical
from its founding, the 1990s nevertheless brought a further weakening of the army’s
relationship to the ruling party.
involved in the Barraket Essahel affair (Le Monde 2012). The officers themselves were rehabilitated to their
military rank and pensions, but prevented from re-joining the military.
40. Commandant Alia Mzoughi, interview with the author, November 4, 2015.




Soldiers’ experience interacting with citizens during domestic interventions generates
innovation in the army’s doctrine for future interventions. Because military intervention
in response to protests or riots has been historically rare, each intervention on Tunisian
territory has served as an influential guide for doctrinal innovation. The lessons learned
from a small number of domestic interventions in the 1970s and 1980s, which nevertheless
came at a critical time in the professional development of the army as a whole, therefore
drove a process of major doctrinal innovation, which ultimately created the neutrality
doctrine observed in the 2011 revolution.
Apart from peacekeeping, the Tunisian Armed Forces have only participated in
two significant military engagements in Tunisia’s modern history: the Battle of Bizerte,
in July 1961, and the Libyan-backed attack on Gafsa in January 1980. In both cases,
the Tunisian armed forces took immediate, but limited, military action while political
leaders used diplomacy to secure reinforcements from abroad. In my interviews with
senior army officers, these two incidents were almost universally cited as critical moments
in the history of the Tunisian military, indicating the influence the events had on the
development of military doctrine. In the eyes of the military, both engagements were
positive examples of the correct and proper role of the military. In both cases, the public
lauded soldiers’ heroism and sacrifice, as compared with the public backlash after the
army intervened against civilians.
Since its creation in 1956, the army has generally maintained positive relations
with society, but during crises, officers worried that tensions would erupt and the sit-
uation would get out of control. In one officer’s words, “We were always afraid that a
confrontation would explode and the situation would become uncontrollable.”43 When
the army, following established protocol, is brought in to back up the security forces,
43. ColonelMajor AhmedGhiloufi (Former seniormilitary instructor), interviewwith the author, October
30, 2015.
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soldiers can either try to calm the situation or escalate the use of force. In the army’s first
post-independence intervention in 1978, the army intervened violently, killing and injur-
ing civilian demonstrators (Disney 1978, 13-14). After 1978, however, officers’ strategy
for domestic intervention shifted away from overwhelming force and toward peacefully
defusing the situation.
Turning Point
The military’s direct involvement in domestic politics peaked in the final decade of Bour-
guiba’s presidency, when the army carried out its two largest domestic interventions of
the twentieth century. Despite being formally apolitical and largely disengaged from
elite politics, the Tunisian Army initially accepted a primary role in order maintenance
through the 1970s. The army’s first major intervention came during the fall and winter
of 1977 and 1978, culminating January 28 on a day known as “Black Thursday.” As the
government inaugurated a second Five-Year Plan in 1977, increasing Tunisia’s dependence
on foreign investment, tensions mounted between the country’s largest trade union, the
Union générale de travailleurs tunisiens (UGTT) and the hegemonic Parti Socialiste Des-
tourien (PSD). Receiving only minor concessions from the government, UGTT leader
Habib Achour resigned from the political bureau of the PSD and called a nationwide
general strike to begin in January 1978, its first since independence. The union coupled
economic grievances with demands for political pluralism, highlighting the UGTT’s po-
sition as the only capable challenger to the PSD, as it had been since 1956 (Perkins 2014,
167). As the police, army, and a little-known PSD militia clashed with demonstrating
students and workers, the strike devolved into violent rioting. This was the first case in
post-colonial Tunisia where protests escalated beyond the capacity of the police.
Responsibility for the government’s response to these protests fell to Director
General of National Security Zine el-Abidine BenAli. Under Ben Ali’s direction, the police
and national guard used live ammunition to disperse public gatherings. As the strike
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gained support across the country, protesters began to fill streets in towns and villages
across the country. Bourguiba then declared a state of emergency and instructed the
Minister of Defense to order the army into the streets to disperse the protests. According
to a former MoD spokesman, the army chie’s close ties to the political elite influenced
his decision to intervene:
In 1978, the army chief was too close to the politicians, so when they asked
him to intervene, he sent the army into the streets. This led to [the army]
firing into crowds, which is contrary to the principles of the army.44
Sending armed conscripts into the street with simple orders to put down the protests
virtually guaranteed a violent outcome. One senior officer, who later served as inspector
general of the armed forces, observed, “The army went out against riots, stupidly with
weapons, but theywere not prepared for riots. You have armed soldiers facing provocation
without any training for this.”45 The official death toll was forty-seven, but most sources
put the number as high as two hundred (Anderson 1987, 242). Although the forceful
combined response of the police and army ended the protests quickly, the state’s brutality
created a negative public reaction (Disney 1978, 14).
The military’s subsequent actions demonstrated an acute sensitivity to the public
criticism of the army’s role in putting down the unrest. Once the protesters were subdued,
the government and armymoved to protect their image. Unofficial casualty figures, circu-
lating on international news wires, were censored from the national press, which ran only
the improbably low government figures.46 On January 19 Hassib Ben Ammar, director of
a political newspaper and an ex-Minister of Defense, had published an editorial criticizing
the army’s role in repressing protests early in the conflict; he was quickly brought before
a military tribunal, which convicted him on charges of defaming the institution of the
army. With the newspapers censored to prevent negative coverage, Bourguiba delivered
44. Colonel Major Mokhtar Ben Nasr, Interview with the author, November 25, 2015.
45. El Bekri, interview.
46. Department of State, “New York Times Articles,” Wikileaks Cable: 1978STATE024708_d, dated
January 31, 1987.
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a public address thanking and congratulating the armed forces for restoring order.47
Yet themilitary itself was deeply shaken by the events. Aweek after the events, the
US Ambassador reported that “Officers, from Army Chief of Staff General Excheikh (sic)
on down, are still shaken up,” while junior officers appeared “confused” and ill-informed
about the events and their causes.48 Many officers, both junior and senior, regretted their
involvement in Black Thursday and were determined to avoid being drawn into another
political confrontation with the public (Ware 1985, 39). The US Embassy monitored the
situation closely, interviewing senior government officials and military officers of all
ranks. The American ambassador reported strong dissatisfaction among the armed forces:
“They see themselves as being blamed by many Tunisians for shooting other Tunisians,
a decision over which they had no control.”49 Later, as these officers reached positions of
influence within the military, they would make sure that the next time a domestic crisis
threatened the government, the military itself would have a measure of control over the
decision to intervene.
Steps toward Restraint
In 1980, an incident known as the Gafsa Affair helped push the military’s focus back to
traditional defense, rather than politics. In the 1970s, tensions had escalated with neigh-
boring Libya and its volatile leader, Muammar Gaddafi. On April 1979, the Minister of
Defense told the US Ambassador that Tunisian defense strategy was “ almost exclusively
on the threat from Libya.”50 By the end of that year, social unrest had begun to reappear,
echoing the general strike of 1978. Seeking to take advantage of the political turmoil,
Gaddafi had trained a group of Tunisian militants in commando tactics and helped them
47. Embassy Tunis, “Bourguiba Congratulates Army,” Wikileaks Cable: 1978TUNIS00967_d, dated
February 8, 1978.
48. Embassy Tunis, “Reaction of Tunisian Military to Use of Armed Forces against Rioters,” Wikileaks
Cable: 1978TUNIS00831_d, dated February 2, 1978.
49. Embassy Tunis, “Assessment of Tunisian Situation,” Wikileaks Cable: 1978TUNIS01109_d, dated
February 13, 1978.
50. Embassy Tunis, “Tunisian Defense Strategy-Meeting with with [sic] Minister of Defense Farhat,”
Wikileaks Cable: 1979TUNIS03246_e, dated April 20, 1979.
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infiltrate back into Tunisia, hoping to instigate an uprising that could topple Bourguiba’s
government (Perkins 2014, 169). On the night of January 26, 1980, a group of about thirty
commandos launched a surprise raid on the southern city of Gafsa.51 Thanks in part to
intelligence warnings of an impending attack, the Tunisian Army competently repelled
the attack, limiting civilian casualties while retaking control of the city and preventing
the escape of the assailants.52
The Gafsa Affair forced Bourguiba to admit the necessity of an army to defend
Tunisia’s borders (Perkins 2014, 170). As a result, he grudgingly augmented the military’s
budget for provisions and equipment (Ware 1988, 594). Nearly all of the military’s new
resources were spent countering a series of cross-border raids launched by Gaddafi over
the coming years, so the change did not massively increase the resources available to the
military.53 However, the incident demonstrated that Tunisia, though extremely secure
by regional standards, was not without need of a robust national defense. Finally, public
praise of the army’s performance provided a stark contrast to the wave of criticism that
had followed the army’s last intervention. As a result, the material strength of the military
was actually increasing through the 1980s. Rather than weakness, the non-interventionist
policy of the Tunisian armymust be understood as a choice. As one commander explained,
“During the three crises of 1978, 1980, and 1984, the regime depended on the army. In other
countries in this situation you would have seen the army take power, but the Tunisian
army does not involve itself in politics. This is a point of pride for us.”54
When nationwide bread riots broke out four years later, avoiding bloodshed at
the hands of the army had become a top priority, demonstrating how doctrine had al-
ready begun to shift following the disastrous events of 1978. The “bread riots” of January
1984 were set off by a severe reduction in government subsidies for bread and semolina
51. Boubaker Ben Kraïem, “L’affaire de Gafsa en 1980 : Témoignage du Colonel Boubaker Ben Kraiem.”
Site officiel de Moncef El Materi. Accessed on: Dec. 3, 2015.
52. A senior officer who did not wish to be named, Dec. 6, 2015.
53. Interview with a senior military officer, November 7, 2015.
54. Colonel Major Hedi Tajani, interview with the author, May 18, 2016.
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(i.e., couscous) at the behest of the IMF and World Bank (Perkins 2014, 172). As riots
broke out, Bourguiba recalled Ben Ali from an ambassadorial post in Poland, to again
oversee the brutal suppression of the protests in his former role of director general of
national security. Ben Ali again ordered the police and national guard to fire on crowds
of unarmed demonstrators, and theMOI called for assistance from themilitary (Paul 1984).
With many officers already concerned about the reputational costs of firing on unarmed
civilians, some commanders leading the 1984 intervention sought to reduce casualties.
One regimental commander described his approach as follows:
We had declared a state of emergency, the highest level of emergency, at
which point the Army is charged with maintaining order. I had no direct
experience with this, but I had the lessons and ideas from my comrades who
had participated in 1978… I said to myself the most important thing is that no
one be killed by the Army’s bullets. I wanted the civilian leadership stay in
place, not to replace it with military government.55
Althoughmany commanders who had experienced the disaster of 1978 looked for creative
ways to diffuse confrontations without violence, others followed orders and opened fire.
Several army units participated with the police and national guard in firing on demonstra-
tors, killing dozens of civilians. This time, the military crackdown created such a severe
public backlash that Bourguiba was forced to reverse himself. He immediately restored
the subsidies and implausibly claimed that his prime minister had implemented the cuts
without the president’s knowledge (Perkins 2014, 173).
Officers’ involved in these order maintenance operations recognized that they
were doing political work by confronting crowds of demonstrators chanting slogans against
the political regime. They chafed against their deeply held conviction that the army should
not involve itself in politics, and their immediate response was to minimize their political
involvement. The officers also recognized that the protesters were angry with politicians,
and perhaps the security forces, but not with the army. Following the 1984 crisis, a group
55. Colonel Major Moussa Khalfi (Former Director of Military Security), interview with the author,
November 6, 2015.
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of senior officers informed Prime Minister Mohammed Mzali that they would not support
future orders to deploy against unarmed civilians.56 Another group of senior officers
informed the US Embassy at the time that they are “uncomfortable with assignments to
put down civil unrest and fear that Mzali will call on them again.”57 Although Mzali’s
government made efforts to strengthen the internal security forces, the CIA assessed in
May of 1984 that these efforts were likely to be insufficient, requiring the government to
again depend on the Army “to put down unrest, which may prompt the officer corps to
throw its weight behind a replacement and the rank-and-file to perform in a lukewarm
fashion.” This experience provided the insight and motivation for innovation in the way
the army would prepare to respond to future political crises. The generation of military
officers whose first command experiences came in the popular uprisings of 1978 and 1984
would later lead the army’s doctrinal shift toward nonintervention. Their experience
struggling to control rioting crowds without resorting to lethal force taught this cadre
of officers the value of nonviolent tactics, as well as the steep reputational costs the army
risked incurring if the situation got out of hand.
3.3 Foreign Influence
While the literature in comparative politics has tended to view the military as an inde-
pendent, domestic political actor, international relations scholars have viewed foreign
partnerships and alliances as highly influential inmilitary outcomes. Contrary to common
perception, a national military can be highly influenced by foreign relationships, espe-
cially those forged through international training and educational partnerships, as well
as ongoing cooperation on terrorism and regional security. The causal process unfolds
in three parts. First, domestic and international politics determine foreign relationships.
Second, trans-governmental relations, i.e. direct military-to-military partnerships at sub-
56. The officers described their conversation with the prime minister to the US military attaché, whose
report circulated within the CIA.
57. Directorate of Intelligence, “Tunisia: More Troubles Ahead,” FOIA Document: CIA-
RDP85T00287R001301600001-2, May 23, 1984.
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state level, foster an exchange of ideas and cultural values. Third, these exchanges in-
fluence military organizational culture, encouraging the diffusion of values and ways
of doing things. Although the exchange is officially bidirectional, in practice the more
developed army provides the lessons while the visiting officers learn from the model
provided.58 In the case of Tunisia, the most important form of foreign influence on the
military was through education and training abroad, especially in French and American
military schools.
In Tunisia, the pattern of Western military training and assistance dates to the
1830s, before the French protectorate, when two French officers were dispatched from
Algiers to Tunis to instruct a new nizami army in European-style drilling techniques.59
The exchange, which ended in acrimony after only six months, nevertheless established a
lasting pattern of military cooperation (Anderson 1987, 67).60 Henceforth, whenever the
Tunisian military sought to develop or expand its institutional strength, it looked to the
French, and later American, models for techniques, frameworks, and assistance. Despite
multiple earlier attempts to establish an indigenous standing army, lasting success came
only under the French protectorate, beginning in 1883 with the backing of significant
French financial and administrative resources (143). In this way, the army has been a
joint partnership between Tunisia and Western donors since its inception. Naturally,
this relationship strongly influenced the military’s mode of organization and doctrinal
orientation.
From the start of the post-colonial era in the Middle East, military officers had
58. One exception to this pattern is the exchanges of high-level delegations, who are invited to the
National Defense University and other educational institutions to share insights on their own regions.
59. Tunisia’s Ahmad Bey (r. 1837–1855) attempted to build a standing army which would for the first
time incorporate native Tunisians (Brown 2015, chap. 8). Often called a nizami army, the force was modeled
on the Ottoman Nizam-ı Cedid, which replaced the traditional slave-warrior caste known as Janissaries.
Tunisia was a quasi-autonomous province of the Ottoman Empire until the French invasion in 1881.
60. Ahmad Bey’s reform attempts were doomed by both international politics and the domestic economy.
The French trainers were recalled to Algeria by an ill-fated plot to place Hussaynid rulers on the thrones
of Constantinople and Oran (Brown 2015, 264). Moreover, government revenues were far too meager to
support a standing army. In its first and only expeditionary mission, Ahmad’s army joined the Crimean
War against Russia in 1855. The Tunisian forces were obliterated, bringing an end to military modernization
until the colonial period (Perkins 2014, 20).
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played a dominant role in regional politics, and coups d’état were prevalent through
the late 1940s, 1950s, and 1960s. In this regional context, Bourguiba decreed early on
that Tunisian military officers would not receive training in the Eastern (Arab) or Soviet
countries, not wanting his officers to witness an army that was both politically conscious
and empowered. Instead, he leaned on France and the United States, believing that the
influence of Western militaries would discourage the politicization of the armed forces.61
American diplomatic correspondence demonstrates the Americans’ reluctance to help
Tunisia’s military get involved in domestic politics. In 1974, the Department of State re-
jected a Tunisian request for military training in internal security, counter-insurgency in-
vestigation, and personnel investigation, stating that the US “would prefer to see Tunisians
arrange for potentially repressive activity through non-American channels.”62 In this way,
the Western model steered the developing Tunisian armed forces away from involvement
in domestic affairs.
Initially, Western military schools directly provided all officer training for the
Tunisian army, while Tunisia worked to establish its own military academies and officer
schools. The Army’s own Military Academy was inaugurated in 1967, and the Staff Col-
lege opened in 1977.63 All of the domestic schools and training programs closely followed
the American and French models, in their design and curriculum, and the instructors con-
scientiously mirrored what they saw as the “republican ethos” of theirWestern partners.64
From independence to the mid-1980s, the military education of officers gradually shifted
from France to the United States, beginning with the “Saint-Cyriens” of the Promotion
61. Colonel Major Mahmoud Mzoughi (Former Director of the National Defense Institute), interview
with the author, November 4, 2015.
62. Embassy Tunis, “Tunisian Request for Military Intelligence Training,” Wikileaks Cable:
1974TUNIS05387_b, dated August 30, 1974.
63. The Military Academy (Académie Militaire) in Fondouk Jedid provides an initial officers’ training,
while the Staff College (Ecole d’Etat-Major) in Le Bardo prepares officers for company command. In addition,
a War College (Ecole Supérieure de Guerre) was inaugurated in 1996 to provide high-level instruction for
senior officers whowill be promoted to the highest command positions and the ranks of colonel and general.
More recently, Tunisia established a Defense Institute (Institut de la Défense Nationale) to bring together
senior civilian and military officials from across the government.
64. Colonel Major Mahmoud Mzoughi, interview with the author, May 19, 2016.
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Bourguiba, who soon saw active duty against the French in the Battle of Bizerte and
witnessed a corresponding decline in Tunisia’s relationship with France. By the time
of the 1984 Bread Riots, most field commanders had done the bulk of their training in the
United States (Ware 1985, 38). Among the lessons imparted byWesternmilitary education
was a sense of duty and code of “republican” values:
We had a Western education where we well understood what a republic is.
The country comes before individuals. And, Tunisia had the fortune not only
in the Army but in my whole generation of being educated either abroad or
by foreigners in Tunisia. In the West or by Westerners in Tunisia. Now that
we are the instructors, it’s not the same. We try to impart the same values,
but it’s not the same as living it abroad. They haven’t lived in France. They
haven’t lived in the United States for a period of six months to understand
what it means to be a citizen, the importance of the state, of the flag. All
these things that elevate the mind (l’ésprit).65
The generation of young officers who commanded units during the interventions of 1978
and 1984, educated in the military schools of the United States, had reached the army’s
highest ranks by the 2000s. Their training and experience inspired doctrinal innovation in
the way the army approached domestic intervention, favoring nonviolence and leading to
the army’s response to the revolution in 2011.66 Conscripts, who comprise over four-fifths
of the total force, serve only twelve months before returning to civilian life. They do not
receive direct foreign training or education, as their short-term service precludes all but
the most basic indoctrination and skills training, along with rigorous physical training.
As a result, conscripts rely on the guidance of the officers who train and lead them. In
this way, the education and doctrine of the officer corps dictates the behavior of the entire
army.
Even as Tunisia has developed its own military training and education infras-
tructure, officers have continued to benefit from foreign training as well. From 2002–
2012, the United States trained a total of 4,000 Tunisian soldiers, whether in Tunisia or
65. Khalfi, interview.
66. By a fortunate coincidence, many these officers are recently retired from the senior-most ranks of the
Army and generously offered their time for interviews.
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the United States.67 That figure is especially striking in relation to the modest size of
the professional army, which numbered only about 5,000 in 2018.68 Through the US
International Military Education and Training (IMET) program, Tunisia receives more
than a hundred trainee positions each year.69 While this is lower than the numbers allotted
to other major partners, such as Egypt and Jordan, the small size of the Tunisian officer
corps means that a much higher percentage of Tunisian officers receive US training each
year. Figure 3.1 shows the percentage of the professional army trained each year from the
four largest Arab recipients of IMET; Tunisia’s rate is typically two to three times higher
than that of the next highest recipient.
Foreign military aid also includes the provision of weapons, vehicles, and other




matériel, whether by purchase, loan, or grant. Tunisia’s very first efforts at military
modernization began in 1830 when Ahmad Bey purchased modern weapons from several
European suppliers, including France (Perkins 2014, 19). With no domestic defense indus-
try, Tunisia has continued to depend on Western suppliers, mainly France and the United
States, for all of its military equipment. At independence, the newly established armed
forces had no equipment at all. The force soon received donations of small arms from
Egypt, artillery from Yugoslavia, and leftover World War II armaments from the United
States. Afterwards, the United States was the most consistent supplier, both through
donations of used equipment and purchases of American products with government loan
guarantees.70 This security cooperation has allowed Tunisian armed forces to equip them-
selves with relatively modern weaponry well beyond their limited fiscal means. Although
American assistance to Tunisia was relatively small in absolute terms, it was very signif-
icant as a percentage of the Tunisian military procurement budget.71 As of 2012, the
US embassy in Tunis estimated that 70% of the Tunisian military’s inventory was of US
origin.72 This form of security dependence is typical of smaller, developing countries like
Tunisia.73
The reliance on a small number of powerful allies for military procurement may
reinforce the influence of these donors over the armed forces. Typically, to maintain
interoperability between weapons systems, an army will equip itself primarily with ei-
ther Western or Soviet/Eastern weapons systems, rather than mixing and matching, and
transitioning from Eastern to Western hardware can take decades.74 Tunisia has used
Western equipment almost exclusively, reflecting both diplomatic alignments andmilitary
70. Mzoughi, interview, 2016.
71. Alexis Arieff, “Political Transition in Tunisia,” Congressional Research Service, December 16, 2011,
cited in Brooks 2013, 214n27.
72. “Tunisia – Army,” Jane’s Sentinel Security Assessment - North Africa, IHS Markit, updated February
14, 2018.
73. Mzoughi, interview, 2016
74. For example, Egypt was a Soviet ally during Nasser’s presidency, but transitioned to the Western
camp under Sadat. After nearly three decades of massive US military aid, Egypt has still not replaced all of
its Soviet-era equipment. See chapter 4.
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considerations.75 For comparison, most Algerian equipment is manufactured in Russia,
with an increasing turn to Arab suppliers and China (IISS 2014, 309-310). In addition,
military equipment requires a steady supply of replacement equipment and spare parts
for routine maintenance, such that military acquisitions engage a long-term supplier re-
lationship. At the same time, the leverage that military relationships provide should not
be overstated. The US has struggled to make demands of even the largest recipients of
military aid, such as Pakistan and Egypt, belying the simple premise of a patron-client
relationship (Omelicheva et al. 2017). However, for a small military such as Tunisia’s,
the exclusive influence of Western powers in military training and education can have
powerful long-term effects. American military aid does not guarantee compliance with
US interests, but an army like Tunisia’s, built on Western principles from the ground up,
is far more likely to adopt Western attitudes toward civilian control over the military and
the role of officers in politics.
3.4 Doctrinal Adoption
In the 1970s and 80s, the Tunisian military’s experience with domestic interventions and
foreign examples caused a doctrinal innovation in favor of restraint and nonviolence.
As officers took lessons from their education and experience, they internalized the core
concepts of a non-interventionist doctrine. In my interviews, many senior officers re-
ferred to the uprisings of 1978 and 1984 to explain why the Tunisian Army changed its
doctrine. A few evenmentioned the Romanian revolution of 1989 and the uprising at Tim-
ișoara, where the army’s intervention had failed when soldiers began firing at unarmed
civilians, leading to total chaos, many civilian casualties, and eventually the downfall
of the Ceauşescu regime (Siani-Davies 2007, 63-66). To Tunisian officers, examples like
these offered a bloody case study in how not to intervene.76 From personal and historical
75. Apart from 100 Yugoslav anti-aircraft guns, all current Tunisian equipment is made by NATO-aligned
countries (Jane’s 2018).
76. “I had in my mind what happened in Timișoara, in Romania. When the army made an intervention
against people in Timișoara, they killed 80 people. Why? They were not there to kill people, but there
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experience, they recognized that shooting civilians can be costly to the military. As Bellin
(2012, 132) observes, “shooting on civilians… can spell serious damage to the military’s
core institutional interests: cohesion, discipline, prestige, and legitimacy.” In light of
these interests, the Tunisian military responded to the backlash against its 1978 and 1984
interventions by reforming its doctrine for domestic crises.
Recognizing the nature of the army’s relationship with the population, the pro-
fessional officers at the top of the military organization came to understand that they
could enhance their social position and prestige by refusing to use force against civilians.
According to several military officers, the army’s public reputation benefited greatly from
its respect for the law and abstention from use of force against the population. A retired
senior military officer described the army’s public relations under the Ben Ali regime as
follows:
The police did not have a good reputation in the country, but the army did.
Because several times the army came to help them—especially in natural
disasters—the army had an appreciation in the population. That’s very im-
portant, because we have always treated them that way. The law says that
the military doesn’t even have the legal ability to deal with the population.
To ask someone in the street for his identity card, youmust be a judicial [non-
military] police officer, the law says so.77
Col. Maj. Ben Nasr, army spokesman during the revolution, explained that the army
reformed itself after 1984 specifically to avoid police work and the reputational cost of
confronting citizens directly. “After [the bloodshed of 1984] the army reformed its rules
and said, if we keep doing this [order maintenance], our role will be confused with the
police. After that it was very strict: Under General Ammar, the army only accepted the
role of defending state institutions, not intervening against the population. This is where
divisions were created between the army and the politicians. Ben Ali did not agree with
the army’s stance.”78
are provocateurs. People were peacefully protesting, but someone inside the crowd fires at the army and
[machine gun noises]. This is what happened in Tunisia, I’m convinced that happened” (El Bekri, interview).
77. Interview with a senior army officer, December 5, 2015.
78. Ben Nasr, interview.
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Meanwhile, as the military eliminated the use of violence against protesters from
its repertoire of action, the practice of nonviolence became routinized. From the army’s
founding, the institution stood apart from the coercive apparatus of the state. Because
of the social composition and public role of the army, the public did not initially identify
the army as part of the regime’s coercive apparatus after independence. When Tunisia’s
internal security forces responded to major demonstrations under Bourguiba and Ben
Ali, violence was commonplace. But unlike the internal security forces, the army did
not participate in routine state repression, nor did officers engage in the face-to-face,
low-level interactions with citizens that so often lead to petty corruption and abuses of
power. Thus, citizens came to expect different behavior from soldiers than from police.
In interviews, several senior officers attested that throughout the army’s history, crowds
of protesters have tended to respond more peacefully to soldiers than to the police. One
officer described the dynamic as follows:
Unfortunately the police do not have good relations [with the public] because
they provoke confrontation; they use force. But the population doesn’t accept
that, and it’s [the army’s] role to calm the situation. Generally when we
intervene on the ground, the population calms down. Generally, we do not
allow the police direct contact with the population. We say to the security
forces, ‘stand back, we will handle this.’ Then the police see the population
calm down in front of the soldiers, and of course, still seek confrontation with
the police.79
This scenario, repeated in similar form by several of my interviewees, describes strikingly
positive relations between soldiers and society, based on the army’s limited role in internal
security. Because domestic interventions were rare, the population believed ex ante that
the young soldiers, fellow citizens performing their national service, probably would not
harm them. If they were afraid of military intervention, it was a fear of the unknown, not
fear of a known threat as with the police.
Major labor strikes in the Gafsa mining region in 2008 further routinized the doc-
trine of restraint. As protests grew, they soon overwhelmed the internal security forces,
79. Ghiloufi, interview.
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despite their use of tear gas andwater cannons (Chouikha and Gobe 2009, para. 26). Mean-
while, the army moved to secure key strategic sites, including the mines themselves, but
ignored the escalating crisis in the streets. According to Col. Maj. Ben Nasr, the army’s
restraint was initiated entirely by the military itself, much to the consternation of the
political leadership: “The Army decided to guard the installations, of phosphates, without
intervening on the ground, or in the street to oppose the population. And that started
the tensions between the Army and the political side. The president didn’t appreciate
that but he couldn’t do anything about it, because it’s the law.”80 There was no love lost
between the army and the president; their relations had been fairly icy for decades, despite
Ammar’s deep personal loyalty to Ben Ali. Yet the Gafsa uprising may have given Ben Ali
an insight into how far the armed forces had moved away from the order maintenance
role, establishing a useful precedent for the revolution.
The army joined the intervention only after President Ben Ali declared a curfew
on June 6. Even then, it was the internal security forces who used live ammunition to
disperse the crowds, killing one and injuring twenty-one others, while the military held
its fire (Chouikha and Gobe 2009, para. 29). Kamel Morjane, Minister of Defense during
the crisis, described the military intervention in the town of Redeyef:
The Army entered around 6 o’clock in the evening. At the beginning, [the
strikers] started throwing a lot of things… but when they realized it was the
Army, they started applauding. The bakers who were on strike went to their
bakeries and began preparing bread for them and distributed it to the Army.
Because they knew that they would not touch them. Because if [the Army is]
in charge of protecting a bank, as far as [protesters] don’t touch it, no soldiers
will intervene. Which means for them a certain confidence: if you don’t have
bad intentions, the Army will not touch you. There is a sort of confidence
in the fact that they don’t often have contact with people, except those who
come for their national service.81
To many participants on both sides, the strikes came to be seen as a precursor to the
2011 revolution. In the words of one protester, who demonstrated in both 2008 and 2011,
80. Ben Nasr, interview, November 25, 2015.
81. Interview with the author, May 25, 2016.
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“The revolution started here in 2008 in Moulares and Redeye”82 The remarkable success
of the military’s restraint in Gafsa signaled that nonviolence had become routine within
the Tunisian armed forces.
Moreover, the Tunisian army had taken explicit stepsmany years earlier to prepare
its nonviolent response. One implication of the doctrinal shift was an overhaul of the
army’s training and tactics for public order operations. During Rachid Ammar’s command
of the army, the general staff worked to implement reforms in the training of soldiers
for domestic interventions, focusing on defending public buildings and minimizing con-
frontation with demonstrators. A senior officer working on the staff at the time, Brigadier
General Mohamed Ali El Bekri, described their motivations as follows: “As we took the
lessons from [the past interventions], we trained people how to deal with a population in
front of them. We had as a background to try the maximum to avoid civilian casualties.”83
From 2004-2010, under General Rachid Ammar, the army implemented a specific training
doctrine for crowd control. A senior officer involved in the planning described these
preparations as follows:
We did all that we can to protect the population because we felt that we must
not, absolutely not [use force]. Because the people are asking for freedom
or asking for rights, they must not be killed. It is against humanity. So we
trained our people. The training and the preparation… is important to avoid
shooting stupidly. Because you have weapons, you think you are allowed to
kill people who are not protected.84
To mitigate the risk of a violent confrontation with protesters, the army followed a simple
procedure: soldiers first delineated clear lines to the demonstrators, then refrained from
interfering the protesters or responding to insults or provocations. If protesters did not
fully respect the limit, soldiers would warn them by firing on a harmless, predetermined
target. Force would be used only as a final resort, if protesters attempted to disarm the
82. Carlotta Gall, “Tunisian Discontent Reflected in Protests that have Idled Mines,” The New York Times,
May 13, 2014.
83. El Bekri, interview.
84. El Bekri, interview.
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soldiers. El Bekri, an architect of these tactical plans, described them as follows:
One of the steps is you shoot down [into the ground]. Here, the main impor-
tance is they do not take your weapons. Because if they take your weapons
they can shoot on you or on other people… Unfortunately, if you shoot some-
times ricochet can cause accidents. We take another step, to show people that
the bullets can kill, in our plans we choose a place—for example if there is a
big wall behind the crowd, we make a square target and fire on that target to
show the population it kills, it’s real bullets. Why did we do that? Because
in 1978, some in the population would say, when [soldiers were] firing in the
air, “Oh, it’s blank ammunition. Don’t worry about it! Cross the line, it’s
blank ammunition!” So it’s one more step to show the population.85
These procedures are not intended to provide crowd control, since they do not enable
soldiers to clear an occupied area, nor to disperse protesters. Moreover, the Tunisian
Army does not possess if non-lethal crowd control equipment, such as batons, water
cannons, or tear gas. Instead, this approach allows the army to defend a fixed point, such
as a government building, without directly confronting the population. In most cases,
however, the army tried to keep weapons out of the equation altogether. The director of
military security in the 1990s explained the value of confronting protesters unarmed:
If you see a soldier with a weapon you think he’s going to oppose you; if
you see a soldier or policeman who was unarmed you think he is just doing
his job. [He] is not going to use weapons against me. These things are very
important. All the years I was in charge of military security, whenever there
was a disturbance or situations like this in the country, I always kept this in
mind, but above all, soldiers must not act as though they are armed, going
into battle. They should act as Tunisians, explain what they are doing and
try to find a solution. If you can avoid force, and especially weapons, all the
better.86
In addition to domestic training, the Tunisian army formalized its nonviolent tactics dur-
ing deployments in support of UN peacekeeping missions in Cambodia, Somalia, and
Rwanda, where they received high praise from UN commanders for their exceptional pro-
fessionalism and exemplary contributions to multinational forces.87 According to Jane’s,




a highly-respected defense analysis publication, “Deployments with UN peacekeeping
missions in Africa provided the essential experience and resource capabilities to fill the
void left by the collapse in legitimacy and capacity of BenAli’sMinistry of Interior security
forces in 2011” (IHS 2016).
In conclusion, soldiers’ reflections on previous interventions and their Western
military education internalized the values of nonviolence and nonintervention. Restraint
became routine as more and more officers exercised discretion when confronting their
fellow citizens. Finally, officers’ formal training and peacekeeping experience served
to formalize a nonviolent repertoire of action for domestic security, which ultimately
ensured the Tunisian army’s peaceful and politically neutral response to the revolution.
3.5 Responding with Restraint
In December 2010 the tragic self-immolation of Mohamed Bouazizi, which catalyzed the
revolution, took place 100 kilometers north of Gafsa in another economically-depressed
city of the southern interior, Sidi Bouzid. As massive protests developed and spread
throughout the country, the army avoided contact with the protesters. Instead, the Army
Chief of Staff, General Ammar, ordered his forces to defend strategic sites and state insti-
tutions like the national radio, but not to go beyond this minimal mission (Jebnoun 2014,
304-9). The army spokesman at the time explained that Ammar was explicitly following
the doctrine established previously and employed on a smaller scale during the mining
protests in Gafsa (see section 3.2):
During the revolution it was the same [as in 2008]. The Army was solicited,
it intervened and positioned itself at certain sensitive points and stopped
there. When the army was asked, in certain places, to intervene the army
said, “Look, we do not fire on the population. That’s the role of the police
and the National Guard.” There was a dispute with the president, so the chief
of staff [Ammar] wrote, “no soldier may fire on the population, no matter
the situation, without prior authorization from his commander.” Which is a
nonsensical order in a military context, but it was to forbid firing on crowds.88
88. Ben Nasr, interview, November 25, 2015.
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Thus, crowd control and order maintenance were left to the internal security forces under
the direction of the MoI. Meanwhile, the MoD and military commanders continued to
participate in crisis meetings with President Ben Ali, but neither suggested nor supported
a plan to increase military involvement in the response. As protests spread across the
country, the size and scope of demonstrations began to overpower police capacity. By
early January, many low-ranking police officials throughout the country had lost contact
with high-ranking officials, who had turned off their cellphones (Mekouar 2017, 858).
Citizens began attacking police stations and overrunning barricades throughout Tunisia,
but the military did nothing to defend the police.89 In isolated cases, it was reported that
soldiers and police even exchanged fire.90 By January 14, police authority had completely
collapsed, and Ben Ali ordered Army Chief of Staff General Ammar to take control of the
central operations room at the MoI (Grewal 2016, 5). With the situation escalating out of
control, why did the armed forces not respond in force to subdue protests?
The answer lies in the doctrine of neutrality the army had developed over the
previous decades. As the crowds swelled in December 2010 and January 2011, the internal
security forces under theMoI, not the army, deployed to confront them. As the police used
deadly force against civilians, the police themselves became the target of demonstrators’
rage. Protesters attacked the police in front of them at demonstrations, along with police
stations and the MoI headquarters in downtown Tunis (ICG 2011c). The army, however,
avoided engaging the protesters by only defending major government institutions and
strategic sites, like the state radio station and presidential palace (Brooks 2013, 206n5).
This strategy of restraint was entirely consistent with the restrained approach army of-
ficers had developed for order maintenance after the 1978 and 1984 uprisings and had
codified under General Ammar’s command. In response, protesters did not target govern-
89. In the words of a senior officer interviewed by Hicham Bou Nassif, “We shed no tears when the
people attacked police stations. The police were corrupt and arrogant vis-à-vis the population and the
armed forces. That the military should kill civilians in order to protect the police was out of the question;
whatever happened to the police, they asked for it” (Bou Nassif 2015b, 86n79).
90. These reports cannot be confirmed, but skirmishes like these between various branches of the state
coercive apparatus are common during political transitions (Gledhill 2012).
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ment sites defended by the army, but preferred instead to attack the major manifestation
of government abuse in their own lives: the offices of the ruling RCD party and the palaces
of Ben Ali and his family and allies, along with police stations (Aleya-Sghaier 2013, 38-39).
In this way, the army used its strategy of restraint to avoid engagement with the entire
revolution until late on January 14, when Ben Ali fled into exile.
Once the regime fell and protesters’ demands were met, the army quickly stepped
in to reestablish security. Having stood by impassively for two months, the military sud-
denly acted firmly to restore order, demonstrating a latent capacity that was intentionally
untapped during the revolution (Jebnoun 2014, 311). In one much-publicized incident,
soldiers raced to secure a large supermarket in the Tunis suburbs, arriving just in time
to disperse a mob of looters descending on the giant building.91 The army had sufficient
tactical capability and organizational strength to halt the looting and criminal activity that
proliferated after the collapse of the interior security forces. During the revolution, nine
of the country’s eleven prisons had been abandoned, and thousands of inmates escaped,
most of whomwere not political prisoners, thus presenting a serious risk for public safety
and security.92 At least thirty-seven civilians were killed by the military over the next six
weeks, but calm returned to Tunisia under the security guarantee of the armed forces.
A retired chief of staff of the navy later asserted, “Had the orders been given to
shoot, the officer corps in its entirety would have turned against ʿAmmar” (Bou Nassif
2015b, 80n77). His view reflects the extent to which restraint and nonviolence were firmly
entrenched in the military’s doctrine. On the other hand, a brigadier general of the army
who worked closely with Ammar asserted to me that if Ammar had decided to crush the
uprising by force, even as late as January 14, he could absolutely have done so.93 Yet the
general never came close to giving such an order, even after gathering in a crisis meeting
with the country’s top officials on January 13 (Jebnoun 2014, 305). Instead, his soldiers
91. “Carrefour, défendu par les forces de l’armée nationale, et fermeture provisoire,” Leaders (Tunis), 10
February 2011.
92. Aloui, interview.
93. El Bekri, interview.
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hewed closely to the neutral role they had established for themselves over the past three
decades. In the end, it was this doctrine which enabled the largely peaceful revolution of
14 January and the subsequent transition to electoral democracy.
Conclusion
The Tunisian military’s response to the Arab Spring was entirely consistent with the
doctrine of restraint that had been established prior to the uprising. Since its founding,
the Tunisian army has asserted its political neutrality and refrained from meddling in
civilian politics. This stance, unusual in the Arab world, can be explained by the Tunisian
armed forces’ origins in a marginalized colonial-era institution, their lack of participation
in the national independence movement, and the absence of direct ties to the ruling party.
Yet despite its formal apoliticism, the army continued to play a role in major domestic
crises, notably when responding to popular uprisings in 1978, 1984, and 2011. In its
first domestic interventions, soldiers fired on unarmed protesters, demonstrating that the
institution’s non-political foundation was not enough to guarantee a nonviolent response
to popular uprisings. However, the reputational backlash that soldiers suffered in these
early incidents led to innovation in military doctrine. By the 1990s, the officer corps had
internalized a doctrine of restraint, routinized the tactics of restraint through training and
application in smaller interventions, and formalized the dictum of neutrality in the army’s
standard operating procedures and rules. The military’s experience intervening against
mobilized citizens had generated a doctrinal orientation toward political neutrality, and
declining relations between the military and the political regime further motivated sol-
diers’ pursuit of institutional autonomy. When the revolution began, the army was poised
to respond with restraint, allowing the revolution to succeed without mass violence.
Conventional wisdom holds that the Tunisian military defected from the Ben Ali
regime in 2011 because the army was small, politically marginalized, and highly pro-
fessional. However, capacity does not explain the army’s inaction during the revolu-
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tion. Tunisian history reveals that the army’s small size and meager armaments were
no obstacle to the use of deadly force against protesters in 1978 or 1984. In addition,
the Tunisian armed forces demonstrated their capacity to impose order immediately after
Ben Ali’s fall, when soldiers quickly and competently reestablished security across the
country.94 Furthermore, interview evidence reveals that the officers’ discontent about
their political marginalization has been vastly overstated. It was Bourguiba, not Ben Ali,
who established that Tunisian soldiers would be banned from politics and the ruling party.
Yet far from resenting this exclusion, Tunisian officers universally acclaim the wisdom of
Bourguiba’s decision and fully embrace the separation of military and political affairs. In
sum, neither capacity nor political grievances explain the Tunisian military’s response in
2011.
The professionalism of Tunisian officers seems to better explain their behavior.
Even before its widely-lauded role in the 2011 revolution, the Tunisian army had been
described as a positive model for regional militaries because of its professionalism. While
this chapter broadly supports the Tunisianmilitary’s positive reputation, it is nevertheless
important to clarify the meaning of professionalism, a term which has taken on an impre-
cise and overly broad set of meanings according to different theorists, and even become
a catchall for positive military attributes. This dissertation finds that the critical factor
in soldiers’ response was the military’s prior commitment to restraint and nonviolence
toward civilians. Although previous research has labeled these attitudes “professional
values,” they are inherent neither to professional (versus conscript) armies, nor to highly-
trained and disciplined soldiers. Instead, soldiers’ response to the revolution was guided
by military doctrine, which had internalized, routinized, and formalized the practice of
nonviolent restraint. As the next chapter demonstrates, the traditional hallmarks of mili-
tary professionalism, technical expertise and institutional autonomy, did not prevent the
Egyptian armed forces from seizing power throughmass violence against civilians in 2013.
94. Compare the descent into chaos which followed the toppling of Saddam Hussein or Muammar
Gaddafi, for example, because the armed forces in those countries had collapsed or been disbanded.
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Chapter 4
Egypt: A Doctrine of Control
This chapter presents the first of two comparative case studies, which follow a simi-
lar form to the Tunisia case study. Along with Tunisia, Egypt and Syria are the two
countries whose Arab Spring revolutions created the greatest disruption to politics as
usual, although with far different outcomes. Despite the superficially similar role of the
Tunisian and Egyptian armies in the Arab Spring, the actions they took during the 2011
uprisings were fundamentally different. Instead of neutrality, the Egyptian Armed Forces
responded to the uprising by forcing the president from power and asserting military
control over the ensuing political transition. Meanwhile, the Syrian Armed Forces, de-
spite many similarities to their Egyptian counterparts, took the opposite approach to the
Arab Spring demonstrations, applying unrestrained military force to suppress them. The
brutality of the military response in Syria led not only to the fracturing of the armed
forces, but also to an armed uprising against the government. In each case, the military
followed a doctrine for domestic crises established over decades of experience.
Both Egypt and Syria boast large and well-trained armies, and both militaries are
seen as highly politicized. While Tunisia is considered a classic case of a professional,
non-political military, Egypt and Syria are paradigmatic examples of militaries based on
patronage and ethnicity, respectively. In Egypt, the military controls a substantial share of
the national economy, which has helped to subsidize a military budget above $4 billion an-
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nually since 2006 (including around $1 billion from US military aid). Retired officers, too,
participate in the military’s vast economic empire, reaping substantial financial rewards
after their years of service. Syria’s military is also active in industrial production and
construction, providing material benefits to officers. However, the Syrian armed forces
are best known to analysts for their ethnic composition. As in the civilian government,
the minority Alawi sect holds a disproportionate share of power and influence within the
military. Sunni Arabs, the majority ethnic group in Syria, are severely underrepresented
among the top brass and in elite units. Before the Arab Spring, conventional wisdom
held that patronage in Egypt and ethnic ties in Syria would guarantee the loyalty of the
armed forces to the regime and the political status quo. In 2011, this conventional thinking
failed in Egypt. Although the outcome in Syria was consistent with prior expectations,
I nevertheless reconsider how ethnicity came to play the role it did in the Syrian armed
forces, in light of the dissertation’s theory. While institutionalized ethnic bias contributed
to the Syrian military’s doctrine of combat, the army’s historical behavior is inconsistent
with the standard ethnicity argument.
As compared with Tunisia, both the Egyptian and Syrian armies played a larger
historic role, since independence, in their countries’ political and economic life. Many of
the definingmoments in Egyptian and Syrian history cast the armed forces in central roles,
for example the catastrophic defeat both nations suffered in the Six DayWar against Israel,
and the massacre at Hama, Syria, in 1982. The two countries, which had even been joined
in a political union during a critical period from 1958 to 1961, shared comparable levels of
professionalism but reacted in different ways to the challenge of the Arab Spring. I argue
that a critical difference between Egypt and Syria was the military doctrine for domestic
intervention that had developed in each country from the 1970s to the 2000s. Where the
Egyptians’ doctrine of control dictated that officers seize power at the regime’s expense,
the Syrians’ doctrine of war dictated an all-out military offensive against an uprising they
viewed as an existential threat to military and regime alike.
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∗ ∗ ∗
With generals holding the presidency for six consecutive decades, the armed forces
abstained from direct intervention in politics until February 11, 2011, when the Supreme
Council of the Armed Forces (SCAF) forced Mubarak to resign. Egypt’s Arab Spring,
known as the 25 January Revolution, succeeded in dislodging the unpopular autocrat
after thirty years in power. Yet the political result of the uprising was a reassertion of
military domination of the Egyptian state. In the wake of its decree removing Mubarak,
SCAF seized power directly, issuing constitutional decrees and serving as the country’s
executive authority until June 30, when Morsi was sworn into office. The military was
likely surprised by the narrow electoral defeat of its preferred candidate, General Ahmed
Shafik (who lost 48.3%–51.8% in the second round) but chose to allow Morsi, a member
of the Islamist Muslim Brotherhood, to take office. Only a year later, on the first an-
niversary of Morsi’s inauguration, massive protests erupted calling for his resignation,
and the military deemed Egypt’s experiment in pluralism a failure. Within a week, the
head of the Armed Forces, General Abdel Fattah el-Sisi, announced that the military had
removed Morsi from office. The military-appointed interim government then declared
the Brotherhood a terrorist organization, clearing the way for el-Sisi to replace him.1 For
Egypt, the upshot of the Arab Spring has been a further retrenchment of the political
power of the armed forces, even surpassing that of the Mubarak era (Brooks 2015, 29).
4.1 Foundations of Doctrine
Institutional Origins
Like the state itself, the Egyptian Army has created a proud myth of its lineage from
Pharaonic times, through Ottoman and mamluk rule, to the Free Officers’ revolt and the
1. Themilitary appointed a placeholder, interim President Adly Mansour, until el-Sisi was elected in 2014.
The vote was marred by the disqualification of the Muslim Brotherhood (winner of the past two elections),
a boycott by most political parties, and the presence of only one other candidate, the politically marginal
Hamdeen Sabahi (El-Ghobashy 2018).
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establishment of the republic.2 The modern Egyptian Army was established in the early
nineteenth century by Muhammad (Mehmet) Ali Pasha, whom most nationalists claim
as “the founder of modern Egypt” (Fahmy 1997, 12).3 The Pasha built a military academy
(now Africa’s oldest) in Cairo in 1811, and set out to build a modern, European-style army
on the organizational model of the Nizam-ı Cedid of Ottoman Sultan Selim III. To fill the
ranks, Muhammad Ali conscripted tens of thousands of fellahin (peasant farmers) and
indoctrinated them into a new national identity – that is, he trained them to consider
themselves Egyptians.4
In 1881, Egyptian Colonel Ahmed ʿUrabi organized a short-lived military coup
to challenge the entrenched, Turkish-speaking ruling elite. Unfortunately the mutiny,
known as the ʿUrabi Revolt, created a pretext for Great Britain to invade in “defense” of the
Khedive Tewfik Pasha. ʿUrabi’s forces were dispatched with relative ease by the British,
who established a “veiled protectorate” over the Khedivate of Egypt in 1882.5 The British
subordinated and further weakened the native army, while propping up the increasingly
illegitimate ruling class. To Egypt’s emergent nationalists, ʿUrabi’s daring challenge to the
elite inaugurated a “myth of national heroes in uniform” rising up to save Egypt, which
2. Today, nationalist and militarist imagery often features Pharaonic images blended with modern
military equipment.
3. Muhammad ʿAli Pasha al-Masʿud ibn Aga commanded the Ottoman army that, in alliance Britain,
drove French forces out of Egypt in 1801. He remained there after the French withdrawal, declared himself
Khedive of Egypt and Sudan (a title denoting greater autonomy within the Ottoman Empire), and raised his
own army. Muhammad Ali and his son, Ibrahim Pasha, fought a series of military campaigns, first on behalf
of Ottoman Sultan Mahmud II, and later against him. Muhammad Ali’s descendants ruled Egypt – albeit
under significant British influence – until the Free Officers’ coup in 1952. On Napoleon’s Egypt campaign,
see Cole (2007, chap. 12); on the establishment of Muhammad Ali’s reign, see Sayyid-Marsot (1984, chap.
3). On Muhammad Ali’s contribution to modernization, see Vatikiotis (1991, chap. 4).
4. According to Fahmy (1997, 19), “The Pasha’s army did indeed turn the population of Egypt into loyal
and devoted citizens of Egypt.” But the transformation of fellah into citizen was accomplished by force:
conscription was strongly resisted all across the country, and the awakening of nationalism among the
soldiers was more akin to propaganda than to self-discovery. Ultimately, Mohammed Ali – himself an
ethnic Albanian from Macedonia – fostered Egyptian nationalism in order to secure his own hereditary
rule.
5. Formally, Egypt remained an autonomous tributary state of the Ottoman Empire until World War I,
when Britain replaced the Khedivate with a protectorate called the Sultanate of Egypt. Members of the
Muhammad Ali dynasty continued to rule as sultans until 1922, and then as kings of the “independent”
Kingdom of Egypt until 1953. However, the British exercised de facto imperial rule over Egypt throughout
the entire period, 1882–1953.
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would provide a precedent for the Free Officers’ coup d’état in 1952 (Abul-Magd 2012,
152). Colonial domination continued even after 1922, when Britain unilaterally declared
Egyptian independence, and continued to inspire nationalist mobilization, especially in
the middle class.
In 1936, the first middle-class cadets were admitted to the Military Academy, pre-
viously reserved to members of the Egyptian upper class (Abdel-Malek 1968, 44). Many of
these new recruits, including Gamal Abdel Nasser, would go on to lead the Free Officers
Movement. The young officers identified strongly with their Egyptian national identity,
and suffered the humiliations of British domination and Egyptian military weakness with
growing discontent (El-Bishry 1979, 539-540).6 Despite a reduced British presence in
Egypt after the Anglo-Egyptian Treaty of 1936, a contingent of 10,000 British troops still
controlled the Suez Canal Zone, and the Egyptian King Farouk, then only sixteen years old,
was evidently incapable of standing up to the United Kingdom. It was in this context that
the Egyptian Army joined the Arab coalition against the newly-declared State of Israel in
1948 – and suffered a shocking defeat, known by Arabs as al-Nakba (the catastrophe).7
Lacking training, equipment, and experience, the Egyptian contingent felt betrayed by its
government as it suffered heavy losses. Their aspirations turned to their homeland; Nasser
wrote, “We were fighting in Palestine, but our dreams were in Egypt” (Rogan 2009, 267).
Ironically, public dissatisfaction with the defeat would come to strengthen the military
politically, when a group of officers deposed the monarchy in 1956.
The Egyptian army was designed as a mixed conscript and professional force,
6. The movement also had a distinct class element: junior officers of the middle class resented the
traditional privileges of the upper classes. Not only had the landowning elite, largely of Turkish or
Circassian descent, monopolized economic opportunities at the expense of “native” Egyptians, but they
had completely dominated the upper military ranks. Thus, the Free Officers – an ideologically diverse
group without a specific political program – acted quickly to enact agrarian reform in 1952 (Vatikiotis 1978,
205-209). However, socialism figured in Egyptian rhetoric only after Nasser became president in 1956.
7. Even today, the true causes of the Arab defeat in 1948 remain controversial (see for example, “Why the
Arabs were defeated,” Al-Jazeera, July 13, 2009). Unlike other British colonial subjects, the Egyptians had
seen almost no combat during World War II, and so were untested in battle (Kandil 2012, 11). Like other
Arab states, Egypt also underestimated Jewish combat strength and inadequately mobilized its population
(Pollack 2002, 15-27).
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with a large professional officer corps numbering about 100,000 men, and around 200,000
short-term conscripts serving for one to three years (IISS 2018, 329). In most countries
with conscription-based armies, the presence of so many regular citizens filling the ranks,
and the officers’ dependence on them to carry out their duties, tends to strengthen and
improve the relationship between the military and society. In Egypt, however, the social,
political, and economic strength of the professional officer corps dominates whatever
effect national service might have on military-society relations. Instead of conscripts
bringing the popular will into the military institution, conscripts simply join up with
“Military, Inc.,” for a short term of service (Marshall and Stacher 2012). An Egyptian
proverb suggests that military service has long been seen a means of subsistence for many
poor young men: “in kunta ʿāyiz taʾkul ʿaish, ruḥ li-l-gaysh” (if you want to eat bread, join
the army) (Sassoon 2016, 100). Indeed, soldiers generally enjoy a higher standard of living
than society as a whole (Jane’s 2016).
As a result of the military’s distinct corporate identity and socio-economic or-
ganization, the military enclave became an essential feature of Egyptian society. Cook
(2007, 14) defines the enclave as “an elite preserve that is in many ways separated from
society in military-only facilities such as schools, hospitals, clubs, and residential areas.”
Through this bifurcation into military and civilian spheres, the armed forces are able to
exist as a self-contained community apart from, and largely above, regular society. Under
Mubarak, there developed a “neo-Mamlukian military elite that lives in virtual isolation
from civilian society,” in Nasr City and other purpose-built military developments around
Cairo (Springborg 1989, 104). While the military is in some respects independent of
civilian society, most Egyptian families are linked in some way to the armed forces.
Therefore, despite the military’s economic and political autonomy, it retains a pervasive
influence at all levels of society.
Among professional officers, the isolation of military society fosters a distinctive
worldview, featuring, for example, a complete faith in the military as a modernizing force
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in Egyptian society (Cook 2007, 15). As (Frisch 2001, 1) argues, “the ethos and discourse
of the Egyptian armed forces resembles the style of the early and mid-twentieth century,”
such as gender roles and “The army continues to be the repository of military values.” This
distance from the population shapes the doctrine to be distrusting, and even fearful, of the
population. Likewise, the Egyptian public did not trust the military as much as Tunisians
did during the tumultuous days of the Arab Spring. These mutual suspicions ultimately
did not prevent the military from recognizing the end of the Mubarak regime and publicly
siding with demonstrators, but events following Mubarak’s departure demonstrate that
Egyptian army’s did not enjoy the same respectful relationship with the population that
Tunisia’s did.
The Minister of Defense and Military Production is the top-ranking uniformed
officer of the armed forces and their commander-in-chief. This means that unlike Tunisia
and most democracies, there is no civilian with direct oversight of the military except for
the president, who in practice is also a military officer. Egypt boasts the largest military
of any Arab country, with a total strength of 438,500 active and 479,000 reserve personnel
(IISS 2018). Egypt also began developing a capable air force in the 1960s, when the Soviet
Union supplied modern MiG-21 and Sukhoi Su-7 combat aircraft.8 Under Mubarak, who
was an accomplished air force officer, the air force became Egypt’s favored service (Cook
2007, 16). In an indication of Egypt’s history of civil-military tensions and elite infighting,
the presidency is protected by the praetorian Republican Guard (wwāt al-Ḥaras al-
Jumhūrī ), comprised of 24,000 carefully selected soldiers. It is the only military force
allowed to operate within the capital, Cairo.
Primary responsibility for internal security falls to the Ministry of Interior (MOI),
which is thought to employ at least 1.5 million police officers.9 The Egyptian National
8. Nearly all of these aircraft were destroyed in the Six Day War (most on the ground during initial
Israeli airstrikes), but were replaced by further acquisitions from the Soviet Union. As many as 54 later-
model MiG-21s are still in service in Egypt, alongside American F-16s, French Rafales, and a growing fleet
of brand new Russian MiG-35s (IISS 2018).
9. Walsh, “Why Was an Italian Graduate Student Tortured and Murdered in Egypt?”
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Table 4.1: Egyptian Military Ranks
Army Rank (in Arabic) Air Force NATO
General Officers
Field Marshal (Mushīr) — OF-10
General (Farīq ʾawwal) Air Chief Marshal OF-9
Liutenant General (Farīq) Air Marshal OF-8
Major General (Liwāʾ) Air Vice-Marshal OF-7
Brigadier General (ʿAmīd) Air Commodore OF-6
Senior Officers
Colonel (ʿAqīd) Group Captain OF-5
Lieutenant Colonel (Moqaddim) Wing Commander OF-4
Major (Raʾid) Squadron Leader OF-3
Police (ENP, al-Shurṭa al-Waṭaniyya al-Maṣriyya) is the country’s main police force. How-
ever, Egypt’s massive paramilitary forces, numbering nearly 400,000, are most impor-
tant in responding to popular uprisings. In particular, the Central Security Forces (CSF,
wwāt al-ʾAmn al-Markazī ) includes around 325,000 short-term conscripts, mainly used
for riot control and intimidation, and is widely considered the “battering ram” of the SSI
(the MoI’s secret intelligence service).10 As described below, a mutiny by CSF conscripts
in 1986 proved to be a pivotal moment in the development of the military’s doctrine for
domestic intervention.
The military’s participation in politics has changed over time, going through three
distinct phases under Nasser, Sadat, and Mubarak. Yet the military’s ultimate author-
ity has been the foundation of the Egyptian political regime despite the ebb and flow
of officers’ involvement in day-to-day governance. As Imad Harb (2003, 270) observes,
“Throughout these periods of changing political roles, the Egyptian military remained the
loyal repository of political power answerable only to a strong executive leadership in
the person of a former military officer (the President) and sure of its privileged position
within the polity.”
10. Mohamed Adam, “Brute force: Inside the Central Security Forces,” Egypt Independent (Cairo),
November 11, 2012. When called for national service, recruits are assigned to the branches of the armed
forces (mainly the army) according to their skill and education. Those with the poorest education and
vocational skills are sent to the CSF.
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Independence Movement
Officially, Egypt gained nominal independence from the United Kingdom in 1922 by dec-
laration of the British government. However, with a controlling stake in the Suez Canal
Company and 80,000 troops stationed along the waterway, the British continued to exert
a dominant influence over Egyptian economic and security policy. Complete national
independence was only achieved in the 1950s, when a new nationalist, republican gov-
ernment demanded the complete withdrawal of British forces and nationalized the Canal
by force. Behind these nationalist achievements was a group of soldiers known as the
Free Officers Movement, who led a coup d’état in 1952 and established the Republic of
Egypt. Among their leaders were Mohammed Naguib, Gamal Abdel Nasser, and Anwar
Sadat, who became Egypt’s first three presidents. By 1956, when the last British soldiers
withdrew from Suez, the Free Officers’ resistance to foreign occupation had turned them
into unimpeachable national heroes, endowingmilitary leaders fromNasser to el-Sisi with
a powerful nationalist legitimacy.
Kandil (2012, 9-10) points to three main factors motivating soldiers to revolt in
1952, each of which impinged directly on the military’s image and corporate interests: hu-
miliation at home and abroad, the increased reliance on the military for domestic repres-
sion, and transferring control of military affairs from elected government to the monarch.
After their ignominous defeat in Palestine, soldiers returned home to find domestic po-
litical tensions spiraling out of control. King relied the army to repress civilian demon-
strators, especially after thousands of police officers joined the protests (El-Bishry 1979,
292-95). The protests continued intermittently until 1952, and escalated after the British
Army captured the Ismailia Police Station by force on January 25, after which rioters set
fire to downtown Cairo.11 The Egyptian military stepped in to restore order, but officers
now felt like the henchmen of an illegitimate political regime (Aly 1994, 63). Several
11. In 2009, Mubarak decreed a National Police Day holiday on 25 January in commemoration of this
event. Protesters in 2011 selected this day to highlight police brutality, starting what would become the 25
January Revolution.
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groups within the mid-ranking officer corps began organizing a nationalist revolution.
The Free Officers Movement, organized by Nasser and with Mohammed Naguib
as its figurehead, was the most effective of these factions, and successfully seized power
on July 23, 1952. After the coup, the officers established a Revolutionary Command
Council, which framed itself as the “vanguard of the revolution” against the ancien régime
(Cook 2007, 66). The revolt established a specific form of nationalism to legitimate its
exceptional status in Egyptian society. “The military has derived a significant measure
of legitimacy from nationalist narratives that place the officers at the center of struggles
against colonialism, external aggression, and the realization of the ‘national will’” (Cook
2007, 28). Naguib became Egypt’s first president, but Nasser soon gathered the political
strength to replace him. In 1956, a public referendum overwhelmingly ratified a new
constitution and Nasser’s election as president. In July of that year, Nasser took the bold
step of nationalizing the Suez Canal, provoking a tripartite invasion of British, French, and
Israeli forces. Despite its military disadvantage, Egypt prevailed in the diplomatic contest,
and the last foreign troops left Egyptian territory in March 1957. Thus, the Suez Crisis
solidified the popularity and political legitimacy of both the president and the military in
the first decade of Egyptian self-rule.
Unlike in Tunisia, the Egyptian military’s active role in national defense has fur-
ther legitimated the military and enhanced its status as guardian of the nation. As the
largest Arab army, Egypt led coalitions against Israel in 1948, 1967, and 1973. Following
the Arab defeat in 1948, resistance against the “Zionist entity” became a major source of
legitimacy for themilitary. Yet Egypt’s losses in 1967were again catastrophic, exacerbated
by Egypt’s ongoing involvement in the civil war in Yemen (Ferris 2012). After the defeat,
“demands that the armed forces should be accountable began to be loudly expressed in
Egyptian society. A population that had been promised the strongest army in the region
suddenly realised it had been misled as a result of the gross negligence of its leadership,
which led to massive defeat” (Karawan 2011, 44). Widespread protests began in 1968,
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“sparked by lenient sentences meted out to those in the air force high command convicted
of negligence for their contribution to the 1967 debacle.” (Springborg 1989, 96) As a
result of the protests, the initially light punishments were reversed in 1968, and relations
between the military and society reached a nadir.
Humiliated and held in public contempt after al-naksa (the setback), the military
establishment immediately retrenched and redoubled their commitment to Egypt’s na-
tional defense. Aiming to recover its stature and redeem its purpose – and prodded
along by Nasser’s March 30 Program – the military “relinquished its significant role in
the day-to-day governance of Egypt in favor of a mission that focused almost exclusively
on preparing for another round of warfare with Israel” (Cook 2007, 66-67). Rallying
around the slogan “everything for the battle,” the military established first claim to the
nation’s resources, and the Armed Forces’ total personnel swelled to a historic peak of
nearly 900,000 men (Springborg 1989, 95). Reinforced and refocused, the military sought
its redemption in what became known as the October War. In a surprise attack on the
Jewish holiday of Yom Kippur, October 6, 1973, Egyptian troops crossed the Suez Canal
and stormed deep into the Israeli-occupied Sinai Peninsula.12 Within three weeks, Israel
had regrouped and put the Egyptians back on the defensive, before the international
community brokered a ceasefire. Despite their rather modest accomplishments on the
battlefield, Egypt accomplished its ultimate purpose: to force Israel to take the Egyptian
threat seriously, and to restore pride to the Egyptian people. Thus, the Arab-Israeli conflict
eventually enhanced the nationalist legitimacy that the Egyptian military had claimed in
1952.
12. The Yom Kippur War, as it is called in Israel, began October 6, 1973, with a joint Egyptian-Syrian
surprise attack on the Israeli-occupied Sinai and Golan Heights. According to the Egyptian commander
Mohamed El-Gamasy (1993, 180), the date was chosen to catch Israeli soldiers off-guard during their
celebrations.
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Relationship to the Ruling Party
From 1952, the Egyptian state developed a large civilian bureaucracy, which neither in-
filtrated nor directly controlled by the military, but was instead developed and led by
soldiers-turned-politicians. The domestic political sphere soon took the shape of a police
state, enforced by the internal security forces of the Ministry of Interior (MoI) and the
General Intelligence Directorate (GID, Jihāz al-Mukhābarāt al-ʿĀmma; widely known as
the Mukhabarat). In addition to the GID, an officially secret organization reporting di-
rectly to the presidency, the MoI and MoD also controlled their own parallel intelligence
agencies. Under the MoI, the State Security Investigations Service (SSI,Mabāḥith ʾAmn al-
Dawla) focused entirely on internal security and is believed to employ 100,000 personnel
and at least as many informants.13 As JohnWaterbury (1983, 338) writes, “There have been
police states more repressive and brutal than Egypt’s of the 1960s, but it is significant that
both the [political] left and the right eventually concurred that it was a question of a police
state.”
At the same time, the military remained deeply influential, despite its hands-
off approach to day-to-day governance. Since 1952, every Egyptian president except
Mohamed Morsi, who served only one year after the 2011 uprisings, has been a senior
military officer.14 Over time, the military ceded greater control over political develop-
ment and policy management to the nominally civilian president and his administration,
while retaining influence at the highest levels of government.15 Beginning with the Sadat
13. Declan Walsh, “Why Was an Italian Graduate Student Tortured and Murdered in Egypt?” New York
Times, August 15, 2017. The SSI was formally dissolved on March 15, 2011, as a response to the 25 January
Revolution. However, its functions and organization continued, and the agency was reconstituted after the
coup in 2013 as the National Security Agency (NSA, Qiṭāʿ al-ʾAmn al-Waṭani; also known as Homeland
Security). The organization gained international notoreity after an Italian PhD student, Giulio Regeni, was
killed in Cairo, when it was revealed that the NSA had been tracking him prior to his death.
14. I exclude civilian acting Presidents Sufi Abu Taleb, who held office for eight days after Sadat’s
assassination, and Adly Mansour, who was appointed by SCAF after Morsi’s removal. After the 25 January
Revolution, the Chairman of the SCAF, Field Marshal Mohamed Hussein Tantawi also served as acting
president.
15. A former senior military officer reported that in the early 2000s, “at the highest level of the Egyptian
state there is no appreciable difference between military and civilian” Cook (2007, 73). This pattern was
briefly reversed after the 25 January Revolution, but has been strengthened under President Abdel Fattah
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presidency (1970–1981) and continuing through Mubarak’s term in office (1981–2011) the
army became increasingly autonomous from the civilian regime. In Egypt, Hazem Kandil
(2012, 2) observes, “The armed forces and the security establishment workwith rather than
for the political apparatus” (emphasis in original); therefore, the nature of the political
system is shaped in large part by the relative weight of these three institutions.
Despite the predominant role of the internal security forces in day-to-day gover-
nance, the armed forces have remained the ultimate guardian of the Egyptian state. Since
the 1950s, they have presided over a “military dominated” system in which civilians can
lead the government only with the support of the military, which retained the right to
intervene should the government come to threaten its core interests (Cook 2007, chap.
3). Although Egypt’s generals ceded control of day-to-day politics to civilian politicians,
they have always stood at a short distance from politics, ready to intervene when neces-
sary. To this end, the Military Intelligence and Reconnaissance Administration (ʾIdārat al-
Mukhābarāt al-Ḥarbiyya wa-l-Istiṭlāʿ) has carried out extensive surveillance within Egypt,
exceeding the traditional military intelligence mission of spying on foreign militaries and
the internal mission of surveiling Egypt’s own military personnel.16 Traditionally, the
presidency and the military have formed a close partnership, with the military entrusting
the president – almost always a senior military officer17 – as “the steward of the state and
political development” (Cook 2007, 73). Despite periods of tension between the presidency
and senior officer corps, the relationship has mostly been symbiotic and cooperative: “The
presidency remains the crucial institutional mechanism of the military establishment’s
political influence” (70). By contrast, the hegemonic ruling party has always been sec-
ondary to the military-executive partnership. Nasser’s Arab Socialist Union was never
el-Sisi.
16. For example, in 1970–71, Sadat relied onMilitary Intelligence to protect him from rivals with influence
in the civilian intelligence agencies. However, the same agency failed in its more direct mission, to detect
the plot within the military to assassinate the president. Military Intelligence had reportedly investigated
the assassin, Lt. Khalid Islambouli, only weeks prior, but failed to discover anything unusual (Sirrs 2010,
144–145).
17. Egyptian generals have always resigned from the military prior to holding civilian office, including
the presidency; however, the minister of defense remains a military position.
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able to operate within the military (Springborg 1989, 96). Its successor under Sadat and
Mubarak, the National Democratic Party (NDP), received support from the military, but
senior officers did not consider it essential to sustaining their own political position (Cook
2007, 70).
Nasser, 1956–1970 After the coup, Egypt became a “military society,” in the words of
Egyptian historian Anouar Abdel-Malek (1968). The Free Officers infiltrated the civilian
bureaucracy under the pretext of carrying out the “revolution” against the ancien régime,
but their immediate goal was to sideline potential challengers to Nasser and his collab-
orators (Kandil 2012, 17). The struggle for power left Nasser significantly paranoid, and
he filled all important civilian positions with close allies from the military (18). However,
in leaving the military for government careers, officers turned their focus from national
defense to regime security. Men like Zakaria Mohieddin and Ali Sabri – both military offi-
cers who went on to head themukhabarat and later serve as prime minister – contributed
to building Egypt’s massive internal security apparatus.18 Thus, the military began to
develop its autonomy from the civilian regime even as former military officers dominated
the political sphere.
The Six-DayWar of 1967 was perhaps the most important turning point in modern
Egyptian civil-military relations. The humiliation in Palestine was understood as a per-
verse result of the politicization of the armed forces, leading both the president and the
officer corps to turn firmly away from direct involvement in politics (Hashim 2011, 72).
Nasser promulgated the “March 30 Program,” which purged the powerful army chief, Field
Marshal Abdel Hakim Amer (formerly Nasser’s closest friend) and Amer’s allies within
the military, while legally reclaiming control of the armed forces (Hashim 2011, 68). In
practice, though, with Israel continuing to occupy Egyptian territory in Sinai, the army
remained too important to marginalize (Springborg 1989, 96). Nasser died suddenly of a
heart attack in 1970, and was succeeded by his vice president, Anwar Sadat.
18. Both Mohieddin and Sabri made the progression from Free Officer, to director of the GID, to prime
minister, to vice president of Egypt.
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Sadat, 1970–1981 As Sadat came to power, the defeat of 1967 still weighed heavily in
the national consciousness. Faced with an ongoing economic crisis – partly caused by
the ongoing “War of Attrition” against Israel – and a weakened and deeply unpopular
military, Sadat launched what he called the “Corrective Revolution,” a series of leadership
and policy changes that aimed to restore Egypt’s economic and military strength. He
won popular approval by reining in the power of the secret police, in part by dismissed
two of the most powerful figures in the regime, Vice President Ali Sabri and Interior
Minister Sharawy Gomaa. To further address popular demands, Sadat pushed the military
to prepare for a renewed confrontation with Israel, but in so doing, to eliminate the
politicization that he saw as the root of the 1967 failure. To this end, Sadat set out to
demilitarize the civilian government, first by replacingmost of the former military officers
who had been serving asministers and governors (Springborg 1989, 95-6). He then pushed
the top brass hard to develop a winning strategy for the coming fight. The October War of
1973 was only a partial success, but it generated a sense of euphoria and won Sadat public
acclaim as the “hero of the crossing.” Egyptians broadly believed Sadat had redeemed
the national humiliation of 1967, at least partially, and considered Sadat’s “Revolution” a
triumph. After the war, Sadat continued to demilitarize the state by decreasing the direct
involvement of military officers in the civil administration and political ranks.19
Meanwhile, the military’s economic interests grew, thanks to the two policies
that were Sadat’s legacy: the economic opening (infitāḥ; i.e. liberalization), and the
diplomatic opening to the West and Israel. Both policies required Sadat to ignore public
opinion, which eventually led to the bread riots in 1977 and the “autumn of fury”20 in 1981,
which ended in Sadat’s assassination.21 Themilitary offered Sadat only tepid support, but
did not oppose him in this critical moment. After the landmark Camp David Accords,
19. For example, 38% of the government ministers Sadat inherited from Nasser started in military careers.
From 1971–1974, only 17% of Sadat’s cabinet appointees started in the military. After infitah (1974), the
percentage declined further, to 7.8% (Hinnebusch 1981, 448).
20. Prominent Egyptian journalist Mohamed Heikal coined this term in the title of his 1983 book.
21. In the words of Jason Brownlee (2012, 15), “Bold diplomacy required fierce autocracy.”
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which permanently ended the decades-long, recurring conflict with Israel, the military
was substantially relieved of its responsibility to prepare for an imminent war. The re-
duced threat to national defense, combined with the influx of American military aid as a
result of the peace deal, left the military with a relative wealth of resources to expand its
industrial ventures. In addition, the military downsizing implemented after 1973 targeted
mainly the lower ranks, creating a top-heavy military hierarchy full of senior officers with
the influence and opportunity to develop commercial interests. The military’s economic
ambitions had begun immediately after the Free Officers revolt, and began to deepen in
the 1970s. Sadat’s infitah economic policy created a new Egyptian capitalism, but did not
privatize the public sector, which continued to grow as a share of total employment even
as wages stagnated (Aulas 1982).
Mubarak, 1981-2011 Sadat’s efforts to reduce the size and political reach of the armed
forces largely succeeded, but had engendered significant dissatisfaction among the of-
ficer corps by the time of his assassination (Springborg 1989, 97-98). Upon assuming
the presidency, Hosni Mubarak – only recently been promoted to the vice presidency
from a distinguished military career – took the natural step of seeking reconciliation
with the officer corps. However, in his efforts to placate the military, he inadvertently
empowered its charismatic commander-in-chief, Field Marshal Abdel Halim Abu Ghazala.
In the 1980s, the situation resembled MaxWeber’s (1978) “paradox of the sultan”, in which
“the ruler’s increased reliance on the military gradually transforms him from superior
to subordinate” Springborg (1989, 104). In 1989, Mubarak found an excuse to replace
Abu Ghazala, when the American FBI discovered his involvement in a scheme to illegally
import missile parts from the US. Ultimately, Abu Ghazala’s firing removed a rival to
Mubarak’s position, but did not reverse the military’s deepening autonomy.
Throughout the Mubarak era, the military played a secondary role to the civil-
ian regime in politics, and to the MoI in security. With the military’s core interest in
national defense relatively secure, senior officers turned increasingly to their economic
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interests. Mubarak’s overall strategy to maintain military loyalty was to share patronage
and bestow economic benefits on both military-run industries and retired officers’ private
businesses (Bou Nassif 2013). Throughout Mubarak’s presidency, the military’s economic
role deepened, and its diverse portfolio of manufacturing, infrastructure development,
agribusiness, and services made the military the single most important economic entity in
the country (Cook 2007, 19). Themilitary’s economic and industrial and interests became a
source of independent power and influence for the armed forces, but also gave themilitary
a greater stake in the continuity of the regime. In this sense, Bou Nassif (2013, 509) goes so
far as to claim that “Mubarakwedded senior military officers to his regime… by enhancing
their material privileges and allowing them to profit from their postretirement positions”
(emphasis mine). His strategy achieved its immediate goal of keeping the officer corps
happy, but did not create a deep interdependence between the military and the regime.
Despite empowering the military economically, Mubarak failed to tie these gains to his
personal continuation in the presidency. In addition, the growing influence of Mubarak’s
businessman son, Gamal, increased the distance between officers’ economic interests and
those of the regime. Gamal represented a rising capitalist class, which could pose a threat
to the military economy. Instead, the 25 January Revolution gave officers an opportunity
to sideline their challengers and, ultimately, increase their economic power to new heights
(Marshall 2015).
4.2 Past Interventions
Egypt’s largest mass demonstrations of the twentieth century were the Black Saturday
burning of downtown Cairo in 1952 (an immediate precursor to the Free Officers’ coup),
student protests in 1968, 1971, and 1972, the bread riots in 1977, and the CSF riots in
1986 (Springborg 2009, 14). Internal security forces from the MoI were able to suppress
the student protests, but the other three cases overwhelmed their capacity, requiring an
emergency appeal to the military for backup. It should be noted that all protests were
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illegal under Nasser, who justified the suppression of freedoms of speech with the slogan,
“No voice above the voice of battle” (Drainville 2015). Like in Tunisia, the army served as a
backstop to the internal security forces in cases of civil disturbances. The Egyptian Armed
Forces consider themselves the state’s last line of defense against all security threats, for-
eign or domestic. However, the military is reluctant to get involved in domestic security
issues unless the civilian authorities prove unable to resolve them. Therefore, military
interventionwithin Egyptian territory has been rare. The first major incident took place in
January 1977, when Sadat ordered the army to confront rioters protesting price increases
on bread and other staples. The army objected to playing any role in restoring public
order, but complied after Sadat agreed to withdraw his unpopular decision. The second
incident came in 1986, when thousands of CSF conscripts mutinied and began rioting
around the capital. Here, the military readily agreed to clean up the embarrassing failure
of the MoI, thus emphasizing the military’s superiority over the civilian internal security
forces and demonstrating the regime’s dependence on the military for protection.
Bread riots of 1977 Sadat’s infitah economic plan began in 1974, on the heels of the
October War, and quickly reversed the government’s gains in public approval. In Septem-
ber 1976, transport workers in Cairo started a strike that continued until the army began
using its own buses to break it. Despite this and other early warning signs of the blowback
to come, and under strong pressure from the International Monetary Fund, Sadat decided
in January 1977 to end state subsidies on basic foodstuffs and other necessities. Prices
rose dramatically overnight, and the public responded with “spontaneous insurrection
from Aswan to Alexandria” (Aulas 1982). While the riots were a popular response to
oppressive economic conditions, there were also signs of organization: identical anti-
regime literature appeared simultaneously across the country, systematic attempts to
cut internal communications, coordinated attacks on neighboring police stations, and
selectivity of targets, concentrating on state property (?, 239). As rioting spread, the police
were quickly overwhelmed by the size of the crowds, despite their rapid resort to deadly
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force.22 Sadat’s government looked to be on the verge of toppling; he even secured refuge
in Iran, in case he should be forced into exile, from Mohammad Reza Shah.23
Thebread riots of 1977were one of themost severemoments of crisis in presidential-
military relations to date (Cook 2007, 73). As the police proved inadequate to the chal-
lenge, Sadat called upon the military to suppress the protests. But rather than rising
to the regime’s defense, the military entered into a negotiation. The army chief, Gen.
Abdel Ghani el-Gamasy, “made it clear to Sadat that the army would not intervene before
price increases were cancelled” (Karawan 2011, 46). Only after Sadat reversed the price
increases did Gamasy lead a military intervention restore order (Brownlee 2012, 25). The
results of the riots were 79 civilian deaths (mostly at the hands of police, but some were
also killed by the army) and a hobbled government, which abandoned its goal of reducing
subsidies (Jackson 1981, 61). For the military, the uprising was evidence of the civilian
leadership’s incompetence, and proof that the armed forces were the ultimate guarantor
of Egypt’s peace and security. Overall, officers blamed Sadat’s government for creating
the necessity for military intervention, but believed their intervention had successfully
restored order and stability.
CSF riots of 1986 Major rioting reoccurred early in the reign of Mubarak, but this
time, the rioters came from the MoI itself. as thousands poorly paid and poorly armed
conscripts mutinied from the Central Security Forces. In February 1986, a rumor spread
among recruits that their national service, already the maximum three years, would be
further extended without an increase in rank or salary. On February 25, thousands of CSF
conscripts in the Haram district of Giza (near the Great Pyramids) mutinied, pouring out
of their camp and setting vehicles and luxury hotels ablaze. Both the rumor and news of
the mutiny spread to CSF bases in six other governorates, and a total of around 25,000
22. On January 19, the US consulate in Alexandria reported, “people are dying” in confrontations
with police. Consulate Alexandria, “Renewed Demonstrations in Alexandria,” Wikileaks Cable:
1977ALEXAN00065_c, dated January 19, 1977.
23. Instead, it was the Shah who fled to exile in Egypt, only two years later.
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conscripts joined the violent demonstrations.24 For two days, rioting continued as the
MoI failed to restore order.
Following Sadat’s assassination in 1981, the government had enacted a sweeping
Emergency Law, which authorized the military to intervene with practically unlimited
force on Egyptian territory. Now, Mubarak called on the armed forces to crush the
rebellion. The officer corps, led by Field Marshal Abu Ghazala, was ambivalent about
the request: “The military looked upon this motley collection of illiterate peasants with
very mixed feelings. On the one hand it did not want to be involved in suppressing
public disorder, but it did not favor resources being allocated to another barracked force”
(Springborg 1989, 101-102). Ultimately, armed troops running amok inside of Egypt was
intolerable to the military, and the officers chose to intervene with full military force. The
military unleashed artillery barrages and airstrikes on the hapless conscripts, officially
resulting in 107 deaths.
With order restored, Mubarak fired the Minister of Interior, Ahmed Rushdy, and
the incident was regarded as a massive embarrassment for the MoI. Meanwhile, the inter-
vention strengthened the military politically, and especially improved the personal influ-
ence of Abu Ghazala.25 Above all, the CSF riots, like the bread riots before them, proved
that the civilians of the MoI could not guarantee public security. The regime’s reliance
on the military underlined the reality that the real protector of the regime was the armed
forces (Springborg 1989, 102). Military elites also used their political clout to block various
proposals to strengthen the CSF, which might have improved the forces’ effectiveness
and cohesion, but also could have allowed the MoI to threaten the military (Springborg
PAGE). Thus, the balance of power was maintained, with the military enjoying ultimate
control over state security. At the same time, the generals demonstrated zero tolerance
for popular dissent, and sought to deter future uprisings: “The army also craves stability:
the name of the game is social peace and national unity. Although the leadership cannot
24. Adam, “Brute force.”
25. Adam, “Brute force.”
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be characterised as populist, the army is made up of conscripts and the generals do not
want a repeat of January 1977 or April 1986” (Karawan 2011, 46).
By the 1970s, Egyptian soldiers began avoiding intervention in political crises,
unless and until the civilian authorities proved incapable of resolving the situation and
restoring public order. By remaining uninvolved until the eleventh hour, the armed forces
maintained their position as arbiter of domestic political contests. On the rare occasions
when they were forced to play this role, the officers could rely on their overwhelming
superiority of arms to reestablish control, all while dictating terms to the parties in dispute.
Together, these military’s experiences of domestic intervention in the twentieth century
served to confirm the validity of this doctrine for domestic intervention in the minds of
the senior officer corps. As I discuss in section 4.5, it was this same playbook that the
generals turned to when unrest began again in 2011.
4.3 Foreign Influence
Since the late 1970s, American military aid has dominated Egypt’s foreign cooperation
landscape. Each year, the US provides over one billion dollars inmilitary aid, in the form of
an account which Egypt’s government uses to purchase military equipment and services
from American suppliers (Sharp 2018a, 31-2).26 Egypt ranks among the largest recipients
of military aid in the world, currently surpassed only by Afghanistan, Iraq, and Israel;27
however, US security cooperation has had a far smaller effect on military doctrine and
behavior in Egypt than in Tunisia for two main reasons. First, only a tiny fraction of total
American aid is used for military training and education. Therefore, instead of influencing
the behavior of Egyptian officers, the aid reduced their dependence on the political regime,
thus enhancing their political power and encouraging a more interventionist role that is
26. Egypt has also received at least $100 million in US economic aid every year since the late 1970s, with
much higher levels (nearly one billion dollars annually) until the mid-1990s. Between 1946 and 2016, Egypt
received a total of $78.6 billion (current dollars, i.e. not adjusted for inflation) in bilateral foreign aid from
the United States (23).
27. Israel has received a larger US military aid allocation than Egypt each year since the late 1970s.
Currently, the US provides $3.8 billion annually (Sharp 2018b).
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counter to Western doctrine. Second, Egypt was not a consistent Western ally during
the Cold War, but instead switched from Soviet to American patronage in the late 1970s.
By that time, the future President Mubarak had already done advanced military training
in the Soviet Union, been promoted to Commander of the Air Force, and reached the
age of 50. Thus, Mubarak and his contemporaries in the military lived their formative
years under Soviet, not Western, tutelage. This is a critical difference between Egypt and
Tunisia, where Western military doctrine and political ideas have been a core component
of the overall military education system and the philosophy and doctrine of the armed
forces since independence.
Education and Training
Egypt’s foreign military relationships have been far less constant than Tunisia’s. Initially,
Egypt began in the American orbit: the Free Officers shared their intentions with the US
Embassy shortly before the 1952 coup d’état and pledged to protect American interests. In
return, the US lent critical support by interceding with Britain not to intervene on behalf
of a king they already disliked (Kandil 2012, 15). However, Egypt’s relations with the
West soon deteriorated over issues including the Suez Canal and the establishment of a
Jewish state in Palestine. To counter Western support for Israel, Nasser aligned Egypt
diplomatically and militarily with the Soviet Union (Oweidat et al. 2008, 4). As a result,
Egyptian officers received foreign military training primarily in the Soviet Union and
other non-Western countries through the late 1970s. Table 4.2 lists the most senior leaders
of the political-military elite, including ministers of defense (most of whom achieved the
highest military rank, FieldMarshal, and simultaneously served as commander-in-chief of
the armed forces) and presidents. Among these leaders, only Field Marshal Ali (Minister
of War in 1973), Gen. Sobhy, and President el-Sisi trained in NATO countries, while
the others trained in the Soviet Union or received no foreign training at all. Compare
with Tunisia, where virtually every senior military leader has received training in the US,
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Table 4.2: Senior Leaders’ Military Ranks and Foreign Training
Rank* Name Born Held Office NATO Soviet
President
LTC Gamal Abdel Nasser 1918 1956-1970
COL Anwar Sadat 1918 1970-1981
ACM Hosni Mubarak 1928 1981-2011 X
FM Abdel Fattah el-Sisi 1954 2012-2014 (MoD)2014-pres. (Pres.) X
Minister of Defense
FM Abdel Hakim Amer 1919 1956-1967
FM Ahmad Ismail Ali 1917 1973-1973 X
FM Abdel Ghani el-Gamasy 1921 1974-1978
FM Ahmed Badawi 1927 1980-1981 X
FM Mohammed Aly Fahmy 1920 1975-1978† X
FM Abdel Halim Abu Ghazala 1930 1981-1989 X
FM Mohamed Hussein Tantawi 1935 1991-2012
GEN Sedky Sobhy 1955 2014-pres. X
*FM: Field Marshal; GEN: General; ACM: Air Chief Marshal; COL: Colonel; LTC: Lt. Colonel.
†Served as Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces, but not Minister of Defense.
France, or both, and the limited influence of American education on the Egyptians is clear.
Despite Egypt’s reliance on the Soviets during this period, the military did not
fully embrace Soviet doctrine for several reasons. First, Nasser rejected the Communist
measure of attaching political commissars to army units to report on the officers, pre-
ferring a less ideological, and more personalistic, model of direct control and pervasive
surveillance (Kandil 2012, 14).28 Second, even though Egypt was officially a socialist
regime at the time, Soviet Communism resonated little with the majority of Egyptians,
inside and outside the military, because of its fervent atheism. Third, Soviets officers’
attitudes toward their Egyptian clients tended toward haughtiness and disdain, creating
friction in the relationship. The Six-Day War, which came right in the midst of a Soviet
campaign to arm Egypt with modern weaponry, did not help the situation: “The Soviets
28. Compare Syria, where al-Asad pursued an ideological model more in line with Soviet doctrine (see
section 5.3).
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were staggered by the magnitude of the Egyptian catastrophe [in 1967]. Embarrassment
over the failure of their weaponry in the hands of their Arab allies made them resolve to
seriously train the Egyptians, even if it meant treading on their toes.… [Officers] were not
at all fond of their ‘boorish’ Soviet patrons. The Soviet advisers were considered coarse
louts who did nothing to hide their contempt for Egyptian military prowess. Moreover,
the Soviets had taken over Egyptian bases and acted as if they owned them” (Hashim
2011, 71). To make matters worse, Egypt’s military and economic debt to the Soviets then
totaled $4 billion (more than $15 billion in 2018 dollars), and further Soviet aid was getting
harder to come by. In 1972, with secret preparations well underway for the surprise attack
on Israel, Sadat abruptly expelled all 7,752 Soviet advisers, weapons experts, field troops,
and dependents from Egypt (Seale 1989, 191). Sadat’s risky display of displeasure paid off,
and Soviet aid reached unprecedented levels to both Egypt and Syria over the next year
(192).
Empowered by his popularity after the semi-victory of the October 1973War, Pres-
ident Sadatmoved to break Egypt’s twenty-year relationshipwith the Soviet Union, which
he considered an unreliable and difficult partner. Instead, Sadat began a realignment
with the United States, a better fit for his anti-communist views and plans for economic
liberalization. The new alliance ultimately succeeded because the Americans offered ma-
jor inducements, military and economic aid, which reassured the Egyptian elite, and
especially the military, that its interests would be well served in a Western partnership.
When Sadat stunned the world by visiting Israel in 1978, his most senior officers sent him
cables of support. As the peace with Israel was signed, Sadat directed the military to focus
prepare instead for regional conflicts, and to restructure itself as a (smaller) rapid-response
force, although this restructuring was never accomplished. The new peace did reduce the
need for such a massive army, however, and the military’s total size shrank by nearly one-
half over the next decade (Springborg 1989, 95).29 The officers did not warmly embrace a
29. The size of the armed forces has grown only modestly since the 1980s, totaling 438,500 men under
arms in 2018 (IISS 2018, 329).
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further reduction in the size and ambition of the military, although they appreciated the
massive influx of American military financing and equipment.
Officer training in the United States started in 1978 with a $200,000 IMET program
(Brownlee 2012, 29). While many Egyptian officers have benefited from education and
training abroad, they represent a smaller share of the total officer class than in Tunisia.
Another aspect of cooperation has been a biennial joint training exercise called Operation
Bright Star, which was first carried out in 1980 (39). In the words of one American
participant: “Bright Star presents the opportunity for sharing doctrine, tactics, and anal-
ysis, but at its core it has always been focused on personal engagement and fostering
relationships that may yield diplomatic opportunities – or, as appears to be the case now,
may not.”30 This is because, as Robert Springborg told theNew York Times in 2013, military
supplier relationships buy access, not influence.31 Overall, joint exercises and educational
exchanges have provided channels of communication between Egyptian and American
military leaders, but they have not resulted in American influence over Egyptian decision
makers.
BecauseWestern military education was not foundational to the philosophy of the
Egyptian armed forces, its influence on Egyptian doctrine and officers’ attitudes on core
questions of civil-military relations is more limited than in Tunisia. The prevailing attitude
among Tunisian officers, that the United States was a model for Tunisia in its political
and military development, seems not to be widely shared among Egyptian officers who
received similar training in the United States. For example, el-Sisi himself attended the
United States Army War College in 2006. The capstone of his studies was a research
paper, entitled “Democracy in the Middle East,” whose central thesis is that Western
democracy is “a secular entity” and “unlikely to be favorably received by the vast majority
30. John McRae, “Operation Bright Star: A U.S. Soldier on Training with Egypt’s Army,” Daily Beast,
August 26, 2013. https://www.thedailybeast.com/operation-bright-star-a-us-soldier-on-training-
with-egypts-army.
31. Eric Schmitt, “Cairo Military Firmly Hooked to U.S. Lifeline,”e New York Times, August 20, 2013.
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of Middle Easterners.”32 Current Minister of Defense Sidki Sobhy, who attended the War
Collegewith el-Sisi, expressed a similar skepticism of democracy as amodel for the region,
while leveling a sweeping critique of Western foreign policy towards the Middle East.33
Moreover, despite the presence of hundreds of Egyptian officers in American military
schools each year, Egyptian soldiers are trained to be guarded and reveal little about the
Egyptian Armed Forces. As a result, there is little fraternization between American and
Egyptian officers during foreign training and education, unlike with Tunisian officers
(Hashim 2011, 63).
To be sure, the Egyptian Armed Forces do benefit from training with the world’s
most advanced military. The fact that el-Sisi and Sobhy, two of the army’s brightest rising
stars, were sent to America for an advanced training course demonstrates that Egyptian
officers see some value in American military training. However, this does not mean
they embrace the political and military values they encounter in the US. Moreover, the
Egyptian army does not depend on American training – indeed, it does not seem that
American training has had a significant impact on the operation of the Egyptian Armed
Forces. For example, the US military has pushed the Egyptians for more than fifteen
years to reorient its force structure, acquisitions, and doctrine from conventional warfare
to counterterrorism, border security, and antismuggling operations, notably without suc-
cess.34 As demonstrated by senior commanders’ educational backgrounds (table 4.2), US
training of the Egyptian Armed Forces began in earnest only after the foundational period
of institutional development, and even today only a relatively small percentage of senior
officers receive a Western military education. Therefore, unlike Tunisia, Egypt has not
been influenced sufficiently by US training to induce doctrinal change.35
32. Abdel Fattah el-Sisi, “Democracy in the Middle East,” U.S. Army War College (Carlisle, PA), Mar. 15,
2006, 3.
33. Sedki Sobhy, “The U.S. Military Presence in the Middle East: Issues and Prospects,” U.S. Army War
College, Mar. 18, 2006.
34. “U.S. Dismayed Egypt Still Views Israel as Chief Adversary, WikiLeaks Cables Show,”Associated Press,
December 31, 2010.
35. For example, there were no noticeable results of a stark decrease in the number of Egyptian trainees
from 2015 to 2016 (1,407 trainees to just 477) after the US Government Accountability Office reported to
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Military Financing
Rather than military training, the core of US-Egypt cooperation has always been military
financing and arms sales. In times of popular unrest, Americans have often expected
this aid to translate into leverage over Egypt’s military commanders. After all, Egypt has
received over $38 billion dollars in military aid from the United States since 1978. The
Egyptian army has relied on American assistance to acquire and sustain equipment, and
it would be deeply affected by an American arms embargo that prevented Egypt from
acquiring the necessary equipment and supplies – even if other Egyptian allies were to
step in to provide funding. Despite this, the United States has gained very little leverage
over Egyptian officers from this aid. A major factor in this failure of influence is the
fact that despite using American weapons (among others), Egypt does not depend on
American prestige systems (e.g. the F-16 fighter or M1A1 Abrams tank) to counter any
immediate national security threat. As US Secretary of State Cyrus Vance remarked early
in the relationship: “The importance of American arms sales to Sadat is primarily political.
He does not expect arms sales of an amount which would affect the arms balance in the
area. He sees modest American arms sales as a means of strengthening support of the
all-important Egyptian military establishment for him and the peace effort in which he is
engaged.… Sadat knows he must retain the loyalty of his military if he is to stay in power.”
(Brownlee 2012, 25-26)
From the perspective of the US military, influence over Egyptian domestic affairs
has always been a secondary priority. Instead, military aid and joint exercises are intended
primarily to strengthen security cooperation between the two countries on matters such
as counterterrorism, as well as to guarantee access to Egyptian airspace and the Suez
Canal. These efforts are notably not directed toward democratizing or liberalizing either
Egypt or its armed forces (Brownlee 2012). Historically, when the Egyptian military has
Congress that legally-mandated human rights vetting had not been completed before to training Egyptian
security forces. SecurityAssistance.org. https://securityassistance.org/blog/us-foreign-military-
training-benin-mexico-and-ukraine-spike-2016
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been implicated in human rights abuses, the US military has resisted civilian efforts to
disrupt the relationship. Overall, the US-Egypt arms relationship has been a stable feature
of Middle East geopolitics: “Cairo still receives $1.3 billion annually in US military aid,
and has long been upgrading its inventories with US systems. There is little incentive
to endanger its ability to continue this process, or undermine support and maintenance
agreements. That Cairo might widen its list of suppliers is not inconceivable in some
capability areas, but since the two countries’ Peace Vector deal in 1980, US equipment has
increasingly replaced Egypt’s aging Soviet-era equipment” (IISS 2013, 374).
In the Mubarak era, the military gained significant political leverage from its close
relations with the United States military (Abul-Magd 2012, 155). Mubarak and his first
defense minister, Abu Ghazala, had been classmates at the military academy, trained in
separate but overlapping programs in the Soviet Union in the early 1960s, and had worked
closely together to develop the American military aid package in the 1970s (Springborg
1989, 98). When they rose to the positions of president and commander-in-chief, they
continued to believe that the aid relationship with the United States was a boon to the
armed forces. In time, senior officers came to see this aid as non-negotiable: “Egypt’s
military-political elite value these ties to the extent that the public discussion of relations
between Washington and Cairo is placed off-limits.”36 Yet even while reinforcing Egypt’s
military partnership with the US, Mubarak also invited Soviet technicians back to Egypt
to repair aging Soviet equipment, both to convince the US to provide still more and better
equipment of its own, and also to hedge against strategic dependence on Washington
(Brownlee 2012, 45). Combined with the military’s booming commercial activities, for-
eign military aid in the Mubarak era helped the military establish its autonomy from the
president’s leadership, all while Egypt established its partial autonomy from the United
States.
36. When the opposition press broke this taboo in the mid-1980s, a military spokesman responded angrily
that “while democracy and opposition are respected in Egypt, such inquiries only compromise national
security” (Cook 2007, 23).
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At the same time, US military aid has been important both monetarily and also to
the army’s international reputation. As the Egypt-Israel peace became firmly established
in the 1990s, the threat of a resumption of hostilities between the two nations declined.
In consequence, the Egyptian leverage that had won American aid concessions in the
1970s no longer seemed as potent. With human rights and democracy promotion playing
a larger role in American foreign policy, the threat to cut off aid if the military behaves
inappropriately began to be a real concern for the Egyptian officers. that might constrain
them in certain public ways. Since the end of the Cold War, putschists worldwide have
adorned their coups d’état in the trappings of democracy. Since 1961, US law has man-
dated that foreign aid be cut off automatically to any government that comes to power
by coup d’état. Rather than demonstrating American commitment to democratic civil-
military relations, however, the law’s implementation has shown just the opposite: after
the military removed Morsi in 2013, the US government skirted the law by refusing to
officially declare it a coup d’état (Abul-Magd 2012). Thus it is unsurprising that the threat
of losing foreign aid has not prevented the military from violating human rights.
4.4 Doctrinal Adoption
Unlike in Tunisia, where the military’s doctrine shifted significantly in the 1980s and
1990s, Egypt’s military doctrine was already internalized by the late 1950s and became
further routinized and formalized over time. Although the military played a grudging
role as a backstop to the Ministry of Interior’s forces in 1977 and 1986, officers had already
internalized the view that domestic intervention was exceptional, not a regular military
function. From the late 1970s to the 2000s, the military’s increasing distance from the
ruling party reinforced themilitary’s orientation away from themessy business of internal
security whenever possible. Yet despite the military’s decision to delegate routine order
maintenance to the civilian MoI, domestic security and stability remained a core interest
of the armed forces. Thus, the military’s proper role was defined as nonintervention in
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“normal” periods, but seizing power directly – by force if necessary – when a serious
crisis threatened the state itself. This doctrine, what I label “control,” would become
routinized and formalized over the ensuing decades, but it was already present in the
minds of Egypt’s early military leaders.
The army’s domestic interventions served to routinize this doctrine. Paralleling
the history of domestic intervention in Tunisia, the Egyptian army was called in to re-
press two major uprisings in the 1970s and 80s: nationwide bread riots in 1977 and a
violent mutiny by conscripts of the Central Security Forces in 1986. Both interventions
were based on the principle of emergency authority, and thus classified as exceptional
circumstances. After these incidents and until 2011, the Army actively limited its role
in order maintenance. In that time, there was only one significant uprising, a general
strike in 2008, which was suppressed with overwhelming force by security forces without
military intervention. However, these behavioral similarities belie a deeper, if subtler,
difference. Unlike in Tunisia, the Egyptian Army has historically seen the public as
something to fear and control, not defend. As Sadat pushed military advisers out of
civilian government, officers refocused their attention on the military institution itself,
becoming more protective of the army and coming to see the population as a potential
threat to military interests. Both of these interventions, I argue, reaffirmed to the army
its role as a moderator of Egyptian politics, and the necessity to establish military control
should a political crisis come to threaten the state.
The evolution of terrorist threats and counterterrorism policy since the 1980s has
served to formalize the military’s roles and responsibilities. Egypt is the birthplace of the
Muslim Brotherhood (al-Ikhwān al-Muslimūn), an influential, transnational organization
whose political and religious ideology has helped to inspire both pacific political move-
ments and violent extremism. Founded by Hassan al-Banna in 1928, the Brotherhood
combined political activism with community building, focusing initially on Islamic edu-
cation and charity, and providing schools, health clinics, and other social services to those
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left out of state patronage systems (Masoud 2014). Never recognized as a legal political
party before 2011, the Brotherhood nevertheless was an important voice in opposition
politics throughout the century (Nugent 2018). As Sadat made overtures to Israel in the
1970s, the Brotherhood became a vocal critic of the government’s foreign policy, as well as
the military’s alliance with the United States and contribution to the 1991 Iraq War (Cook
2007, 85-88). By 1992, the group’s strength had grown to the point that it threatened to
alter the political order, virtually guaranteeing themilitarywould support crackdown (88).
This is also the pattern the army would follow after the revolution, allowing the Muslim
Brotherhood to reach the zenith of its power, the presidency, before launching not only a
coup d’état but a full-scale eradication campaign against the entire organization.
Until 2011, the military played only a minor role in responding to political demon-
strations, choosing to cede this responsibility to the internal security forces. Even as
Islamic extremism surged in the 1990s, the MoI led counterterrorism efforts with only
limited support from the military (e.g. providing paratrooper units and prosecuting ter-
rorism suspects in military courts). The regime’s increasing use of ISF in counterinsur-
gency further distancedmilitary from internal security role. Although political repression
has been primarily a MoI mission, military courts have been used extensively to repress
opposition groups (Cook 2007, 22). Since 1992, the Emergency Law (162/1958) and related
regulations “essentially place the country under military rule, if not martial law, and have
been used as a pretext for the creation of a parallel judicial system and the widespread
use of military tribunals” (26). The law also provides a basis for referring civilians to
military courts: “Originally intended to provide for swift sentencing in cases related to
terrorism, military tribunals were increasingly used to try civilians whowere not involved
in violent antistate activity” (72). The most common domestic target of the military’s has
been the Muslim Brotherhood (84). Each of these laws demonstrate the formalization of a
military doctrine which denies primary military responsibility for political repression, yet
enshrines a military prerogative to claim nearly unlimited authority in cases of national
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security.
During the three decades of the Mubarak era, the interaction between the mil-
itary’s increasing autonomy and separation from society, and its experience restoring
order and stability to Egypt in times of dire national crisis, confirmed the military’s ex-
isting doctrine of control. When the revolutionary moment arrived in 2011, the military
followed this doctrine and responded by seizing direct control of both the political and the
security situation in the country. Although officers hesitated to throw out Mubarak, who
had diligently maintained their economic and political prerogatives, they also tried to stay
out of what they viewed as a domestic political issue. In following this doctrine, soldiers
largely refrained from violence against protesters in 2011. Ultimately, as Mubarak and his
security forces failed to quell the unrest, the officers decided the only way to stabilize the
crisis was to seize power themselves.
4.5 Responding with Control
As Tunisia’s Zine el-Abidine Ben Ali fled into exile in Saudi Arabia on January 14, 2011,
Egyptians of all political stripes who had grown tired of the stagnation and corruption
of their own government began to feel a sense of hope that Mubarak might be next.
Activists seized on the upcoming Police Day celebrations (see fn. 11) as an opportunity
to highlight their dissatisfaction with police abuses of their civil rights, as well as broader
political, economic, and social grievances. Unlike the Tunisian revolution, which featured
a cross-class alliance of disproportionately young protesters, the Egyptian revolt was
primarily urban, middle-class, and middle-aged (Beissinger et al. 2015, 2). On January
25, protesters converged on Tahrir Square (maidān taḥrīr, lit. “freedom square;” a central
plaza in downtown Cairo), and the police responded violently, with tear gas, batons, and
arrests of peaceful demonstrators. Despite the abuse, demonstrators carried on for the
next two days, until January 28, the first “Day of Rage,” a broad movement of hundreds
of thousands who converged on public squares throughout Egypt. Violent police tactics
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further provoked protesters, who began torching police stations, and the police began to
collapse. At this point, the army began to intervene with tanks in Tahrir and elsewhere,
although they announced on January 31 that their presence was to ensure public safety
and protect freedom of expression. Yet two days later, soldiers stood by passively as pro-
regime thugs (known as balṭagiyya, lit. “hatchet men”) and plainclothes policemen on
camelback attacked protesters in Tahrir, an incident known as the “Battle of the Camel.”37
Ultimately, the regime’s measures to suppress the demonstrations only served to further
inflame protesters, and Mubarak was forced to turn to the armed forces.
On February 9, President Mubarak chaired a first meeting of the Supreme Council
of the Armed Forces (SCAF), a statutory body which has routinely met during serious
national crises since 1954. The following day, however, the SCAF reconvened without
Mubarak, signaling the military’s permanent break from the existing civilian regime. The
army quickly issued an ultimatum demanding Mubarak’s resignation, which it received
on February 11. Next, the military moved forcefully to shut down the mass mobiliza-
tion that had taken Egypt to this point. Only three days later, the military imposed an
outright ban on all gatherings and strikes, which continued to paralyze the country as
thousands of state employees, including police, and pro-democracy activists vowed to
continue demonstrating until their demands for change were met.38 The army also cleared
out the remaining protesters fromTahrir Square, the symbolic birthplace of the revolution.
In sum, the military’s strategic approach – consistent with its established doctrine – was
to give the civilian authorities a chance to solve their own political crisis, and then, should
the government fail to calm the situation, to assert direct military control.
Despite the public appearance of a popular revolution, the events of 2011 are better
understood as a reassertion of the military’s political power (Albrecht and Bishara 2011).
As Crisis Group analysts concluded, “While there is little doubt the army would not have
37. The state-run media later called it “the day the tide turned” irreversibly against the Mubarak regime.
Yasmine Fathi, “Egypt’s ’Battle of the Camel’: The day the tide turned,” Al-Ahram, February 2, 2012.
38. Craig Whitlock and Sudarsan Raghavan, “Egypt’s army demands end to strikes; opposition vows for
change,”Washington Post, February 14, 2011.
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acted without the protests, once it deployed and its rivals within the regime were swept
aside, what it ultimately carried out bears the hallmarks of a coup” (ICG 2011a, 16). The
result of the uprising was that the army seized power, not the people. In January 2011, the
army made it clear to everyone that it would not fire at the demonstrators (Karawan 2011,
46). This was an assertion of the military’s independence from the political regime, not a
declaration of fealty to the popular will. In fact, senior officers had very little confidence
in the democratic forces sweeping Egypt, and maneuvered against Mubarak in order to
stem the democratization of Egyptian politics. While the revolution occurred without
significant bloodshed at the hands of the military, this relatively peaceful outcome was
far from certain when protesters took to the streets. From early in the conflict, the army
took pains to signal publicly that it stood with the people, yet the meaning of these
pronouncements was uncertain. As events unfolded, many participants on both sides
doubted the intentions of the other, andmany foresaw a potential for violent conflict.39 On
the protesters’ side, unambiguous efforts were made to win the Army over to the people’s
cause. Thewell-known slogan, “the army and the people are one hand” (el-geysh wel-shaʿb
iyd waḥda), is emblematic of a pattern of fraternization between soldiers and protesters
throughout the course of the revolution (Ketchley 2014). The rosy picture of unity of
purpose between the Army and the population must be critically evaluated, however.
There is no doubting the army’s embrace of some of the protesters’ main demands: the
SCAF publicly forced Mubarak from office and allowed the country’s first free and fair
elections. Yet this peaceful and seemingly democratic outcome not only obscures the
tremendous uncertainty of this process, but also misinterprets the power relationship
between army and people – and the idea that a true transition occurred.
If the military no longer recognized presidential authority on February 10, nor did
it recognize democratic, or popular, authority. Instead, the military recognized its own
sovereign authority over the Egyptian state. The SCAF orchestrated a change in civilian
39. Evan Hill andMuhammadMansour, “Egypt’s army took part in torture and killings during revolution,
report shows,”e Guardian, April 10, 2013.
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leadership while maintaining its own role as guardian of the state, what Joshua Stacher
(2012) calls “a structural change to the regime rather than regime change” (160). When
free elections were held in 2012, they took place at the pleasure of the armed forces, and
under the guidance and protection of the SCAF (although the electoral process itself is
widely considered democratic). Throughout the democratic experiment that ensued, the
army maintained an iron grip on the nation’s defense policy, with the chief of the army,
first Field Marshal Mohamed Hussein Tantawi and later el-Sisi, also serving as Minister
of Defense. The events of the following years shed light on the true nature of military
intervention during the revolution. Not long after the revolution, many liberal scholars
and activists became concerned by SCAF’s tight grip on the political transition. In the first
year after the revolution, more than 12,000 civilian demonstrators were tried in military
courts, more than during the thirty years of the Mubarak era combined (Rutherford 2013,
xxvii). Some saw in these moves a resurgence of the “deep state,” which threatened to
undo Egypt’s democratic gains (El Amrani 2012).
During the political transition (2011–2013), the military took a direct role in gov-
erning (e.g. by issuing constitutional decrees and dictating the parameters of the electoral
process) while maintaining a pretense of staying on the sidelines while civilians took
charge. But through the process, the military fundamentally rejected civilian control and
asserted its right to make major decisions over the political process and constitution.
Civilian political actors, finding themselves competing in a chaotic free-for-all, struck
deals with the military to one-up their rivals, reinforcing the military’s role as kingmaker
(Brown 2013, 52). Meanwhile, other major state institutions, from the judiciary to the
police to the media, carried out their own efforts to limit the power of the Islamist presi-
dency.
Egypt’s democratic moment came to an end in 2013, when the SCAF engineered
a coup d’état to remove the country’s first democratically-elected president, Mohamed
Morsi. Representing theMuslim Brotherhood, the army’s traditional political nemesis and
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Boogeyman, Morsi was a perfect target for the military’s intervention. Morsi’s strategic
blunders likely hastened the return of a general – this time, Abdel Fattah El-Sisi – to the
presidency, but the military was never really disempowered to begin with. The campaign
to remove Morsi had begun as a popular movement, known as Tamarod (“rebellion”). But
by July 3, 2013, when soldiers arrested him and brutally cracked down on his supporters,
the grassroots organization had been co-opted and supplanted by the SCAF; therefore,
the military’s actions constituted a classic coup d’état, albeit one with significant public
support – what Stepan called a “Brumairian abdication to the military.”40
An investigation by Human Rights Watch found that state security forces from
the police and army committed a massacre of more than 1,150 protesters at Rābaʿa al-
ʿAdawiyya Square and elsewhere during July and August 2013.41 While the threat of
opprobrium did not prevent the massacre, it pushed the regime to create a pretext for
the assault: the military allowed protesters to arm themselves, so that they could not
be classified as “unarmed civilians.” The demonstrators – who reasonably feared an im-
pending violent crackdown – were allowed to bring weapons into the demonstration site,
which would later ensure a justification for the use of force against them. If the military
had wanted the protests to be peaceful, they could have assured that, since there were
checkpoints set up at the entrances to the square. In sum, while the military sees certain
parts of society as enemies, they need to keep up the pretext and public image of protecting
the public and abiding by international standards in order to placate their international
donors.
Under el-Sisi, US-Egypt relations stand at a potential crossroads. the value of
American aid has declined dramatically in real terms because the amount has held steady
around $1 billion for decades without any adjustment for inflation (unlike aid to Israel,
which has been increased to keep upwith inflation). Into this gap have stepped the oil-rich
40. Alfred Stepan, “The Recurrent Temptation to Abdicate to the Military in Egypt,” Freedom at Issue Blog,




Gulf states, who provided $23 billion in financial assistance to the Egyptian government
within eighteen months of Morsi’s removal from office.42 Meanwhile, the new regime has
diversified Egypt’s procurement sources to include a larger share of Russian and European
systems. Despite procuring new systems almost exclusively from the US for decades,
Egypt has maintained its older non-US systems as well, and only about half of all Egyptian
military hardware is currently American. While diversification of sources increases main-
tenance expenses and creates logistical challenges, it also has reduced Egypt’s dependence
on a single nation. This independence was a non-issue under Sadat and Mubarak, who
maintained exceptionally close military cooperation with the US, but could open the door
for a further decline in American influence over the Egyptian military.
Conclusion
Time will tell whether the military’s experience since 2011 will induce doctrinal innova-
tion in the Egyptian Armed Forces. Under the regime of General Abdel Fattah el-Sisi, a
former director of Military Intelligence and Minister of Defense under Morsi, the military
has taken an unprecedented, active role in domestic repression. Security forces under the
MOI continue to carry out the sustained effort of everyday repression, which has resulted
in the arrest of at least 40,000 political prisoners since 2013.43 But the military itself has
also engaged in numerous campaigns to repress any organized political opposition and
to suppress public demonstrations against the military regime, notably at Rabaʿa Square.
Moreover, the military has claimed a broad and explicit legal authority to intervene in
domestic affairs, including but not limited to security. Whereas past interventions relied
on an emergency law (even if emergency provisions were in force more often than not),
the military’s new authorities are permanent and empower the army to intervene at its
discretion to protect all “public and vital facilities.”44 This expansion of military prerog-
42. “Egypt got $23 billion in aid from Gulf in 18 months: minister,” Reuters, March 2, 2015.
43. Human Rights Watch, “We are in Tombs”: Abuses in Egypt’s Scorpion Prison, September 28, 2016.
44. Email from B. Rutherford.
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atives under the el-Sisi regime represents the accomplishment of a process of military
takeover that began in 2011. Not only can the army guide policy through the National
Defense Council, but it can also try civilians in its ownmilitary courts, placing themilitary
institution almost entirely outside – and above – the civilian legal system.
But as el-Sisi, the latest military officer-turned-politician, has consolidated power,
signs have emerged that themilitary remains distinct from the political regime. Even as el-
Sisi cruised to re-election virtually unopposed in 2018, he could not take complete military
support for granted. A presidential challenge from fellow officer Ahmed Shafik appears to
have rattled el-Sisi, whose intelligence services surfaced a ready-made sex scandal to sink
the general’s candidacy. Meanwhile Ansar al-Sharia, a jihadist group waging an insur-
gency in the Sinai, has shown success in recruiting ex-officers from the military ranks.45
On the other hand, Egypt’s top brass may have interpreted Morsi’s disastrous presidency
as a sign that the military must take a more proactive role in managing the country’s
political future. If so, Egyptian doctrine for domestic security may evolve toward the
warlike doctrine of combat which now exists in Syria.





Syria: A Doctrine of War
My final comparative case study is Syria, where the Arab Spring uprising was crushed
with military force at the direction of President Bashar al-Asad. Syria is an important
counterexample to the largely nonviolent responses of the Tunisian and Egyptian armed
forces. From the outset of the 2011 demonstrations, Syrian police and soldiers responded
with force, employing live ammunition to disperse demonstrators. Rather than quelling
the unrest, however, their violent response backfired, provoking armed rebellions in sev-
eral regions of the country and mass defections from the armed forces. From there,
Syrian society collapsed into civil war, leading the International Crisis Group to label
the government’s brutal response a “slow-motion suicide.”1 To date, the ensuing conflict
has taken more than 465,000 lives, injured more than a million, and displaced over twelve
million – half of Syria’s prewar population – from their homes.2 Although the military’s
violent approach has ultimately succeeded in preserving the al-Asad regime’s grip on
power, it has been a Pyrrhic victory. Syrian military officers have borne enormous costs
in the conflict: mass desertions and combat casualties reduced the military’s fighting
strength from 295,000 to 120,000men in just three years (Ohl et al. 2015). The exceptionally
high cost of the war to Syrian soldiers makes the military response in 2011 all the more
1. International Crisis Group (ICG), “Popular Protest in North Africa and theMiddle East (VII):The Syrian
Regime’s Slow-Motion Suicide,” July 13, 2011.
2. “Syria’s civil war explained from the beginning,” Al-Jazeera, March 4, 2018.
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puzzling.
Why then did the Syrian armed forces escalate the conflict with brutal, military
violence, instead of staying out of the political contest like the Tunisian army, or seizing
control like the Egyptian officers? The most popular explanation is that Syrian soldiers
were extremely loyal to the al-Asad regime because of “ethnic stacking.” The Alawis, an
ethnoreligiousminority which represented just 12% of the populationwhen the revolution
began, have monopolized the senior leadership of both the ruling party and the military
since the 1960s.3 For decades, scholars of ethnic politics have asserted that the dominance
of Alawis in the military virtually guaranteed the military’s loyalty to the al-Asad regime
(Horowitz [1985] 2000, 492–507; McLauchlin 2010). Since the Arab Spring, ethnicity
(i.e. sectarianism) has become a popular explanation for the Syrian military’s violent
response (Barany 2011; Makara 2013; Bou Nassif 2015c; Droz-Vincent 2016). However,
the Syrianmilitary’s history of domestic intervention belies a simple relationship between
ethnicity and violence against protesters. On one hand, The military carried out its first
campaign of mass violence against civilians in 1978–82, before Alawis came to dominate
the officer corps. On the other, the great majority of officers have remained loyal since
2011, including non-Alawis who lack ethnic ties to the regime. Moreover, even if Alawis
dominate the officer corps, Sunni conscripts fill the ranks of the regular army. Loyal
officers can order soldiers to attack civilians, but they ultimately rely on their subordinates
to carry out the killing. Thus, while officers’ preferences strongly influence how the
armed forces respond to an uprising, officers’ loyalty to the regime does not automatically
translate into a violent pro-regime response. In sum, the politicization of ethnic identity
contributed to the development of Syrian military doctrine, but the history of domestic
military interventions belies a direct causal relationship between the military’s ethnic
composition and its response to protests.
Instead, the military’s warlike response to largely peaceful demonstrations in 2011
3. “The ‘secretive sect’ in charge of Syria,” BBC News, May 17, 2012.
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can be explained by the organization’s doctrine for internal security, which framed do-
mestic interventions as a form of combat. Like other military doctrines, Syria’s doctrine
developed over decades of direct experience and foreign influence, and was firmly es-
tablished by the time of the Arab Spring. Under the rule of Hafiz al-Asad (1970–2000),
the Syrian Armed Forces learned to treat domestic intervention as a form of warfare,
especially during the Islamist uprising, which climaxed in the massacre of thousands of
residents of Hama in 1982. Within the ruling Baʿath Party and the military, al-Asad em-
ployed pervasive ethnic stacking, favoring Syria’s previously underprivileged minorities,
to secure his power, which generated an “us-vs-them” mentality within the armed forces.
Close military ties with the Soviet Union, a leading proponent of integrating the military
and the ruling party, encouraged the deep politicization of the officer corps and emphasis
on personal loyalty rather than professional values. By the time Bashar al-Asad succeeded
his father in 2000, officers had learned to see foreign and Islamist enemies behind every
regime critic. Through historical interactions with the population and foreign contacts,
the Syrian Armed Forces developed a doctrine for domestic intervention which called
for the immediate use of overwhelming force to maintain order and stability. In this
worldview, the armed strength of the state was all that kept Syrian society from falling
into the abyss of ethnosectarian conflict and chaos.
5.1 Foundations of Doctrine
Among the three foundational sources of doctrine – institutional origins, role in national
independence, and relationship to the ruling party – the first and third elements were
the most influential. The institutional design of the Syrian army during the French man-
date period resulted in the over-representation of ethnoreligious minority groups in the
armed forces, which in turn created permissive conditions for the establishment of ethnic
minority rule under the Baʿath Party. While the military played no significant role in
national independence, it was central to the rise of the Baʿathist regime, which came to
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power through a series of military coups. Moreover, the al-Asad family’s close alliance
with the military has been central to their ability to weather countless political challenges
during nearly fifty years in power. By the time Hafiz al-Asad became president in 1970,
the Syrian Armed Forces had developed a doctrine that favored violent intervention in all
kinds of political crises, from leadership struggles to popular protests.
Institutional Origins
European colonialism in Syria was shorter than in Tunisia or Egypt, lasting from 1919 to
1946. Nevertheless, the French played a formative role in establishing the Syrian military.
For centuries, the country had been an integral part of the Ottoman Empire, which pro-
moted harmonious relations among the diverse ethnoreligious communities of the Levant
(Shaw 1976, 132-135). With the Ottoman defeat in World War I, Syria came under French
administration, giving the French a powerful influence over the formation of the modern
Syrian state and national identity.4 French authorities organized the first indigenous
Syrian army, then known as the Levantine Forces (Troupes spéciales du Levant), in the
very first year of the mandate. In line with French ethnicity-based approaches to colonial
control, the Levantine Forces recruited mainly rural volunteers from Syria’s minority
ethnic groups, especially Alawis (or Alawites), Druze, Kurds, and Circassians, for whom
enlistment represented an escape from crushing poverty (Batatu 1981, 334). They were
commanded by French officers and graduates of a new military academy, also established
in 1920 (Cleveland and Bunton 2009, 222). The last French officers were forced out in
1946, and the Levantine Forces officially became the Syrian Armed Forces. At the time,
the Homs Military Academy was the only free educational institution in Syria, making
it the best pathway to social mobility for poor young men from minority backgrounds
(Seale 1989, 38). Syria’s minority groups, typically rural and poor, were unable to afford
costly exemptions from military conscription. As such, ethnic minorities continued to
4. French control resulted from the infamous Sykes–Picot agreement, which divided the Ottoman Arab
provinces into areas of British and French influence.
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dominate the enlisted ranks of the military after independence and came to dominate the
officer corps after 1963. At that time, the Alawis were one of several minority groups to
seek social mobility through the army.
When the French withdrew from Syria, they left a vacuum of national political
authority. As indigenous political forces struggled to assert national power for the first
time, the military recruitment policies established by the French administration in the
interwar period directly contributed to the consolidation of minority rule. Syria’s first
three decades of independence were characterized by political turmoil and punctuated
by many sudden changes of power. In this turbulent context, the military was a nat-
ural vehicle for ambitious men to assert their influence. Military officers carried out
successful coups d’état in 1949, 1954, 1961, 1963, 1966, and finally 1970, when Hafiz al-
Asad succeeded in establishing a durable authoritarian regime. The initial outburst of
coups can be attributed to severe factionalism within the officer corps, which was at
that time predominantly Sunni, not Alawi (van Dam 2011, 28). Each resulted in purges
of officers who had supported the unsuccessful faction, thus shifting the sectarian and
political balance within the army. In this way, successive coups progressively shifted the
ethnic composition of the armed forces in favor of the Alawi minority, a process Horowitz
(2000, 486) calls “ethnic attrition.” Because of colonial recruitment policies, Alawis already
formed a plurality in the rank-and-file and predominated among NCOswhen Syria gained
independence, which made possible their takeover of the officer corps in the late 1960s
and 1970s (Drysdale 1979). However, the Alawis did not initially represent a unified
political bloc, and the military remained deeply politicized even after the first Baʿathist
coup. To co-opt the officer corps into his regime, Hafiz al-Asad relied on cross-cutting
ideological, ethnic, and class linkages – not ethnic stacking. With al-Asad in office, coup
plotting declined precipitously in the armed forces, even as non-Alawi minorities and
Sunnis remained in senior military posts. In fact, the most serious challenge to al-Asad’s
rule came not from sectarian rivals, but from his own brother, Rifaat, who plotted against
139
him while he struggled with heart problems in 1983 (Seale 1989, chap. 24). Nevertheless,
members of the Alawi sect, who constituted approximately 11% of the Syrian population
in the 1970s, claimed a disproportionate share of elite positions in the Baʿath regime
(Drysdale 1979, 359). However, the ultimate basis of the military–political alliance was a
combination of partisanship and personalism, not ethnicity.
On paper, the Syrian military follows a similar model to the Tunisian or Egyptian,
with professional officers in command of conscripted soldiers. But because the al-Asad
regime prioritized loyalty and regime security above all other military considerations, the
Syrian Armed Forces used conscripts differently than Egypt or Tunisia. Unlike in the
colonial and early post-colonial periods, the conscripted ranks of the armed forces today
reflect the ethnic composition of the Syrian population, with a majority of Sunni Arabs
(Bou Nassif 2015c, 638). As a result, senior officers have long known that they could not
rely on conscripts to suppress popular protesters from the same ethnic and social origins.
Instead, the military organized elite units within the military command structure, which
prioritized loyalty considerations in their recruitment and promotions. For their part, the
masses of regular conscripts played only a minor role in responding to domestic crises.
Thus, colonial recruitment patterns gave rise to a duality within the military: elite units,
vetted for loyalty, took primary responsibility for regime security, while regular units,
expected to sympathize with the population at large, were relegated to support roles. This
duality was incorporated into the military’s doctrine for domestic security, which relies
on elite units to spearhead the violent repression of civilian resistance.
Independence Movement
Syria’s independence, at the conclusion ofWorldWar II, resulted in large part from British
wartime actions against the Vichy French regime then occupying Syria. Because the
national army had not contributed to the independence movement, soldiers had no initial
claim to political authority, and it was the protectorate-era republican government which
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formally took control after the French withdrawal. However, soldiers’ public stature soon
burgeoned as the military joined the Arab war against neighboring Israel. From the first
Arab-Israeli war in 1948, resistance against Israel became a major source of legitimacy
for the Syrian Armed Forces, as well as the Baʿath Party, which promoted Arab unity
primarily, if not exclusively, to collectively overcome Zionism. Since then, opposition to
Israel has been a central mission of the Syrian Armed Forces, second only to domestic
regime security. Moreover, the two goals have often been mutually reinforcing, since
opposition to Israel and the West served to enhance the regime’s domestic legitimacy.
Besides framing the armed forces indispensable defenders of the nation, the Arab-Israeli
conflict – especially the defeat of 1967 – also stimulated insecurity, which in turn “le-
gitimated the creation of an authoritarian national security state” (Hinnebusch 2002, 7).
Unlike in Egypt, where the defeat caused massive popular unrest and inspired a far-
reaching initiative to professionalize and depoliticize the officer corps, in Syria, censorship
and propaganda allowed the military to keep its humiliation out of the public eye (Sassoon
2016, 110). Nevertheless, DefenseMinister Hafiz al-Asad became personally obsessedwith
redeeming the defeat, even as he rejected personal responsibility for causing it (Seale 1989,
185).
The Syrian Armed Forces participated in the surprise attack on Israeli positions
on Yom Kippur in 1973, but were less successful than their Egyptian counterparts. Syria’s
primary war aim was to recapture the Golan Heights, occupied by Israel since 1967.5
After briefly seizing part of the Golan, Syrian forces were soon expelled, and the Israelis
advanced to within 35 kilometers of Damascus. The Soviet Union began supplying the
Arab forces, including 3,750 tons airlifted to Syria alone, while the US supplied Israel.
Syria also received direct support from 2,000 Soviet technicians and military personnel,
repairing equipment and advising the Syrian command at every level, from battalions to
supreme headquarters (Pollack 2002, 505). After 243 days of fighting, the war ended in a
5. Al-Asad was Minister of Defense during the 1973 conflict and, as president, became “obsessed” with
recovering Syria’s lost territory Seale (1989, 185-86).
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US- and Soviet-backed ceasefire, which restored only a small portion of Syrian territory
and established a buffer zone between Syria and the Israeli-occupied Golan.6 Syria’s poor
performance in the war was exacerbated by al-Asad’s refusal to send his best commando
units to the Golan, relying on them to protect his regime instead (Pollack 2002, 509-10).
“When Sadat made a separate peace at Camp David a few years later, Syria felt deeply
betrayed, both by its erstwhile ally and by the United States, which had claimed Syria
would be part of any peace deal (Seale 1989, 260-61).
Syria has also maintained an active political and military stake in neighboring
Lebanon, which was under Syrian military occupation from 1976 to 2005.7 Originally
invited, under an Arab League mandate, to help stop an eruption of civil violence, 20,000
Syrian soldiers remained fifteen years after the end of the Lebanese civil war. In large
part, the occupation became a proxy battle with Israel, which occupied parts of southern
Lebanon in 1978. However, the majority of Syrians viewed the intervention through the
confessional lens of the Lebanese civil war and interpreted al-Asad’s stance as anti-Sunni
sectarianism, inspired by his Alawi identity (Leèvre 2013, 72). During the occupation, the
Syrian military meddled constantly in Lebanese domestic politics and helped to empower
various militia groups, giving military officers decades of experience with political inter-
vention. The Syrian military had perverse incentives to perpetuate the ethnosectarian
conflict, both to weaken its neighbor and to promote the idea that the collapse of the
Baʿathist order in Syria would inevitably lead to similar chaos, bloodshed, and conquest
by Islamist extremists. Despite Lebanon’s unique history and social characteristics, the
Syrian regime used Lebanon’s strife as proof that only al-Asad stood between order and
chaos. Experience in Lebanon exposed military officers to the logic of order at any cost
and normalized the cynical provocation of sectarianism for political purposes. The same
6. The ceasefire lines have held since 1974 under continuous supervision of the United Nations
Disengagement Observer Force (UNDOP).
7. The population of Lebanon has historically been roughly one-third that of Syria. Today, an estimated
1.5 million Syrian refugees are living in Lebanon, whose prewar population was only 4.3 million. (Eric
Reidy, “Will Lebanon Force a Million Syrian Refugees to Return to a War Zone?” e Nation, January 24,
2018.)
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ideas would be driven home in the fight to suppress Islamist uprisings in Syria, as de-
scribed in section 5.2.
Relationship to the Ruling Party
The Arab Socialist Baʿath Party (Hizb al-Baʿath al-ʿArabi al-ʾIshtirākī ) came to power in
1963, when the party’s Military Committee staged a successful coup d’état to take control
of Syria. With the rise of the Baʿath came a corresponding rise of the military within
the Syrian state. Devlin (1976, 281) writes that as soon as the Baʿath party took power, it
“ended any pretense of cooperation with other organized civilian political forces in Syria,”
immediately beginning a process of institutionalizing the military as a key political player.
The Military Academy’s recruitment became explicitly ideological as well, as hundreds
of young Baʿathists (including Rifaat al-Asad) were admitted to replace ideological rivals
purged from the officer corps (Seale 1989, 79). Meanwhile, many Alawi noncommissioned
officers (NCOs) received promotions to commissioned ranks, and additional minority
candidates were enrolled in the military academy (van Dam 2011, 31–36).
In 1966, a second, bloodier coup was staged by the neo-Baʿath faction of the Mili-
tary Committee, which was characterized by younger, more radical members of the party
dissatisfied with the policies of the current government, and led to the murder or exile of
the party’s historical founders. The main architects of both coups included Hafiz al-Asad,
who would become Syria’s defense minister in 1966 and its president in 1970. Following
the second coup, the newly consolidated regime under General Salah Jadid purged the
government and military of its former members, and sought to restructure Syrian society
to benefit the country’s minority sects at the expense of its majority (Devlin 1976, 281).
This restructuring benefited rural peasants, urban public workers, and minorities at the
expense of the Sunni traditional land owning classes. By this time, the government was
filled with military officers, the majority from al-Asad’s Alawi clan.
Socioeconomic restructuring along ethnic lines not only reflected the Baʿathist
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ideology, as articulated by Syrian intellectuals Michel ʿAflaq and Salah al-Din al-Bitar,
but also mirrored demands of the party’s support base. Ethnic minorities had tradi-
tionally been underprivileged, and cross-cutting cleavages overlay ethnic divisions onto
class divisions. The country’s majority, the Sunnis, had been economically favored and
concentrated in high numbers among the country’s middle and upper classes. Ethnore-
ligious minorities such as the Alawis, the Druze, and the Ismaʿilis (a branch of Shiʿism)
were concentrated among the country’s lower class and among the country’s rural and
peasant populations. Their underprivileged position made these classes susceptible to
radical forms of Arab nationalism, particularly Baʿathism (al-Baʿathiyya, meaning “resur-
rection”). Baʿathism promotes the creation of an Arab nation, and differs frommainstream
Arab nationalism in its emphasis on the importance of the leadership of a vanguard party
and a revolutionary state in creating this nation. Before the Baʿathist coup d’état in 1963,
Syria’s minorities had already been mobilized into peasant movements, citing inequality
between urban and rural areas and elite monopolization of revenue from the agrarian
sector as main grievances. The Syrian Baʿath party recruited young people from these
radical peasant movements, and as a result much of the party’s support was based on these
populations (Hinnebusch 2002, 4). What made Baʿathism particularly attractive to ethnic
and religious minorities in the Arab world was as a secular ideology, which emphasizes
Arab unity over religious or ethnic divisions.8 In addition, Baʿathism views socialism as
an important tool for the development of a strong Arab nation, which in theory would
benefit the masses as the expense of the traditional business elite (Devlin 1976, 79).
From 1963 until the consolidation of the al-Asad regime in 1970, factionalism in-
tensified in the civilian andmilitary sectors alike. While theMinister of Defense, Air Force
Major General Hafiz al-Asad, worked to consolidate his control over the armed forces, his
rival, Salah Jadid, established dominance over the civilian Baʿath party apparatus, creating
8. Ironically, a bitter schism split the movement in 1966, creating Syrian-dominated and Iraqi-dominated
wings. Syria and Iraq remained bitter rivals throughout the rule of Saddam Hussein and his Arab Socialist
Baʿath Party – Iraq Region.
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a “duality of power” (ʾizdiwajiyyat al-ṣulṭa). Within the armed forces, “collateral contacts”
(ʾiiṣalāt jānibiyya) – coreligionists communicating directly, and illegally, outside the
military chain of command – undermined the command structure and military unity, but
strengthened al-Asad’s grip over the military (van Dam 2011, 36–37). Finally, in an act
he called the “Corrective Movement” (al-ḥaraka al-teṣḥīḥiyya), al-Asad seized power in
November 1970. He became Syria’s first Alawi president, a position traditionally reserved
for Sunnis. As al-Asad and his Baʿath Party achieved domination of the political system,
the dual power system gave way to a consolidated, personalistic dictatorship.
The al-Asad Regime, 1970–present
To legitimate his rule, al-Asad assiduously presented himself as the leader of the Baʿath
Party, not head of the military, but the regime was military in most other respects. It
was al-Asad’s power base in the Armed Forces, and especially the Air Force, that brought
him to power in the first place (Ma’oz 1990, 55). And under his rule, the Syrian Armed
Forces became an explicit vehicle for political and ideological indoctrination.9 He sought
to transform the “army in politics” that had brought him to power into a truly “ideological
army” with a hierarchical party structure, modeled on the civilian Baʿath organization
(Seale 1989, 89). As both a praetorian guard and powerful interest group, the military has
remained “the most powerful actor which, particularly in times of crisis, has the potential
to shape outcomes” (Hinnebusch 2002, 69). Unlike in Egypt, the armed forces did not
develop autonomy or independence from the civilian regime, leading to a conflation of
national security with regime security.
Building on its initially close relationship with the regime, the military continued
to play a central role in the governing apparatuses of Syria over the three decades Hafiz al-
Asad ruled as president. Although parliamentary electionswere heldwith some regularity
beginning in the mid-1970s, de facto power remained with the president and his inner
9. A Baʿath party document adopted in 1963 declared, “The organic fusion of the military and
civilian Vanguard sectors is an urgent prerequisite for … socialist reconstruction” (“Baʿḍ al-Munṭalaqāt al-
Naẓariyya” [Some Theoretical Perspectives], Nidal al-Baʿath, vi:232-91, quoted in Seale [1989, 88]).
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circle, the majority of whom are high-ranking military (Mora andWiktorowicz 2003, 102).
The military became the most important support for the al-Asad regime, at the expense
of party and internal security organizations (Ziadeh 2011, 24). Since the beginning of the
Baʿath rule beginning in 1963, the regime has relied on a combination of familial and ethnic
linkages to strengthen its relationshipwith topmilitary elites. This hasmanifested itself in
the military receiving funds beyond its usefulness to the country. While the military has
not been involved in major combat operations since 1973 military spending was estimated
at 30 percent of GDP and it was reported that the army employed 21 percent of the male
labor force in Syria between 1977 and 1998 (Hinnebusch 1998, 227).
Under the al-Asad regime, military officers were categorized into concentric circles
of loyalty, based first on familial and personal relationships and secondarily on Baʿathist
partisanship and rank. In moments of domestic crisis, only the inner circles of loyal
commanders were entrusted with sensitive regime security missions. Even in the largest
domestic interventions (1976–82 and 2011–present), officers in the outer circles were
not assigned to lead order maintenance or combat operations. To strengthen loyalty
throughout the officer corps, the military establishment created an enclave, comparable to
the one in Egypt, which shielded officers from the interests and concerns of broader Syrian
society. The segregation of lower- and mid-level officers in particular served to isolate
them physically and socially from the general population. Khaddour (2015) has described
this strategy as the “ghettoization of the officer corps,” pointing to the development of
a benefits system for army officers “that links nearly every aspect of their professional
and personal lives to the regime.” A striking example of this is a state-subsidized home
purchase program for military officers. Many of these homes were located in exclusive
military developments, such as Dahia (Ḍāḥiyyat al-ʾAsad, “Asad’s suburb”), which housed
more than 100,000 residents in March 2011. As a result of their physical segregation into
military-only living spaces, Syrian officers “may have been too physically and socially
isolated for many of them to see defecting as viable early on in the conflict — even if
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they’d wanted to.” In particular, segregation in the military enclave heightened loyalty
among lower- and mid-level officers, who in turn lost touch with the concerns of the
broader Syrian population and came to see defection from the regime as unthinkable.
Beyond these party, ethnic, and social ties, the closely connected nature of regime
andmilitary ismanifest in themilitary’s economic power, which operates primarily through
patronage and resources, rather than a parallel military economy (as in Egypt). Under
Hafiz al-Asad, the military developed a number of businesses affiliated with the Ministry
of Defense. By 1985, the most expansive of these, the Military Housing Establishment
(known as Milihouse), had become the largest firm in Syria (Seale 1989, 449). The military
was thus able to gain control of important economic sectors and industries, namely those
related to public works, industry, and farm production. Some smaller business ventures
included manufacturing batteries, bottled mineral water, and furniture (Richards andWa-
terbury 2008, 341). In contrast to Egypt, though, large-scale military industries were not
the only, or even the primary, revenue stream for military officers. Instead, individual
officers built private wealth through their political connections and ethnic ties to the
ruling family.
When Bashar al-Asad succeeded his father in 2000, he largely maintained the
power structure he inherited from his father. Despite a longstanding official policy of
economic liberalization – necessitated by economic turmoil in the 1980s and the loss of
resources after the end of the Syrian occupation of Lebanon – the old guard has remained
protected. Military advantages such as favorable taxation policy, subsidies for housing
and consumer goods, and preferential treatment from the bureaucracy have continued
unabated (Gambill 2000). Meanwhile, hundreds of senior officers have operated as facili-
tators for private businesses, offering “protection” from state interference, and constitute
a major segment of Syria’s economic elite (Haddad 2012a, 68). Thus, while liberalization
has extended the circle of cronyism to include a new business elite, it has not alienated
the military in doing so.
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5.2 Past Interventions
Today, the Syrian Armed Forces (wwāt al-Musallaḥa al-ʿArabiyya al-Sūriyya) consist of
the Army, Navy, Air Force, Air Defense Force, in addition to paramilitary forces which are
informally under military command. Before the 2011 revolution, there were 295,000 active
and 314,000 reserve military personnel, plus around 100,000 men in the People’s Army,
an armed militia controlled by the Baʿath Party (IISS 2011).10 The al-Asad regime relies on
four separate intelligence directorates to perform internal security functions. The General
Intelligence Directorate (GID, ʾIdārat al-Mukhābarāt al-ʾĀmma) is a civilian force under
the direction of the Ministry of the Interior.11 Within the GID, the State Security Internal
Branch (known as Branch 251) is especially active in internal security and repression.12
Another civilian agency, the Political Security Directorate (ʾIdārat al-ʾAmn al-Siyāsī ), is
also responsible for surveillance and repression of the political opposition (Ziadeh 2011,
23). However, unlike in Tunisia or Egypt, the military intelligence services – Syrian
Military Intelligence (Shuʿbat al-Mukhābarāt al-ʿAskariyya) and the Air Force Intelligence
Directorate (ʾIdārat al-Mukhābarāt al-Jawiyya) – also play an expansive, and brutal, role in
domestic surveillance, demonstrating the more active involvement of the Syrian military
in regime maintenance.13 The heads of these services are members of the innermost circle
of al-Asad family loyalists, or even members of the al-Asad family.14
10. The army’s total size is estimated to have dropped by one-half in the first two years of the war (IISS
2013).
11. Comparedwith Tunisia or Egypt, there is a paucity of reliable information available from open sources
about the Syrian intelligence services. Here, I rely primarily on classified US diplomatic cables released by
Wikileaks.
12. Embassy Damascus, “Riad Seif Details Recent Security Service Interrogations,” Wikileaks Cable:
06DAMASCUS702_a, dated February 21, 2006.
13. Ahed Al Hendi, “The Structure of Syria’s Repression,” Foreign Affairs, May 3, 2011. According to
one opposition activist, “Air Force Intelligence is known as one of the most brutal security directorates.”
See also Embassy Damascus, “Prominent Opposition and Civil Society Figures Arrested Throughout Syria,”
Wikileaks Cable: 06DAMASCUS1358_a, dated March 27, 2006.
14. For example, Bashar’s brother-in-law Asif Shawkat was a top official in Military Intelligence and
led the agency from 2005 to 2009 (Leverett 2005, 199). His brother, Gen. Maher al-Asad, commands the
Republican Guard (a post formerly held by their eldest brother, Basil, who died in a car accident in 1994)
and is “notorious for his personal greed and complicity in corruption” (29).
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In addition to the Baʿath Party paramilitary, various elite special forces units and
pro-government militias have played a major role in Syria’s internal security operations,
as well as in foreign interventions in neighboring Lebanon and Jordan. Notably, Rifaat
al-Asad, the youngest brother of Hafiz, commanded a militia known as the Defense Com-
panies (Sarāyā al-Diāʿ), which led Syria’s intervention in Lebanon and participated in the
massacre at Hama, as well as the 1967 and 1973 wars with Israel. The infamous militia
later became the backbone of two elite military units: the Republican Guard (a praetorian
guard) and a special forces division. These and other elite units were originally trained by
the Soviet special forces, and adopted Soviet doctrine in areas like tank battle and siege
warfare (Pollack 2002). Since the 1980s, the regime has also mobilized supporters in pro-
government militias known as shabīha (comparable to Egypt’s baltagiya). The shabiha are
mostly Alawi and have operated at times in the manner of criminal syndicates (including
assassinations, smuggling, and protection rackets) and as mercenary soldiers in the civil
war (al Hajj Saleh 2012).
The prevalence of paramilitary forces is a distinct feature of the Syrian Armed
Forces, in comparison to other Arab armies. In most countries, paramilitary forces serve
non-military roles, such as border security and riot control, while traditionalmilitary units
are equipped with heavy weapons and perform all combat functions. Syrian military
doctrine, on the other hand, relies heavily on elite strike forces, which are trained and
equipped for combined arms warfare. Elite units of the military are oriented primarily
toward regime security, and promotions are, above all, based on loyalty considerations,
especially familial ties, ethnicity and geographic origin. Hinnebusch (1990, 160-62) de-
scribes the military establishment as a set of three concentric circles. At the top are the
president’s personal allies, mainly family members and other Alawis, who monopolize
the most sensitive positions, like leading elite military units and intelligence services. In
the next ring are the politicized officers, ranking Baʿathists who predominantly, but not
exclusively, members of religious minorities. The rest of the professional officer corps,
149
those without close ethnic or party ties to the al-Asad family, are still privileged members
of the establishment, but they tend to perform strictly professional functions rather than
critical regime security roles.
Consistent with its political orientation, the army has rarely hesitated to intervene
with deadly force to counter popular mobilization. During the post-colonial period, the
Syrian Armed Forces have used deadly force against protesters on several occasions,
but the military response to Islamist-led uprisings in the late 1970s and early 1980s far
surpassed the scale and brutality of other regime responses prior to 2011. The uprisings
were spearheaded by a self-styled “Fighting Vanguard” of Islamist extremists, inspired
by a violent current within the Muslim Brotherhood.15 From 1978 to 1982, the Syrian
military, pro-government militias, and other security forces waged open war on not only
the insurgents, but anyone suspected of Islamist sympathies as well. Government forces’
warlike response to the uprisings resulted in tens of thousands of civilian casualties,
including the massacre of an estimated 20,000 at Hama in February 1982. The military
framed its intervention as a legitimate response to the treasonous, anti-nationalist, and
foreign-sponsored Muslim Brotherhood. Not only was this rationale consistent with the
Baʿath regime’s nationalist ideology, but the narrative was also strengthened by state
propaganda, spread under a suffocating regime of censorship. As such, the Syrian public
largely accepted the regime’s version of events, and the military’s overwhelming use
of force did not trigger the same backlash that military attacks on civilians engendered
in similar incidents elsewhere in the region. In addition, the interventions were highly
successful in crushing the opposition forces that had instigated them, and therefore taught
the army the lesson that violence was an effective tool for maintaining both military and
regime interests.
15. Like the Egyptian Islamic Jihad and Islamic Group, the Syrian extremists were inspired by Sayyid
Qutb’s advocacy of the use of violence to overthrow Arab regimes judged as “impious” (Leèvre 2013, chap.
5). After the 1978-82 uprising failed, a minority of Syrian Islamists would follow this line of thinking into
the ranks of al-Qaida and other jihadist groups.
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Islamist Uprisings, 1978–82
The rise of the Baʿath Party in the 1960s came at the expense of its secular rivals, mainly
Nasserists andMarxists, who were quickly suppressed. The Baʿathists then moved against
the Muslim Brotherhood, their most implacable challenger. When the Brotherhood was
banned in 1964, its furious supporters, predominantly urban Sunnis, launched strikes and
demonstrations in each of Syria’s major cities (Batatu 1982). An especially strong protest
movement developed in Hama, reputed as a stronghold of conservative Sunni Islam, and
President Amin al-Hafiz ordered the military put down the insurrection.16 Soldiers killed
70–100 alleged members of the Brotherhood while restoring government control. In so
doing, the regime pushed the Brotherhood underground and inspired some of its members
to embrace violence in their politico-religious struggle.
In the late 1970s, with al-Asad now leading Syria, radicalized Islamists led a series
of popular uprisings across Syria, which escalated steadily for several years before cul-
minating in a full-scale revolt in Hama. By early 1980, demonstrations paralyzed nearly
all major cities in Syria, as many opposition groups, both religious and secular, joined
the uprising. In March, the military switched to war fighting tactics. Combat opera-
tions against anti-regime protesters were led by Special Forces, who killed 200 people in
two days (Leèvre 2013, 76). Following a failed attempt on al-Asad’s life, the president’s
brother, Rifaat, led a military assault on a Palmyra prison holding jailed members of
the Muslim Brotherhood, killing 550 prisoners in a mass extrajudicial execution. Next,
units from the Third Army Division entered Aleppo, a center of gravity of the Islamist
opposition, and imposed a brutal, yearlong occupation, which claimed 2,000 lives. The
“military” campaign finally climaxed in February 1982, when al-Asad decided to make an
example of the city of Hama, another anti-regime stronghold, whose leaders had made the
fateful decision to declare open rebellion against the Baʿathist regime. Between 10,000 and
16. As a member of the Baʿath Party’s Regional Command (the central decision-making body), Hafiz
al-Asad supported the use of force in Hama (Seale 1989, 94).
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40,000 residents of Hama were killed by government forces in a full-scale military assault.
In the assault on Hama, the military sent 12,000 troops to seal off the city, then
unloaded with heavy artillery, tanks and helicopter gunships (Drysdale 1982). Heavily
armed units then moved in, demolishing buildings (some with dozens of civilians inside),
leveling entire city blocks, and executing people at random. For the most extreme acts of
violence against the population, the military did not rely the Sunni rank-and-file. Instead,
each of the major assaults on civilians were led by elite units commanded by Alawis
(McLauchlin 2010, 342). To compensate for the reduction of force strength from leaving
out Sunni conscripts, the military and the party recruited and armed citizen militias in
minority-majority regions. Across Syria, the regime armed groups of party members and
supporters to supplement its coercive strength. Pro-government militia and paramilitary
units varied widely in terms of organization and professionalism, from gangs of pro-
regime thugs (shabiha) to elite special forces units (e.g. the Defense Companies). Some
of these groups were directly incorporated into the military command hierarchy, while
others operated semi-independently, taking orders informally from various government,
party, and military leaders. Regime discourse legitimated the use of militias and the
shabiha as “the people in arms,” a concept more typically associated with total war than
with order maintenance. The reliance on multiple, overlapping forces to accomplish a
single mission (without, necessarily, strict coordination among them) was and is char-
acteristic of the organizational structure of the Syrian Armed Forces. The concept of
the “people in arms” would reoccur in the 2011 conflict in the guise of the paramilitary
National Defense Forces (Droz-Vincent 2016, 177).
Although the Syrian Baʿath Party is often conflated, especially by its detractors,
with the Alawi ethnic group, it is ideologically a pan-ethnic party. In 1963, it was the party
that seized power, not the Alawi sect, and the replacement of Sunnis by minority Alawis,
Druzes and Ismaʾilis in government and the military officer corps resulted not from ethnic
bias but from a need to replace anti-Baʿath functionaries and officers the party’s base of
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support and the existing composition of the military rank-and-file. Consequently, the
concentration of Alawis in the regime spiked in the 1970s, as the Islamist uprising and
the unpopular intervention in Lebanon forced Asad to rely increasingly on his most loyal
supporters, especially fellow Alawis, for political survival (Batatu 1981). Thus, the “Alaw-
ization” of the military did not occur immediately with the establishment of “minority
rule” in 1970. Instead, both the regime and the military became Alawi-dominated because
of a combination of institutional precedents and the pressures of a major popular uprising.
In conclusion, the dominant role of ethnicity in Syrian military doctrine after 1980 was a
result of pre-existing features of the military organization, dating to the colonial period,
as well as the formative experience of the Islamist uprising.
After the massacre, stability was restored to Syria, and the military, in coalition
with the al-Asad regime, came out stronger than ever. The success of the army’s indis-
criminate application of war-fighting tactics civilians, and the positive (or at least not
openly critical) public response to their actions, seemingly justified the armed forces’
aggressive doctrine for domestic intervention. According toThomas Friedman (1989, 101),
who visited Hama not long after the massacre, the Syrian population as a whole supported
the military’s actions in Hama: “They might have said, ‘better one month of Hama than
14 years of civil war like Lebanon.’” Al-Asad’s narrative that only he could hold Syria
together found a receptive audience among many Syrians, including Sunnis, who were
watching the Lebanese war develop across the border. The al-Asad regime also pushed
the narrative that the Muslim Brotherhood was fundamentally anti-Syrian, inspired by
foreign ideology and funded by the Iraqi Baʿath Party (Leèvre 2013, 130).17 The regime
also blamed the United States for instigating the violence in unspecified ways, as well
as those who opposed Syria’s “steadfastness” against Israel (Drysdale 1982). Pointing out
foreign plots behind the domestic uprisings shifted the reference point for the government
response: if protests called for policing, a foreign-backed insurgency called for war.
17. The Syrian and Iraqi Baʿath remained bitter rivals after their 1966 schism. See note 8.
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These official narratives about the nature of the uprising and its instigators may
have been intended to convince soldiers at least as much as the general public. The
regime’s discourse also provided a way for officers to justify their participation in what
might otherwise be called gross human rights violations. If their targets were enemy
combatants, their repression could be a legitimate act of war. Syrian military doctrine
called for the armed forces to approach popular uprisings as insurgent threats to national
security, and the “success” of Hama simply reinforced this image. Given the magnitude of
the violence in Palmyra, Aleppo, Hama, andmany other cities, the uprisings left a dramatic
mark on the participants on both sides: “Today, more than ever before, the Syrian regime,
composed of a number of officers and politicians who have themselves, or through the
experiences of their relatives, lived through the internal crisis of the late 1970s and early
1980s, is looking at the current uprisings through the lens of its own history” (Leèvre
2013, 184).
5.3 Foreign Influence
Like in other post-colonial states, Syria’s foreign patrons exerted a powerful influence over
the development of military doctrine. Throughout the Cold War, the Soviet Union was
Syria’s main arms provider and diplomatic ally. Syria began purchasing Soviet weapons
after the Suez Crisis in 1956, but the relationship deepened under Salah Jadid, the de
facto leader of Baʿathist Syria from 1966 to 1970. Internationally, Jadid was considered an
extremist in both domestic and foreign policy. While pursuing a socialist transformation
of Syrian society, he aligned the country firmly with the Soviet bloc, but his government’s
left-wing “adventurism” was not appreciated by the Soviet leadership. When al-Asad took
power in 1970, he sought to moderate Syria’s foreign policy, primarily to gather enough
support to again challenge Israel. In his view, the Soviet Union was the only possible
source of enough weapons to win the upcoming war (Seale 1989, 186-87). Over time,
al-Asad made Syria into the Soviets’ indispensable Middle Eastern ally, a status which
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has persevered through the present civil war. Although al-Asad was “never more than
a cautious ally of the Soviets,” Syria remained solidly in the Eastern bloc throughout the
Cold War, and subsequently continued as a Russian client (Pollack 2002, 105). Despite
the significant cultural barriers between the two countries, Russian influence has been
effective in Syria, in part because it is unconstrained by the limitations that democratic
states face when attempting to influence authoritarian regimes through military assis-
tance (Biddle et al. 2018).
Meanwhile, Syria’s foreign relations within the Arab world degenerated through-
out the second half of the century. Relations with Egypt soured when Syria pulled out
of their short-lived political union (1958–61), and fractious wartime alliances in 1967 and
1973 did little to improve the relationship. By the 1970s, Egypt’s Sadat had become a vocal
critic of what he called the “Alawi Baʿath” (van Dam 2011, 93). Relations with neighbor-
ing Jordan reached a nadir during Black September 1970, when Syrian forces entered
Jordanian territory. Syria’s goals were not fully clear, but the results were unambiguous:
military defeat and a new enemy in King Hussein. Following the Iran’s 1979 Revolution,
Syria increasingly turned to the Islamic Republic for diplomatic and military backing.
Open support for Iran in turn created tensions with Gulf states in particular, who had
previously provided substantial economic aid. Thus, Syria’s relationships with Russia and
Iran have been the most influential in shaping Syrian military doctrine, while theWestern
influences observed in Tunisia and, to a lesser extent, Egypt have been entirely absent.
Military Aid
Soviet sponsorship in the 1970s and 80s provided cover for the development of an authori-
tarian national security state, the domestic counterpart of Hafiz al-Asad’s assertive foreign
policy. As Hinnebusch (2002, 7) observes, “the resources for this project partly derived
from Syria’s exploitation of Cold War rivalries that allowed it to access Soviet protection,
arms and development aid.” Syria’s foreign policy required large investments in military
155
expansion and equipment. Egypt’s peace with Israel brought a “peace dividend” – reduced
military expenses plus substantial American aid – but Syria took the opposite tack. In car-
rying the mantle of resistance, Syria entered into a ruinous regional arms race, becoming
one of only ten countries in the world to spend over ten percent of GNP on the military
in the early 1980s (Drysdale 1982). Escalating military costs were a major burden on the
state budget, diverting resources from economic and social development. Despite a partial
subsidy from the Arab League, the costs of military occupation in Lebanon ran at least $1
million daily by one estimate (Drysdale 1982). At the same time, Syria remained one of
the world’s largest arms importers, a feat made possible by Soviet resources.
Armaments were the bloodline of the Soviet-Syrian relationship. The Arab coali-
tion had relied on the Soviets to arm them for battle with Israel in 1973, and Soviet tech-
nicians were on the ground during the war, repairing damaged equipment and advising
Syrian officers. As Sadat turned Egypt away from the Soviets after the war, Syria became
even more essential to Soviet influence in the region (Cobban 1991, 113). Throughout the
1980s, al-Asad pushed the Soviets to help Syria achieve “strategic balance” with Israel:
“Syria continued to rely heavily on the Soviet Union, which resupplied the Syrian armed
forces with sophisticated weapons, and with which it concluded the Treaty of Friendship
and Cooperation on October 8, 1980. This relationship did not evolve, however, to either
country’s complete satisfaction. As of early 1987, Syria had not granted the Soviets per-
manent port facilities, and, although the Soviets had pledged to defend Syria if it were
attacked by Israel, it refused to support a Syrian blitz on the Golan Heights” (Collelo 1987,
226-28). Syria could also rely on the historical example of 1967 and 1973, when the Soviets
went so far as to threaten invasion in order to push Israel to accept a ceasefire (Glassman
1975).
Despite these policy disagreements, a stable, if transactional, relationship evolved
betweenDamascus andMoscow, which provided the al-Asad regimewith a reliableweapons
supplier (Seale 1989, 218). Importantly, Soviet assistance to the Middle East was not
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conditional on domestic politics in the recipient country. The Soviets did not use arms
sales as leverage to impose human rights standards or democratization, as Washington
sometimes did with its allies. While Moscow did foster ties between the Communist Party
and the Syrian Baʿath, it was uncoerced and intended to foster greater influence (Freedman
1985, 42). Notably, Moscow never discouraged the use of deadly force against civilians.
In the post-Soviet period, the Russian military used indiscriminate violence in its own
internal wars, for example in Chechnya (Lyall 2009). Thus, at a minimum, Syrian officers
could safely assume that using their Russian-made weapons to attack civilians would not
impede further acquisitions. Continuing support from Russia, as well as Iran, after 2012,
even as the Syrian military was credibly accused of numerous war crimes, demonstrates
how guaranteed access to Russian arms enabled the Syrian military to pursue a military
campaign against civilians in contravention of international law.
Education and Training
The Soviet Union also served as the most important foreign influence on civil-military
relations in Syria. As discussed above, French recruitment and promotion policies during
the mandate period served to politicize and polarize the military along ideological and
sectarian lines prior to independence (see section 5.1). Then, during the formative post-
colonial period in Syria’s national development, the Soviet Union became patron and
sponsor of the Syrian Armed Forces. As Syria’s military patron throughout the Cold
War, the Soviet Union provided the great majority of foreign training opportunities for
Syrian officers. Some Syrians also trained with other Arab forces, but this exchange was
limited by rising tensions in Syria’s regional relationships. For his part, Hafiz al-Asad
received military training both in the USSR and in Egypt, where he studied with fellow
Air Force officer Hosni Mubarak (Ma’oz 1990, 53). Overall, the Soviet influence over
Syrian doctrine has been less significant than Western influence in Tunisia, but some
important characteristics were transferred through military-to-military exchange. Since
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the 1960s, Syria and the Soviet Union (later Russia) have had an ongoing military-to-
military exchange, with dozens of Syrian officers traveling toMoscow formilitary training
each year, and hundreds and even thousands of Soviet trainers giving courses in Syria at
any given time. Soviet influence was felt most in three areas: general doctrine and force
structure, the relationship between the ruling party and the military, and methods of
control within military units.
First, Syria’s military relationship with the Soviet Union significantly influenced
the doctrine and organization of the Syrian forces. The 1960s were a prime era of military
development in Syria, as the armed forces adopted modern weaponry and corresponding
tactics from the Soviet Union. Because senior officers were preoccupied with the turmoil
of constant coups d’état, the few hundred Soviet advisers sent to train and educate forces
in Syria had an important influence on doctrine at a pivotal moment in Syrian military
history (Pollack 2002, 459). As a result, Soviet doctrine would have a residual influence
in Syria for generations. In internal security operations like in 1980–1982 and 2012–2013,
the Syrians often relied on siege tactics which strongly mirrored Russian tactics formerly
seen in Chechnya and elsewhere (Droz-Vincent 2016, 180).
Second, the politicization of the Syrian military, already rampant prior to the So-
viet relationship, was only encouraged and reinforced by Soviet concepts of civil-military
relations. Luckham (1971, 23-24) labels the communist model of civil-military relations
“apparat control.”18 In this model, a “well articulated ruling party apparatus” is able to
balance the power of the military, “though both institutions are powerful.” The party
achieves its influence over the military by establishing lateral connections with junior
officers and by ensuring the ideological indoctrination of soldiers of all ranks; “importance
is attached to the diffusion within the military of political as well as military doctrine.”
Under Soviet influence, Syria’s Baʿath Party developed a similar system to govern the
relationship between party and military, drawing ideological justification from Leninist
18. The term apparat refers to the administrative system of a communist party, but Luckham applies it to
other socialist or fascist regimes as well.
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political philosophy. Like in the Soviet Union, the army was explicitly considered a
political “vanguard” in early Baʿathism (Galvani 1974, 8). After the Baʿathist coup in
1966, the regime made a serious effort to implement a Communist model of civil-military
relations (Hinnebusch 1990, 158). Thus, indoctrination and party loyalty were central
to military training, doctrine, and promotions, especially to the most elite (and most
privileged) military formations (159–62). Politicization, as described here, has the result
that Syrian officers account for political goals in the strategic planning and operations
of the armed forces, even at the expense of strictly military considerations. Although
Syria’s military would have been politicized even in the absence of Soviet mentorship,
Soviet training inevitably reinforced this politicization.
Finally, Soviet ideas about ensuring political control of the military likely inspired
some of the strategies of the al-Asad regime. In particular, the Syrian military adopted
certain Soviet concepts for ensuring internal security within military units. The central
problem of civil-military relations theory is to ensure civilian control over the military. In
the Soviet Union, the Communist Party exercised this authority not only vertically, from
the top down as in the West, but also horizontally, through the ideological indoctrination
of soldiers and officers. To ensure “ideological education” and civilian control within the
military, the Party appointed a political commissar, responsible for indoctrination and
surveillance, to each military unit (Colton 1979). Politicizing the military in this way
was anathema to the Western model of the professional, apolitical soldier (Huntington
1957; Janowitz 1964; Finer 1962); however, it resulted in a stable, “coalitional” relationship
between military and party leaders (Perlmutter and LeoGrande 1982). Syria did not adopt
the Communist system directly, but assured a similar horizontal form of political control
by assigning security officers to each military unit. Like Soviet commissars, security
officers are responsible for monitoring soldiers’ behavior and political attitudes, limiting
the ability of individual commanders or units to go rogue. Because the regime prioritizes
political security above military considerations, security officers are highly empowered
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and sometimes even more influential than the unit commander (Droz-Vincent 2016, 172).
The “Axis of Resistance”: Iran & Hezbollah
Hafiz al-Asad was an early supporter of the revolutionaries in Iran in 1979, and a conflu-
ence of interests, as well as Shiʿa identity ties, have motivated a close partnership between
the two nations. Syria’s support of Iran in its war with Iraq (1980–88) further distanced
Syria from the moderate Arab countries (Collelo 1987, 45). During the devastating eight-
year war, the Islamic Republic employed popular mobilization tactics to leverage its popu-
lation advantage against Iraq’s superior military. In particular, the Basijwas established as
a volunteer paramilitary force to serve as auxiliaries in the war and to assist with internal
security. As relations with Iran deepened, these concepts began to influence the thinking
of Syrian commanders. For example, in the Syrian Civil War, the government organized
a new militia called the National Defense Forces to combine the models of the Baʿathist
“people in arms” from the Islamist uprising with the Basij model, all with the assistance
of Iranian advisers (Droz-Vincent 2016, 177).
The civil war in Lebanon offers another example of Iran’s militia-based military
doctrine. Both Iran and Syria were active in the conflict. As discussed previously, Syria’s
direct military intervention began in 1976, and although billed as an Arab League peace-
keeping mission, Syria operated as an independent party to the conflict. It was the Israeli
invasion of Shiʿa-majority southern Lebanon in 1982 that motivated Iran to involve it-
self. In the following years, Iran helped Lebanese supporters of Ayatollah Khomeini to
consolidate various Shiʿa militias into a single organization, Hezbollah (Party of God).
Syria endorsed Hezbollah by allowing 1,500 troops from Iran’s Revolutionary Guard into
Lebanon to train the newmilitia. Iran has continued to support Hezbollah financially, and
the militia is seen as both an Iranian proxy and a Syrian ally in the conflict with Israel. In
the 2000s, Iranian officials began using the term “axis of resistance” to describe the Iran–
Syria–Hezbollah alliance against Israel, and Syrian officials emphasized their alliance with
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the “Shiites” to project strength against Saudi interference in Lebanon.19 Demonstrating
the strength of the alliance, Hezbollah joined the Syrian Civil War in 2012 on behalf of
the al-Asad regime.
5.4 Doctrinal Adoption
The adoption of Syria’s warlike doctrine for domestic interventions took place as the al-
Asad regime consolidated power in the 1970s and 1980s. The development of doctrine
in Syria is consistent with the three processes outlined in chapter 2: internalization,
routinization, and formalization. The foundations of military doctrine in Syria had long
favored a combative, us-versus-themmentality, which had been internalized by the officer
corps late 1970s. But it was in responding to the the Islamist uprising of 1978–82 that
Syria’s combative doctrine was routinized and formalized. The massacre of Hama in 1982
was a watershed moment in Syrian military development. When the Islamist uprising
pushed this political order to the brink, the military was forced to either break or double
down. With its overwhelming brutality against civilians, unparalleled in the modern
histories of Tunisia or Egypt, the Syrian military went to war on its fellow citizens. The
military’s organizational response to the uprising was to formalize the existing loyalty
structures within the armed forces and paramilitaries. In this way, elite military units
were officially organized to provide a robust defense of the status quo during the next
uprising.
The uprising severely tested the loyalty of the armed forces, but the army avoided
widespread insubordination and succeeded in crushing the city’s resistance. Soviet pa-
tronage provided the resources necessary to sustain the authoritarian security state in this
critical time, allowing the military to expand despite economic strain. The institution’s
existing biases were reinforced: a partisan leaning toward the ruling party grew into a
deep ideological alignment with its Baʿathist ideology, and ethnicity, long manipulated
19. Embassy Damascus, “Iranian President Visits Damascus,” Wikileaks Cable: 06DAMASCUS208_a,
dated January 19, 2006.
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by colonial policies, created new tensions as the military institution rose in prominence,
fueling the politicization of sectarian identities. In the Muslim Brotherhood’s account
of the events, it is observed that the regime’s strategic ethnic composition of soldiers
and officers made collective revolt “impossible,” while the Baʿath Party’s official history
lauded the “internal cohesion and unity” of the armed forces (van Dam 2011, 114). These
assessments exaggerate the sectarian composition of the military, as well as its loyalty.
Even the crushing assault of Hama was slowed down considerably by soldiers’ disloyalty
Hinnebusch (1990, 297). In the end, though, al-Asad’s fellow Alawis did prove more
reliable in enacting mass violence against the Sunni majority, leading to a retrenchment
of the sectarian approach to internal security (McLauchlin 2010, 342).
However, it was not only the regime which politicized Syria’s ethnic diversity. The
Islamist movement also relied on sectarian rhetoric in its anti-regime campaign, hoping
to incite popular opposition to minority rule. In the late 1970s, Islamists of the radical
“vanguard” hoped to draw Syria’s Sunni Muslim majority into the campaign by exposing
the regime’s “sectarian face” (Leèvre 2013, 63). To this end, the Brotherhood released
a reform manifesto, which called for the armed forces to be freed from their “sectarian
composition” – implying a purge of Alawis from positions of power. By framing the anti-
regime movement in increasingly sectarian terms, they hoped to “polarize antagonisms
in Syrian society around the confessional axis” (van Dam 2011, 108).
Unfortunately for the opposition, the sectarian tack backfired. Before the upris-
ings, the opposition’s characterization of the regime as an Alawi one were overstated, and
al-Asad had actually taken steps to balance out the sectarian composition of the Baʿath
leadership since taking office (Drysdale 1982). But as nationwide rebellion pushed the
regime to its breaking point, the elite began relyingmore heavily on its most loyal circles –
family, tribal, and regional connections, who were of course predominantly Alawis. Thus,
the accusation of rampant sectarian bias in the regime became a self-fulfilling prophecy.
As the crisis developed, the military embarked on a major campaign to “ethnically stack”
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the officer corps with Alawis, recruiting heavily from the ethnic group while purging
Sunnis suspected of disloyalty. Since the early 1980s, Alawis have comprised 80–85% of
every incoming cohort at the military academy (Bou Nassif 2015c, 631-32).20 Moreover,
the “Alawization” of key positions in the security and military sectors has been a classic
tactic of the al-Asad regime in times of crisis (Droz-Vincent 2016, 176).
Long after the uprising was crushed, the regime continued to exaggerate the threat
the Muslim Brotherhood posed to Syria.21 This strategy makes sense because the Brother-
hood are Sunnis, who the regime claims would oppress Syria’s religious minorities (pos-
sibly as retribution for past repression). Even after being thoroughly dismantled by the
regime, the Brotherhood represented the most organized opposition force in Syria. Thus,
the regime used them as a straw man for any political alternative to the al-Asad regime.
The regime also exploited opportunities to burnish its pro-Islamic credentials, like the
Danish cartoon crisis in 2006, when officials tacitly encouraged rioters to attack European
embassies in retaliation for the publication of an image offensive to many Muslims.22
5.5 Responding with War
On the eve of the Arab Spring, Syria’s most senior officers had an unprecedented loyalty
and deep interdependence with the political regime. Still, divisions continued within an
army built on divide-and-rule rather than unity from its founding, and grievances among
Sunni soldiers were particularly salient (Bou Nassif 2015c). The army did fracture as
the conflict wore on: although senior officers remained steadfast in their support of the
regime, many junior officers began defecting before the end of 2011 (Albrecht and Ohl
2016, 47). Neither superior loyalty to the regime nor unity within the ranks fully explains
20. In fact, Hafiz al-Asad initially sought as president to moderate the sectarian antagonism he had
inherited from his “neo-Baʿath” predecessors; it was only during the 1978–1982 crisis that he fully embraced
Alawization (Leèvre 2013, 71, 77).
21. Embassy Damascus, “The Muslim Brothers in Syria; Part I: Could They Win an Election Here?”
Wikileaks Cable: 06DAMASCUS517_a, dated February 8, 2006.
22. Embassy Damascus, “Mood of the SARG; Cabinet Reshuffle Rumors,” Wikileaks Cable:
06DAMASCUS528_a, dated February 9, 2006.
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the brutality of the military crackdown. Instead of focusing on loyalty alone, I argue we
should look to the army’s doctrinal development, shaped by the army’s historical role in
domestic crises, especially in violent crackdowns on anti-government demonstrators, and
Soviet influence through military education and financial assistance.
When the Arab Spring arrived in Syria, “The members of the decentralized ruling
coalition perceived the challenge from society as existential. Either the coalition remained
intact or the regime would collapse. There was no soft out as in the case of Egypt.
Unwilling and unable to change the ruling coalition, state-society relations were reduced
to a zero-sum game as the state tried to stop the protests.” (Stacher 2012, 160). The
International Crisis Group observed: “When the opposition says it will topple the regime,
what Alawites hear is that their source of income, employment, and physical protection
will be eliminated. When it evokes the undoing of the system and all its institutions, they
hear a return to second-class citizenry. When it speaks of justice and accountability, they
hear the threat of collective retribution.”23 The al-Asad regime had long promoted itself
as the country’s only hope for stability, and it seems that many Syrians believed them.24
Knowing the al-Asad regimewould notwillingly yield power, the opposition pleaded
with military officers to turn on the regime (Droz-Vincent 2016, 173). Just like Egyptian
protesters before them, Syrian demonstrators chanted the slogan “the army and the people
are one hand” and waved olive branches to passing soldiers. Conscious of the military’s
violent response to past protests, they hoped that in the euphoria of the Arab Spring, the
military would be prove more sympathetic this time around. Unfortunately, protesters’
hopeful attempts at fraternization never gave way to actual cooperation between soldiers
and citizens. Instead, the army quickly joined the police in using live ammunition to put
down the unrest (Nepstad 2013, 344).
23. ICG, “Syria’s Mutating Conflict,” 2012.
24. In 2006, US chargé d’affaires Stephen Seche reported, “Most Syrians we talk to believe that President
Asad still represents their best hope for change without instability. It is their fear of instability that stops
the majority of Syrians from pushing harder for internal change.” Embassy Damascus, “Applying Targeted
Sanctions to Syria,” Wikileaks Cable: 06DAMASCUS68_a, dated January 4, 2006.
164
Even as the military escalated its engagement with the demonstrators, the great
majority of officers remained loyal, and very few soldiers of all ranks deserted until mid-
2012, after the conflict had metastasized into a full-scale civil war (Koehler et al. 2016,
454). As protests continued, the regime leaned on senior officers’ ethnic and kinship
ties to the al-Asad family to bolster unity at the top of the military hierarchy (Haddad
2012b). The continuing loyalty of the senior officer corps, even as the prospect of a quick
military victory faded, demonstrate the regime’s success in getting officers invested in
the regime’s continuity (Bou Nassif 2015c). The military’s long-term success in main-
taining adequate loyalty and manpower throughout the civil war is a testament to its
original doctrine for domestic crises. The army’s behavior in the civil war has mirrored
the aggressive warfighting approach to internal security developed over decades. As attri-
tion through casualties and defections increased, the military shored up loyalty through
strategic purges and promotions of ethnic and familial relations, and doubled down on
the use of militia forces (often based on a particular sect or ideology) to meet manpower
requirements25
Why did Syria turn from a revolution into a war? The answer lies in the mili-
tary’s warlike response to the initially peaceful demonstrations. The regime was taken by
surprise by the demonstrations, but the demonstrations gained momentum more slowly
than in Tunisia or Egypt, where the suppression of public dissent had been far less se-
vere.26 In conjunction with massive physical repression, the regime used propaganda to
stoke fear, especially among minorities, of imminent sectarian bloodshed, and to portray
demonstrators as foreign agents and armed Islamists.27 From the first days of the uprising,
the regime promoted a war narrative, which labeled protesters “rebels,” not demonstrators
(Droz-Vincent 2016, 178-79). In fact, the regime led the way in calling the uprising a “war,”
as the International Crisis Group (2011b, 9) reported: “Even in late-March, at a time when
25. Tom Cooper, “What’s Left of the Syrian Arab Army?” War is Boring Blog, May 18, 2016, https:
//warisboring.com/whats-left-of-the-syrian-arab-army/.
26. On the suppression of political expression in Syria, see Wedeen (1999); Pearlman (2016, 24-26).
27. ICG, “The Syrian Regime’s Slow-Motion Suicide.”
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the popular movement appeared manageable, the regime resorted to language suggesting
that all protests represented a decisive threat. In a letter sent to most administrative
departments in the capital, the governor of Damascus, following cabinet instructions,
requested civil servants to draw up plans to contribute to the ’war effort’ (al-majhud al-
harbi); in a more or less contemporaneous speech, the president spoke at length of a global
conspiracy, which helped shape the security services’ response.” On March 25, 2011, as
the New York Times reported Syrian soldiers had opened fire on demonstrators,28 Syrian
state media blamed a vast foreign conspiracy to spread “fabricated news and lies on the
situation.”29
Yet for the regime to so powerfully impose the war narrative on the armed forces,
it was necessary that the military’s doctrine already reflected this way of thinking. And
indeed, the military response to the uprisings was an echo of previous conflicts. Leèvre
(2013, 181-82) notes a “historical continuity” between the military’s responses in the late
1970s and in 2011: “In a rhetorical twist echoing that of the late 1970s, early on the regime
justified its crackdown on the protests by arguing that it had to uproot the ‘jihadist ele-
ments’ and ‘gangs’ supposed to be active in the demonstrations.” On the protesters’ side,
the late-1970s uprisings would also become a theme of the new protest movement: “We
will not let the massacres of 1982 be repeated!” In recalling the past uprisings, protesters
of course hoped that 2011 would be different. At first, Syrians resisted these narratives; in
July 2011, the ICG still assessed that, “The Syrian people have proved remarkably resistant
to sectarian or divisive tendencies, defying regime prophecies of confessional strife and
Islamisation.”30 But the regime’s escalation of the conflict eventually opened the door
for extremism to flourish, and over time, the Syrian government’s insistence that the
opposition were all jihadist extremists became a self-fulfilling prophecy.31
28. Michael Slackman, “Syrian Troops Open Fire on Protesters in Several Cities,” New York Times, March
25, 2011.
29. Fadi Allafi, “Mass Rallies All Over Syria Stressing Importance of National Unity for Opposing Foreign
Campaign Targeting Syria,” Syrian Arab News Agency, March 25, 2011.
30. ICG, “The Syrian Regime’s Slow-Motion Suicide.”
31. ICG, “Tentative Jihad: Syria’s Fundamentalist Opposition,” October 12, 2012.
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Once the military phase of the conflict was underway, Syrian officers reached a
point of no return: they knew that their acts of violence in service of the regime had
eliminated any prospect of survival in a post-Asad Syria (Landis 2012). With the rapid
conquest of Syrian territory by the Islamic State (al-Dawla al-ʾIslamiyya ī-l-ʿIrāq wa-l-
Shām) in 2015, senior officers had justifiable fears that a post-Asad political order might
be worse not only for them, but for all Syrians. The prospect of sectarian reprisals, that
even innocent Alawis would be punished for their co-ethnicity with the former oppressor,
may also have motivated officers to carry on fighting through the darkest days of the war.
But for the vast majority of military officers, the situation at the start of protests in the
spring of 2011 still offered nonviolent alternatives. In the moment of crisis, the Syrian
Armed Forces simply followed their doctrine, which called for a declaration of war. Seven
years later, that war has killed 400,000 Syrians and driven half the population from their
homes.32 Even if the al-Asad regime and its military loyalists survive, the catastrophe of
the war belies any claim of rationality behind the military’s choice to brutalize peaceful
demonstrators in 2011.
Conclusion
Overall, the case of Syria supports the dissertation’s theory better than the main alterna-
tive, ethnic loyalty. Conventional wisdom holds that Syria’s military stayed loyal because
of the over-representation of Alawis, kinsmen of President al-Asad, in the officer corps.
In a classic statement of the argument, Horowitz (2000, 497-501) describes the rise of
“ethnocracy” in Syria as a process of “ethnic attrition” by which a minority group, the
Alawis, consolidated power by sequentially excluding rival groups from power, narrow-
ing the ethnic basis of their rule to ever-smaller circles. Further, Horowitz claims that
“regimes that rest on the support of small minority groups,” like the al-Asad regime, are
exceptionally durable because they “are not likely to be lulled into a false sense of security.”
32. “Timeline of the Syrian conflict as it enters 8th year,”e Associated Press, March 15, 2018.
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However, this informal logic has been overturned by quantitative scholarship, which finds
that excluding large ethnic groups from political power increases the likelihood of civil
conflict (Wimmer et al. 2009). Moreover, all consolidated authoritarian regimes concen-
trate power in the hands of a small circle of stakeholders, yet authoritarian breakdown
remains commonplace (Geddes et al. 2014b).
Instead, I find that the historical development of military doctrine offers a better
explanation for the military’s response to the Arab Spring. Per the theory, each of the
factors observed in Syria predicts the development of an assertive, even aggressive, doc-
trine for domestic security, and the consequent use of extreme violence against protesters.
First, colonial institutions favored the separation of soldiers from the general population,
especially by skewing the ethnic composition of the force. Moreover, colonial policies
favored the creation of a strong military institution but a weak civilian government;
therefore, the sudden lifting of imperial domination created a power vacuum into which
military officers would step. Like the Egyptian military, Syrian soldiers played no role in
winning national independence, but they gained legitimacy by helping establish national
sovereignty in the following years, especially in the pan-Arab struggle against Zionism.
When officers took power in a series of coups d’état, the military was the primary elite
base for the regime’s power, leading to close and durable ties between the ruling party
and the military.
The combination of social segregation from the population and deep ties with the
ruling elite instilled soldiers with a powerful inclination to defend the existing order.
From 1970 to the mid-1980s, the military’s doctrine of combat against domestic unrest was
routinized and formalized, in the aftermath of the Islamist uprising andwith the support of
the Soviet Union and revolutionary Iran. By the time the Arab Spring reached Damascus,
Syrian officers had internalized an antagonistic view of the population, routinized the
means of suppressing dissent through violence, and formalized the elite command struc-
tures to carry out effective violence against civilians. In light of the military’s doctrinal
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The central claim of this dissertation is that the military’s historical development and
foreign training relationships shape its doctrine, which in turn determines how soldiers
respond to popular uprisings. Qualitative case studies of three simultaneous uprisings
during the Arab Spring (Tunisia, Egypt, and Syria) support the hypothesized causal mech-
anisms. The goal of this chapter is to test the generalizability of my argument to the other
Arab Spring uprisings and to attempted nonviolent revolutions worldwide. First, I apply
the concept of military doctrine to the remaining Arab Spring uprisings, namely Bahrain,
Libya, and Yemen. After discussing the uprisings and responses, I assess the extent to
which the military’s behavior is predicted by the theory. I then describe the political
trajectory of the Middle East and North Africa after the uprisings, highlighting the effect
of military behavior on regional politics.
Next, I broaden the scope of the investigation to all nonviolent revolutions world-
wide since 1950. To test the theory cross-nationally, I develop a new data set of military
responses to uprisings. In each case, I gather data on the military’s relationships with the
independence movement and the ruling party, as well as its history of receiving military
education and training assistance from the United States. Regression analysis indicates
robust support for the proposed mechanisms, while failing to confirm the alternative
explanations of capacity, patronage, and ethnicity.
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6.1 Across the Arab Spring
The case studies in the previous chapter document the particular pathways that Arab
militaries took from their foundation to the Arab Spring. In the Middle East and North
Africa, the development of modern coercive institutions began in the early twentieth
century under the influence of the European colonial powers. Emerging from colonial
rule in the 1950s, the Arab states were left to grapple with diverse institutional legacies.
The relationship of the military to the independence movement and the emergent political
regime would come to have a powerful long-term influence on military doctrine. Before
long, the Middle East was caught up in the Soviet–American competition for client states,
and the region’s militaries received exceptionally high levels of foreign assistance from
both sides. Where each state fell along the Cold War battle lines would also come to
influence the shape of military doctrine for generations to come.
The Arab Spring encompassed a diverse array of military doctrines and revolu-
tionary outcomes. The uprisings included both violent and nonviolent military responses,
successful and unsuccessful protest movements, and divergent political trajectories, from
authoritarian retrenchment to democratization. In Tunisia, a doctrine of restraint kept
the military on the sidelines of the revolution, which enabled a largely peaceful trans-
fer of power and subsequent transition to democracy. In Egypt, a doctrine of control
prevented widespread military violence during the 2011 revolution, but also inspired a
bloody, military-led counterrevolution in 2013. In Syria, a doctrine of combat led the
armed forces to immediately engage protesters with tanks and artillery, provoking a
disastrous civil war. All three cases demonstrate the influence of historical factors on
military doctrine and behavior, as well as the critical role of the military in shaping the
course of events during popular uprisings.
After the fall of Tunisia’s Ben Ali, significant protests took place in virtually every
Arab capital. Overall, the region’s monarchies proved more resilient to the Arab Spring
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than the republics, owing to their broad-based traditional sources of popular support,
robust coercive apparatuses funded by rents from natural resources or foreign aid, and
the protection of foreign patrons (Yom and Gause 2012, 75-76). The Kingdom of Bahrain
was the exception that proves the rule. With a staunch and combative military response
and foreign assistance from the arch-conservative and oil-rich Kingdom of Saudi Ara-
bia, Bahrain crushed the uprising quickly and completely. Unlike the national armies
discussed previously, the Bahraini military was established from the beginning as a prae-
torian force, designed to defend not the nation but the monarchy, and staffed with foreign
mercenaries (Louër 2013, 248-53). The result was a doctrine of combat, which dictated the
use of violence to defend the status quo.
Among the Arab republics, protests escalated to full-scale revolution in both Libya
and Yemen in 2011. The authoritarian leaders of both countries were ultimately deposed,
but only after their armies responded with violence against civilians, and then dissolved
into rival factions whose fighting continues to this day. The divisions that split the Libyan
and Yemeni armies were not spontaneous consequences of the Arab Spring. Instead, these
militaries lacked cohesion since their founding and never established a unified doctrine
or common agreement on roles and missions (Gaub 2013; Knights 2013). In Libya and
Yemen, a disunified doctrine helps to explain the rapid fracturing of these forces into rival
militias and insurgent groups.
Bahrain
Bahrain remained a British protectorate until 1971, when it came under the rule of the
Khalifa family. Since 1973, the family has ruled the tiny Persian Gulf nation as a consti-
tutional monarchy, protecting its political supremacy but also establishing a national as-
sembly. Members of the ruling family dominate the nation’s highest political and military
posts. Notably, the royal family is Sunni, whereas roughly 70% of Bahrain’s approximately
677,000 citizens are Shia Muslims.1 When the uprising started on February 14, 2011,
1. More than half of the resident population in Bahrain is comprised of non-citizens.
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the lack of political representation was important to protesters, as was the Sunni bias in
the military. In particular, they denounced the government’s policy of recruiting Sunni
foreigners, mainly from Pakistan, Yemen, Syria, and Jordan, into the Bahraini military
(Nepstad 2013, 343). On February 17, King Hamad ordered his troops to fire on the demon-
strators. However, this actually galvanized the protesters. According to international
media reports, 200,000 citizens (i.e. 25% of the adult population) were spurred to action
after this event.2 Military violence escalated in March, when the regime declared a state
of emergency and invited its allies to send security forces to assist in restoring order.
Saudi Arabia sent 1,000 soldiers, while the United Arab Emirates sent 500 policemen
(Kamrava 2012, 99). Using live ammunition, pro-government forces cleared the central
demonstration site at the Pearl Roundabout, and protests subsided. When revolution
threatened the monarchy, the Bahrain Defence Force performed exactly as it had been
trained to, vigorously defending the regime. Moreover, Bahraini forces later contributed
to the Saudi-led intervention in Yemen’s civil war. This decision can be explained not only
by pressure from Saudi Arabia, but also by their doctrinal orientation to defend the status
quo.
The case of Bahrain is generally consistent with the theory of the dissertation.
Military doctrine in Bahrain most closely resembles Syria’s doctrine of combat, in which
soldiers are trained to view dissidents as enemy forces and respond with violence. How-
ever, the original causes of this warlike doctrine in Bahrain differ from the historical
circumstances found in the other cases. Unlike national armies elsewhere, the military
was created in 1969 to protect the Al Khalifa family, and it is dominated by members
of the ruling family and the ruling family’s co-ethnics (Louër 2013, 257-58). Despite the
family’s continuous rule since 1971 many, if not most, Bahraini Shias “continue to view
them as invaders” (Barany 2016a, 16). In the short history since independence, Bahrain
did not experience a popular uprising prior to 2011. However, Shia Islamists undertook
2. Adrian Humphreys, “The Arab Awakening: A Bahraini activist struggles to keep protests alive,”
National Post (Toronto), December 21, 2011.
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a serious coup attempt in December 1981, which led to purges of Shia officers from the
military and a doctrinal shift from accommodation to confrontation with the regime’s
Shia opponents (14). Like the Islamist uprising occurring at the same time in Syria, the
conspiracy against Emir (later King) Hamad cemented the military’s doctrinal shift to a
combative posture.
While the Bahrain armed forces’ institutional origins and past interventions are
both consistent withmymain hypotheses, the case fails to confirm the influence of foreign
military training. Bahrain has been a United States ally since its independence, and the
country hosts the headquarters of the United States Navy’s Fifth Fleet. The Bahrain
Defence Force was extremely weak through the 1990s, and the US has worked to build
it into a useful regional ally. By 2011, Bahrain had received only 20 years of American
military aid, but virtually all senior officers had already received significant training in the
United States. Therefore, the case does not support the hypothesis that American training
decreases the use of violence against protesters. However, it is possible that whatever
American influence may have existed was canceled out by countervailing tendencies to-
ward a more combative doctrine.
When considering the alternative explanations for military response, the outcome
of Bahrain’s revolution appears to be over-determined. Capacity, patronage, and ethnicity
all point to a violent response from themilitary. Although the armed forces are small, with
only 8,200 active members, yielding a ratio of 61.9 soldiers per ten thousand inhabitants,
comparable to 63.2 per 10,000 in Egypt (IISS 2018). Moreover, readily available foreign
assistance means that pro-government forces had ample capacity to suppress a revolt
of any size. Military spending per soldier is far higher in Bahrain than in other Arab
Spring cases, because the force is small but, with US encouragement, has invested heavily
in American prestige systems such as F-16 fighter jets. In addition, a high proportion
of Bahrain’s soldiers are foreign mercenaries who depend on the monarchy for their
continued livelihood in Bahrain, thus constituting an extreme patronage relationship.
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Bahrain also qualifies as a case of minority rule, and the military is ethnically “stacked” in
favor of Sunnis, against a Shia-majority population. As such, the case of Bahrain cannot
be used to distinguish among the competing explanations, but is compatible with all of
them.
Libya
The Libyan Armywas established in 1951, when Libya gained its independence from Italy.
In 1969, the young Colonel Muammar Gaddafi led a coup d’état, establishing himself
as Revolutionary Chairman, and later the “Brotherly Leader,” of the country. During
much of Gaddafi’s tenure, the government budget was flush with oil revenues, allowing
the regime to reduce popular opposition through generous handouts. The Libyan army
did not confront mass mobilization prior to 2011, but was instead employed in various
missions abroad, including occasional peacekeeping missions and numerous border skir-
mishes with Egypt, Chad, and Tunisia. In this way, the military never developed a clear
doctrine for domestic intervention but became familiar with the tactics of combat. Thus,
the military met the 2011 uprising with a blend of aggression and disorganization, killing
thousands of civilians before disintegrating under NATO’s air assault.
The Libyan military’s response to the Arab Spring was consistent with its disuni-
fied doctrine, as shaped by its institutional design, past interactions with the population,
and foreign influences. Unlike neighboring Tunisia and Egypt, where well-developed
nationalist movements celebrated the arrival of independence, Libyan independence was
an accidental consequence of European politics. Historian Dirk Vandewalle (2012, 43)
explains, “Libya had passed from colonialism to independence at the behest of the Great
Powers, without a unifying ideology or a movement whose goals and aspirations were
shared throughout the country.” Thus, although the new Libyan Army was dominated
by Senussi veterans of the anti-Italian resistance, the mantle of national liberators rested
uneasily on their shoulders.
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Gaddafi’s leadership was extremely personalistic, and he stripped the armed forces
of any authority to exercise political influence. In his own terminology, soldiers were not
“authorized to guide the popular revolution” (Gaub 2013, 230). Gaddafi further reduced
the military’s authority by purging all of the Senussis from the armed forces, along with
all general officers (i.e. anyone who outranked him). He then significantly refashioned
the military institution, redesigning the armed forces with an eclectic mix of Egyptian
doctrine – namely the creation of elite praetorian guard units loyal to the regime – and a
socialist concept of a People’s Army, as outlined by Gaddafi in his revolutionary man-
ifesto, the “Green Book.” As in Baathist Syria and post-revolution Iran, Libya estab-
lished a popular paramilitary force known as the People’s Resistance Forces (quwwat al-
muqawama al-sha’biya, known as the “People’s Militia”). Intended and trained to protect
public buildings, the force had the effect of militarizing Libyan society (Mattes 2004).
Gaddafi harbored a deep distrust for the armed forces and refused to centralize command
or strengthen their organization. The doctrinal result of these policies was disunity and
factionalism, leading to both violence against civilians and disintegration.
The Libyan case presents a previously unexplored consequence of disunified or
weakmilitary doctrine, which occurswhen organization’s culture, organization, and train-
ing are weakly and unevenly established. When the Arab Spring began in 2011, the
Libyan military was deeply factionalized along the lines of kinship and geographic origin,
and soldiers were not well indoctrinated into a common set of values and expectations.
Therefore, army units initially fell back on what they knew – warfighting – but could
not maintain cohesion under enemy assault. As seen in the final case, Yemen, this kind
of disunified doctrine was not unique to Libya and might also be found in other weakly
institutionalized states in the developing world.
The competing arguments of capacity, patronage and ethnicity find mixed support
in the Libya case. With 76,000 active duty soldiers and only 6.2 million inhabitants in 2011,
Libya had the highest ratio of military personnel to population of the states affected by the
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Arab Spring, thus predicting their violent response, but not the factional splits which soon
crippled the force. The patronage argument holds little explanatory power, since military
spending per soldier was middling prior to the revolution and officers were excluded from
elite privileges. Although tribal identity is central to Libyan politics, Gaddafi’s regime did
not share an ethnic bond with the armed forces; therefore, the ethnicity argument fails to
explain the outcome.
Yemen
Although Britain had relinquished colonial control of both northern and southern Yemen
by 1968, the two territories were not unified until 1990. At that time, the President of
North Yemen, Ali Abdullah Saleh, became president of the combined state, and South
Yemen’s president became vice president. Because Saleh was not from a religiously im-
portant family or a large, influential tribe, he maintained his position by creating his own
patronage network with his family at the top: his seven brothers were placed in critical
government positions, and he also relied on “sons, daughters, sons-in-law, and nephews”
in both the civil and military hierarchies. Beyond his immediate family, he relied heavily
on the loyalty of two tribes, his own Sanhan tribe and the Hamdan San’a (Kadhim 2013,
309). Although the national unification agreement provided for the integration of both
countries’ military forces, themilitary organization remained extremely decentralized and
was led through personalistic and family ties, not a formal command structure. When
protests broke out in 2011, Saleh immediately made significant concessions, but they did
little to quell the unrest. On March 18, security forces killed 52 protesters, and the conflict
escalated. The protests continued despite military violence against demonstrators, and
some regime opponents soon turned to armed resistance. Before long, the armed forces
split, with the defection of a large faction of former loyalists. Although Saleh eventually
stepped down, he was replaced with his deputy, and the rebellion escalated to a full-scale
civil war.
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Amajor source of Yemen’s combative military doctrine was the North Yemen Civil
War (1962–1970), in which Republican forces allied with Egypt used chemical weapons
against civilians. After more than 100,000 deaths on both sides, the Republicans won, and
their forces became the backbone of the new independent military. As predicted by the
theory, the soldiers’ role in securing national independence improved their claim to po-
litical authority, leading to a more assertive military doctrine. However, the institutional
merger of the northern and southern armies in 1990 was fragile and increased divisions
within the military hierarchy (Albrecht 2016, 134-35). The incorporation of southern
troops into the northern military was partial at best, and created a similar disunity in
Yemeni military doctrine to that experience by the Libyan army. While the unified army
did not have experience responding to popular protests prior to 2011, its officers were
veterans of bloody civil conflicts, which favored a warlike orientation in their planning
and operations. Ultimately, the military response was consistent with the combative but
disunified doctrine the military entered the conflict with.
In the case of Yemen, the conventional alternative explanations do little to explain
the complex factional divisions that characterized the military response. With a large
conventional force of 66,670 and an even larger paramilitary numbering more than 71,200,
Yemeni forces would have had more than enough capacity to repress a rebellion if they
had remained unified. Patronage was essential to the personal networks that held the
armed forces together prior to 2011, but many previously loyal officers defected as protests
continued (Knights 2013). As in Libya, tribal affiliations did help determine the lines along
which the military disintegrated, but ethnic stacking in the military was not a factor.
Overall, the institutional origins and historical experience of the Yemeni military better
explains the response to the Arab Spring than the alternatives.
178
Table 6.1: Military Repression and Campaign Outcomes
Country Regime Typea Military
Repressionb
Campaign Outcomec
Tunisia Party-based None Success
Egypt Party-personal-military Mild Success
Yemen Personal Extreme Success
Bahrain Monarchy Extreme Failure
Libya Personal Extreme Success
Syria Party-personal-military Extreme Failure
a Geddes et al. 2014b. b Original data. c NAVCO 2.1.
Politics after the Arab Spring
In the aftermath of the 2011 uprisings, the countries affected followed widely divergent
political trajectories, ranging from democratization to civil war. The question of why
attempted political transitions in Tunisia, Egypt, Libya, and Yemen produced different
results has been treated at length elsewhere (Brownlee et al. 2014; Nugent 2018). In
addition to strictly political factors, such as elite polarization and the outcomes of early
elections, the military’s response to the protests also played a significant role in what
followed. Table 6.1 summarizes the military responses to and campaign outcomes of the
Arab uprisings in 2010–11. The most striking feature of these data is the high incidence of
“success” despite extreme military repression. However, the NAVCO definition of success
measures immediate, short-term political outcomes (i.e. leader replacement), without
accounting for the medium- and long-term outcomes of the political process set in motion
by the campaign. In other words, a campaign is considered successful if it removes
an authoritarian leader even if he is soon succeeded by an even harsher autocrat. In
Egypt, the success of the January 25 Revolution was followed in 2013 by a military-led
counterrevolution. The 2013 coup, which brought military strongman Abdel Fattah el-
Sisi to power, was a direct response to the 2011 revolution, and must be understood as
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the ultimate outcome of Egypt’s Arab Spring. In Libya and Yemen, protesters’ success
in toppling authoritarian leaders was immediately outweighed by the devastation of war.
Both countries, destabilized by revolutionary violence and the collapse of the strongman
politics that had held competing power centers in check, continue to suffer violent in-
surgencies which take Libyan and Yemeni lives and hinder effective governance. Again,
these outcomes resulted from the military responses to the Arab Spring protests in 2011.
Despite their initial promise, the Arab Spring did little to contribute to the growth
of democracy in the region. Figure 6.1 shows the trends in the quality of electoral democ-
racy after the uprisings in Egypt, Syria, Tunisia, and Yemen. The upward climb of Tunisian
democracy is striking, representing the only true “success” of the Arab Spring. Mean-
while, both Yemen and Egypt witnessed only one year of increased democracy before
sinking below 2010 levels. I exclude Bahrain and Libya because their records of democratic
governance are abysmal both before and after the uprising. In sum, the ability of protesters
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to remove a leader from office is an important goal of many pro-democratic movements,
but it is not sufficient to guarantee a democratic outcome. In light of this, it is all the
more important to understand the role of the military in shaping the outcomes of both
revolutions and political transitions.
6.2 Cross-National Data
Next, I perform a medium-n, quantitative analysis of popular uprisings for regime change
worldwide from 1950 to 2013. To test the theory, I collected original data on the use of
violence by the military in responding to popular uprisings. Modeling the data in an
econometric framework, I find support for the dissertation’s main argument that both
institutional origins and foreign influences affect the military’s propensity to use violence
against peaceful protesters. By contrast, I find no support for the three main competing
hypotheses from the literature: capacity, patronage, and ethnicity.
At the macro level, military doctrine can only be observed in its application –
that is, in the military response. Therefore, the quantitative model tests the relationship
between the initial causes (i.e. factors which influence doctrine) and the ultimate out-
come (military response). On the strength of the empirical process tracing in previous
chapters, I assume here that any relationship observed between the hypothesized initial
causes and observed effect operates through the proposedmechanism ofmilitary doctrine.
The statistical results indicate support for the theory of the dissertation, suggesting that
both colonial origins and foreign influence affect a military’s long-term propensity to use
violence against civilians during popular uprisings.
Data Collection
To perform a general test of the dissertation’s theory, I assembled a quantitative data set
including all large, initially nonviolent protests for regime change in the modern era. The
data are based on the Nonviolent and Violent Campaigns and Outcomes (NAVCO) Data
Project (Chenoweth and Lewis 2013). After combining NAVCO with various open data
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sources, I manually coded an additional variable measuring my main outcome of interest,
the military response to the campaign.
The scope of the theory is subject to three bounding conditions. First, the original
regime must be authoritarian in nature, but need not be a case of direct military rule.
Second, the popular uprising must be of a scale and intensity sufficient to threaten the
survival of the original regime. This excludes localized, regional protests which do not
threaten the national government’s power over the center. In other words, although
my definition does not explicitly require protests to be concentrated in urban centers
(cf. Beissinger 2013, 574n1), uprisings which threaten the center of national power will
inevitably entail the mass occupation of urban spaces. Third, the military must act as an
arbiter between the government and society, not as the instigator of a coup d’état. As
I discuss below in greater detail, I include uprisings which start as popular movements,
even if they later result in a military coup. Note as well that I include cases which start
as food riots or strike actions if they ultimately evolve into mass movements calling for
regime change. In my qualitative research for this chapter, I observed that in many
revolutions, organized labor is responsible for bringing the first demonstrators to the
streets. Such cases are included inmy study only if they grow into anti-regimemovements
by expanding their base beyond workers in a given sector and by articulating political, as
well as economic, demands.
My theory explains military responses to nonviolent protest movements, but not
to armed insurgencies, which themilitary responds to using a distinct doctrine and tactics.
Therefore, cases where the popular resistance initiates violence against government forces
are outside the scope of this study. However, the theory does apply to cases like Libya
in 2011, where political protests first started peacefully but were transformed into armed
resistance within a week after the state initiated violence. However, NAVCO classifies
campaigns using an annual measure of the primary method of resistance (violent or non-
violent). This variable indicates whether protesters’ tactics were primarily nonviolent
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in the first year of the campaign, regardless of whether resistance later became violent.
But if the turn from nonviolent to violent tactics occurs quickly (e.g. after a few days
or weeks), NAVCO will not pick up the movement’s nonviolent origins. Thus, NAVCO
mischaracterizes (for my purposes) Libya in 2011 as a violent campaign. The erroneous
exclusion of such cases shrinks the number of observations in my data, thus weakening
the statistical power of the model; however, their exclusion should not bias the results.3
Although popular uprisings sometimes succeed quickly (for example, Egypt’s 2011
revolution lasted just two and a half weeks), they are often suppressed even faster. NAVCO
includes only sustained campaigns, thus excluding uprisingswhich are suppressed quickly,
before they can mature into sustained campaigns.4 For example, the bread riots in Tunisia
(1984) and Egypt (1977) were quickly suppressed and are therefore excluded, while bread
riots in Sudan (1985) are included because they led to regime change. These cases are
distinguished by their outcomes, not their causes (i.e. selected on the dependent variable).
This leaves many of the critical past interventions out of the data set (e.g. the bread riots
in Tunisia and Egypt). In future iterations of the analysis, I plan to collect new data on
military responses to shorter uprisings. Nevertheless, the existing data represent a hard
test of the hypotheses because they systematically include the strongest campaigns and
exclude weaker campaigns. The theory predicts a stronger historical legacy effect from
responding to a sustained campaign than a flash in the pan, so the selection process should
bias against my theory.
3. In statistical terms, the miscoding produces a truncated sample, i.e., observations where the outcome
variable is above a certain threshhold are systematically excluded. Specifically, where the military is
extremely repressive, protesters may resort to violence as soon as protests begin, and the case will be
excluded as a violent campaign. As a robustness check, I fit a truncated regression model on the data
(Greene 2018, 833-39). The results are consistent with the main model.
4. The NAVCO 2.1 Codebook (2018: 4) admits, “Other would-be nonviolent campaigns that are crushed
in their infancy (and therefore fail) will not be included in this dataset. This is the major limitation in this
study, and it is difficult to avoid.”
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Coding Procedure
To approximate these inclusion criteria, I began with NAVCO’s consensus list of “mature”
protest movements worldwide. NAVCO 2.1 covers the years 1945 to 2013 and includes
information on the goals, structure, and size of sustained, large-scale protest movements.5
I used the auxiliary variables to exclude protest campaigns which did not meet my case
selection criteria. Following the scope conditions outlined above, I filtered the full set of
campaigns in NAVCO to identify large-scale (≥ 100,000 participants), primarily nonvi-
olent protest movements demanding regime change. I excluded movements which are
strictly regional (e.g. campaigns for local autonomy or secession), anticolonial move-
ments, and primarily violent campaigns. To satisfy the third scope condition above, that
the military must be an arbiter between the regime and the population, I excluded from
my analysis any campaign which was suppressed by the internal security forces alone,
without requiring an appeal to the military.
Next, I created a measure of my primary outcome variable, military repression
against protesters, by manually coding an extension to the existing NAVCO data. My new
variable disaggregates the NAVCO measure of state repression against each campaign, to
identify the use of violence by the military in responding to the uprising. I define military
responses to protests differently from previous studies, by focusing on the use of violence
against unarmed civilians, rather than political motives. The military’s use of violence is
a more precise concept than alternatives like political orientation or loyalty to the regime,
which can only be inferred from observed behaviors. Consequently, military violence can
be coded with greater accuracy and less subjective bias than explicitly political outcomes.
Before researching individual cases, I wrote a coding protocol for the new variable.
I modeled the protocol on the NAVCO codebook, mirroring as much as possible the coding
instructions for their state repression variable, tomaximize compatibility with the existing
5. NAVCO 2.1, an update providing campaign-level data for 2007–2013, has not yet been released publicly,
and was provided to the author by special agreement.
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data. Like the state repression variable, my military repression variable is ordered and
categorical, taking the values none, mild, moderate, or extreme.6 Before generating the
data, I test-coded a few randomly selected cases to hone the coding protocol, mainly to
clarify the handling of borderline cases. After revising the protocol, I deleted the test
coding and started again, working through the cases region by region.
After using the data from NAVCO to identify a list of candidate uprisings, I used
secondary sources to determine whether the military response was violent or nonviolent.7
First, I referred to the state repression variable in NAVCO and located the reference used
by the NAVCO coders. In several cases, the military was mentioned in the same source
as a perpetrator of violence. Next, I checked the Global Nonviolent Action Database and
its works cited for any explicit mention of military violence.8 In most recent cases, the
use of violence by government troops anywhere in the world makes global headlines, and
the military response can be clearly identified in wire reports by the Associated Press,
Reuters, or Agence France Presse.9 Where news reports did not discuss the military, I
searched Google Scholar for scholarly works mentioning both protests and the military
in the country. In some especially repressive contexts, particularly in historical cases,
government censorship blocked straightforward reporting of military atrocities. As a last
resort, I performed a general internet search for credible, third-party investigative reports.
Non-governmental organizations committed to human rights and conflict prevention have
done admirable work documenting these abuses in most cases. In particular, I relied on
case reports compiled during the uprisings by investigators from Human Rights Watch
and the International Crisis Group.10 In most cases, these sources were sufficient to de-
6. In the main analysis, military violence is modeled as a binary response, either violent (moderate or
extreme repression) or nonviolent (mild or none).
7. A full list of references is provided in the replication data for this chapter.
8. Swarthmore College, Global Nonviolent Action Database, available at https://nvdatabase.
swarthmore.edu/.
9. Wire reports are cataloged in the Nexis Uni database. For each event, I searched using the location and
date range of the protests, using the keywords “military,” “army,” “soldier,” and “troops.”
10. Reports available online from Human Rights Watch at https://www.hrw.org/publications, and
International Crisis Group at https://www.crisisgroup.org/latest-updates/reports-and-briefings.
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termine whether the military used violence against protesters.11 If the size of the protests
was small, and the police were able to disperse the mobilization without military backup,
the case was excluded with a code of “not applicable.”
Explanatory Variables
In order to test the dissertation’s theory, I collected data on three causal factors that, per
the theory, affect the military’s propensity to use violence against peaceful protesters. To
capture the historical origins of the military institution, I measure the military’s relation-
ship to a) the national independence movement and b) the ruling party. As I argued in
chapter 2, the role soldiers play in securing national independence shapes the military’s
conception of its appropriate missions and roles. Where decolonization was won through
combat, I expect the military’s doctrine to favor the use of violence against public dis-
turbances. Similarly, the armed forces’ relationship to the ruling party, whether closely
ideologically integrated or clearly institutionalized apart, should shape the military’s doc-
trine for domestic political crises. Where soldiers play an active role in party politics, they
will be more likely to resort to violence in defense of the status quo.
To operationalize these variables, I rely on two indicators. First, I proxy for the
role of the military in the national independence movement with an indicator of whether
the state’s independence campaign was violent or nonviolent. These data are available
from the Issues Correlates of War (ICOW) project.12 Typically, where indigenous armed
groups fought for independence, the liberation organizations became the backbone of
the national army after the colonizer’s retreat. Therefore, I expect that states which won
their independence through violence will be more likely to see military violence against
protesters.13
11. Only one case, the Anti-PRI campaign of 1986–2000 is coded as unknown. The Mexican army
employed extreme violence during this period in counterinsurgency operations against armed groups, but
there was not clear evidence whether the military ever targeted peaceful anti-government demonstrators.
12. ICOW Colonial History Data, available at: http://www.paulhensel.org/icowcol.html.
13. A non-systematic review of the data indicate that the proxy is a good one, despite some anomalies.
One case for which the proxy fails is Egypt, which is coded as a case of nonviolent independence in 1922.
While this is technically accurate, de facto independence did not occur until the military seized power in
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Second, I proxy for the relationship between the military and the ruling party
using regime type data. Specifically, I rely on Geddes et al.’s (2014b) Autocratic Regimes
Data, which includes autocratic regimes’ start and end dates, and a composite, categorical
regime type variable specifying various configurations of authoritarian power sharing.
The latter variable indicates the participation of various elite groups (e.g. a ruling party
and themilitary) in political rule, so it serves as a good proxy for themilitary’s relationship
with the ruling party. Importantly, this is not simply a measure of “military regimes,”
where soldiers rule directly (cf. Geddes 1999). Instead, the autocratic regimes data indicate
whether the military is an integral part of the political regime, or if the system is better
characterized as personalistic or party-based.14
To test the second part of the theory, which argues that foreign military training
shapes doctrine for domestic interventions, I rely on military aid data from the USAID
Greenbook.15 The data cover all state recipients of American military assistance from
1950 to 2014. Because no reliable data are available on the number of foreign soldiers
receiving American training each year, I instead rely on annual military assistance to
indicate an ongoing military relationship between the United States and a given recipient
state. The theory states that in countries where a substantial portion of all active military
officers have received Western training, the military will be less likely to use violence
against civilians. In order for a significant portion of the officer corps to be influenced
by Western military values, an entire generation of officers must receive foreign training.
To operationalize this causal factor, I construct a dichotomous variable from the USAID
data to indicate whether the military had received a cumulative 25 years of US military
assistance prior to the uprising.16
1952.
14. For further discussion, see the Autocratic Regimes Data Codebook, available at: http://sites.psu.
edu/dictators/.
15. U.S. Overseas Loans and Grants (Greenbook), available at: https://catalog.data.gov/dataset/us-
overseas-loans-and-grants-greenbook-usaid-1554.
16. As a robustness check, I also calculated indicators for five or ten years of US military assistance. In
addition, I tested whether ongoing US assistance at the time of the uprising had a similar effect. Regression
results with these indicators are available in the appendix. As the theory predicts, short-term aid flows have
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At first glance, it is counterintuitive to count some American allies, like South
Korea during the 1960 Student Revolution, as negative cases (i.e. non-US influence). After
all, the US military had already occupied South Korea (1945-48), fought in combat along-
side the ROK Army (1950-53), and trained Korean soldiers since the occupation. However,
ROK officers in this period had been trained in the Imperial Japanese Army and continued
to view their new overlords with suspicious (Stueck and Yi 2010). Thus, Western military
doctrine had not yet taken root in the South Korean military by 1960, but was in greater
evidence during Korea’s second popular uprising in 1979, after 30 years of US assistance.
A final mechanism proposed in the theory of this dissertation is that the military’s
past interventions can influence future responses by motivating officers to innovate the
organization’s doctrine. In my case studies of the Arab Spring cases, I identified qualita-
tively how soldiers reacted to their historical interventions, interpreting their experiences
as positive or negative lessons, and then either upholding or updating the army’s doctrine,
depending which lessons they took from these encounters. My military repression vari-
able offers an indication of an army’s previous responses. However, only 20 of the 86
uprisings in my dataset took place in countries where the army had historically used vio-
lence against protesters – too small a number to decisively study its impact quantitatively.
I do include past military repression as a variable in one model, but this specification is
underpowered, so the null result cannot be interpreted as a refutation of the hypothe-
sis. Moreover, the theory predicts that this variable operates as an interaction with the
military’s self-evaluation of the response. In other words, past military repression should
predict future military repression only when soldiers evaluate the historical experience as
a success. Data on soldiers’ evaluations is not readily available, and in any case the small
number of cases would further weaken the statistical power of the quantitative model.
no statistical relationship with the military’s use of repression.
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Additional Variables
In addition to the explanatory variables described above, I include variables measuring
the three main competing hypotheses from the existing literature, as outlined in chapter
2: capability, patronage, and ethnicity. First, I operationalize the military’s capability for
suppressing an uprising as the number of military personnel per 10,000 citizens, calculated
using Correlates of War data.17 If the capability argument is correct, a higher ratio of
soldiers to citizens should increase the propensity to use force. Second, I use the military’s
annual budget allocation, relative to the total number of military personnel, as a proxy for
patronage. According to the literature on military patronage, soldiers are more likely to
side with the regime if they are satisfied with their equipment and remuneration. In this
view, the military should be more likely to use violence against anti-regime protesters
if the military receives more resources per soldier from the government. Finally, I test
the ethnicity argument with an indicator for ethnic minority rule. Using Ethnic Power
Relations (EPR) data, I construct and indicator for whether an ethnic minority group holds
dominant or monopoly power in the polity at the time of the uprising.18 According to this
argument, minority ethnic groups like the Alawis in Syria aremore likely to employ ethnic
stacking in the armed forces to ensure loyalty in moments of crisis. Thus, violent military
repression should be more likely under minority rule.s
The main analysis relies on a medium-n data set (86 observations), so the in-
clusion of extraneous “control” variables is likely to wash out meaningful results. For
completeness, I also ran regressions with various control variables added to the model,
including population, GDP, and an indicator of whether the country experienced an armed
conflict within the past five years.19 Because the primary measures described above are
constructed as ratios (relative to population or military personnel size) I would not expect
17. Correlates of War, National Military Capabilities (v. 5.0), available at: http://www.correlatesofwar.
org/data-sets/national-material-capabilities.
18. Vogt et al. (2015), Ethnic Power Relations, available at: https://icr.ethz.ch/data/epr/.
19. UCDP/PRIO Armed Conflict Dataset (v. 17.2), available at: http://ucdp.uu.se/downloads/. See also
Allansson et al. (2017).
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population or GDP to have an independent effect on the military response. Conversely,
they may weaken the statistical significance of the main findings because they are cor-
related with the primary indicators, and they decrease the model’s degrees of freedom.
It seems plausible that a recent war would cause a military’s doctrine to become more
warlike, but there is not a strong theoretical motivation for this hypothesis, and again the
inclusion of an extraneous variable weakens the statistical power of the model.
The full data set includes 86 uprisings from 1952 to 2013, of which 52 succeeded
in producing regime change. As the bread riot example illustrates, the apparent success
rate is subject to selection effects: only the most effective campaigns are able to grow to
massive scale and sustain themselves in the face of escalating state repression. Of the 39
successful campaigns which faced extreme government repression, 67% succeeded only
after major defections from the military and/or state security forces. Table 6.2 presents
summary statistics of the main variables included in the analysis.
Table 6.2: Summary Statistics
Dichotomous Variables Yes No
Violent response (dependent variable) 57.0% 43.0%
Violent decolonization 53.5% 46.5%
Regime-military ties 23.3% 76.7%
US military aid (25+ years) 44.2% 55.8%
Minority rule 14.0% 86.0%
Continuous Variables Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max.
Military personnel per 10,000 66.4 63.4 7.10 320
Military expenditure per soldier $11,645 $14,857 $152 $118,000
Observations 86
Results
I model the data as a standard logit function, with a binary response variable for the use
of military violence against demonstrators. Four of the six predictors are dichotomous.
The other two, continuous variables are standardized to mean zero and unit variance. The
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main regression results are provided in Table 6.3. The effects of the threemain explanatory
variables outlined in my theory are all significant at the 0.05 level and in the expected
direction. Of the three alternative causes, the coefficients on minority rule and military
budget are in the expected direction but not statistically significant. Meanwhile, military
size (relative to population) is significant in the opposite direction from the prediction of
the capability argument. The data show that having a higher ratio of soldiers to citizens
makes military violence less likely, perhaps because larger armies are more likely to adopt
a doctrine of control, which calls for violence only in extreme circumstances.
Table 6.3: Main Model Results
(1) (2) (3)
Violent Independence 1.425∗ 1.353∗ 1.213∗
(2.45) (2.34) (2.13)
Regime-Military Ties 1.373∗ 1.372∗ 1.084
(2.12) (2.12) (1.63)
US Military Aid (25 yr) -0.952∗ -0.991∗
(-2.12) (-2.22)
Military Size -0.691∗ -0.671∗ -0.530
(-2.08) (-2.05) (-1.68)
Minority Rule 0.662 0.677 0.779
(0.79) (0.83) (0.98)
Military Budget 0.286 0.246 0.279
(1.24) (1.14) (1.16)
Past Military Violence 0.635
(1.16)
US Military Aid (10 yr) -0.488
(-0.71)
Constant -0.437 -0.534 -0.303
(-0.78) (-0.98) (-0.39)
Observations 86 86 82
t statistics in parentheses
∗ p < 0.05
The substantive effect sizes of the main explanatory variables are quite large. Fig-
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ure 6.2 plots the marginal effect of a one-unit change (from 0 to 1 for binary variables)
in each variable on the probability of military violence against civilians, holding other
variables at their mean values. Due to the sample size, the confidence intervals around
these estimates are very wide, but the effect sizes are substantively meaningful. The effect
of winning national independence through violence is estimated to increase the probabil-
ity of violent military repression by 34.8%. This supports the hypothesis that when the
military is involved in securing national independence, military doctrine calls for soldiers
to act as guardians of the nation, defending the national interest even against fellow
citizens. Similarly, the military’s participation in the ruling coalition, ceteris paribus,
increases the probability of violent repression by 33.4%. This significant effect is evidence
for the hypothesis that the military’s relationship with the ruling party conditions its
doctrine for domestic security, increasing the likelihood of resorting to violence. Finally,
receiving US military aid for 25 or more years, all else equal, decreases the probability of
military repression by 23.2%.
Of the alternative predictors, only military size has a statistically significant effect,
but it is in the opposite direction from the prediction. In other words, the data suggest that
larger militaries are actually less likely to use violence against protesters. This contradicts
the capacity argument, which hypothesizes that smaller armies are unable to repress large
protests. The national military budget per soldier does not have any effect on response.
Admittedly, the budget per soldier captures only one type of military patronage, but
the lack of any statistical relationship does contradict simple models of loyalty buying
(e.g. Besley and Robinson 2010). Finally, ethnic minority rule has no effect on military
responses. This is perhaps the most surprising result, since minority rule is rare (only 14%
of cases) and represents the most extreme form of ethnic bias. Therefore, this relationship
can be considered a hoop test for the ethnicity hypothesis, and the null result is especially
problematic for the argument (Collier 2011).
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Figure 6.2: Quantitative Results: Marginal Effects
ysis, a cluster-robust standard errors are appropriate to correct for heteroskedasticity
within country observations. However, when used with non-linear models (e.g. binomial
logit), robust standard errors can fail to correct biases resulting from model misspeci-
fication (King and Roberts 2015). Instead, I perform a generalized information matrix
(GIM) test, a formal statistical test for model misspecification. The GIM test statistic
(13.97, p = 0.35) indicates that the model is not misspecified, increasing confidence in
the estimates.20
Table 6.3 also presents two alternative model specifications. Model 2 adds an
indicator of whether the military used violence in responding to a previous uprising. The
main explanatory variables are almost identical in this specification, The coefficient for
past military violence is in the expected direction but is, unsurprisingly, not significant
20. Cluster-robust standard errors and the GIM test were implemented in R using the RobustSE package
(see https://github.com/IQSS/RobustSE). Based on GIM test statistic, we fail to reject the null hypothesis
that the model specification is correct.
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Table 6.4: Results with Additional Controls
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Violent Independence 1.381∗ 1.812∗∗ 1.281∗ 1.663∗
(2.43) (2.69) (2.32) (2.49)
Regime-Military Ties 1.347∗ 1.350 1.382∗ 1.312
(2.13) (1.88) (2.10) (1.81)
US Military Aid (25 yr) -0.907∗ -0.955∗ -0.975∗ -0.934
(-1.98) (-1.97) (-2.02) (-1.69)
Military Size -0.656∗ -0.659 -0.617∗ -0.497
(-2.03) (-1.77) (-2.08) (-1.57)
Minority Rule 0.718 0.844 0.458 0.749
(0.83) (0.94) (0.51) (0.72)
Military Budget 0.294 0.401 0.0278 0.309
(1.26) (1.00) (0.06) (0.39)
Population 0.137 0.148
(0.55) (0.51)
GDP (per capita) -0.000 -0.000
(-0.27) (-0.37)
Recent War 0.0558 0.164
(0.13) (0.35)
Constant -0.428 -0.582 -0.297 -0.403
(-0.77) (-0.77) (-0.48) (-0.50)
Observations 86 80 76 70
t statistics in parentheses
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01
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(see discussion in section 6.2 above). Model 3 repeats the main model using an alternative
measure of US military assistance: 10 years of aid rather than 25. As hypothesized, 10
years should be insufficient for Western military doctrine to significantly affect military
behavior, and indeed, the effect of a ten-year aid relationship is not significant.
As a robustness check, I also ran the model with three additional control variables:
total population, gross domestic product per capita, and an indicator of whether the
country had experienced a war in the previous five years. Regression results are provided
in Table 6.4. As predicted, none of these controls have a significant relationship with the
outcome. When the extraneous variables are included, the standard errors increase on the
main predictors due to a lack of power, but the point estimates remain fairly consistent.21
Overall, the empirical results provide strong support for the dissertation’s theory.
My findings suggest that the institutional origins of the military and the influence of
foreign military training both have a significant effect on military responses to popular
uprisings. Moreover, the main competing explanations find no support in the cross-
national data. Despite including the entire universe of popular uprisings worldwide in
the modern era, I nevertheless arrive at a medium-n analysis, which can provide only
suggestive evidence of the theory’s validity and generalizability. Nevertheless, the results
of this general empirical test are encouraging and should motivate further testing of the
theory through the appropriate qualitative methods.
Discussion
Military responses vary substantially across region, althoughmost regions havewitnessed
both violent and nonviolent military responses. Figure 6.3 maps the prevalence of military
violence globally. Notably, East Asia has seen mostly violent responses, while states with
only nonviolent histories are scattered among the other world regions. It is no surprise
that democratic North America, Western Europe, and Australia saw few or no uprisings
21. With all three controls included, n = 70 versus n = 86 in the main model. The pseudo-R2 value is








Figure 6.3: Violent Military Responses as Percent of Uprisings
in the post-WWII era. More surprising is how many authoritarian states in Africa do not
enter the data. One possible explanation is that African mobilization has been overlooked
by Western journalists and scholars, resulting in undercounting in the data. Another
explanation could be the exceptional weakness of postcolonial African states, rendering
state capture via mass mobilization less attractive. However, the historic prevalence of
armed insurgencies in the region suggests there must be an alternative cause. While this
question is beyond the scope of this dissertation, it could serve as a direction for future
research.
During the coding process, two factors stood out from the qualitative data. First,
during several uprisings, the military responded by seizing power in a coup d’état. Al-
though the case selection criteria exclude coups and other military-led revolts, the theory
still applies to scenarios where the military reacts to popular mobilization by staging a
coup. Using Powell and Thyne’s (2011) data on coup attempts, I identified whether a
coup attempt occurred during the uprising. In the existing literature, a violent military
response is associated with disloyalty to the regime. By this logic, armies which use
violence to defend the regime should not be expected to carry out coups. Surprisingly,
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Table 6.5: Coup Attempts during Popular Uprisings
Response Coup Attempts
None Failed Successful
None 24 2 2
Mild 6 0 0
Moderate 7 2 0
Extreme 28 3 9
the data reveal that most coup attempts occur during uprisings in which the military also
uses extreme violence against demonstrators. In many of these cases, military hardliners
lead a crackdown but are undercut by the coup plotters. But in other cases, such as
Burma in 1988, the military took a hard-line approach throughout the conflict, first by
shooting protesters and then by overthrowing the government because, in officers’ view,
it was too soft on dissent. Although this correlation alone does not indicate any specific
causal relationship, it does suggest that military loyalty to the regime is not the only factor
determining the military’s treatment of protesters.
In addition to the diversity of military responses, I observed variation in the state’s
actions toward the military. I did not attempt to code whether the executive gave an order
to open fire on protesters. As the example of Tunisia demonstrates, private discussions
between a besieged leader and his military chief are often unknowable. Occasionally, the
military was ordered not to use violence, as in East Germany in 1989, when Soviet troops
were ordered not to retaliate against protesters even under “extreme provocation” (Barany
2016b, 114-16). On the other hand, the military sometimes publicly defied government
orders by refusing to intervene, as in Argentina in 1987. Of course, in a number of
countries, the regime itself was a military junta. In my theoretical framework, a military
which takes direct power is demonstrating a doctrine of control, which can lead to extreme
violence against opponents viewed as enemies of the state. A common theme in the cases
of extreme military repression is the “othering” of protesters by association with allegedly
foreign ideologies, especially Communism and Islamism. In other cases, the military
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itself was largely foreign. For example, anti-communist uprisings in Eastern Europe were
sometimes suppressed by the Soviet Army, under orders fromMoscow, not by indigenous
forces. Where foreign troops are involved in repressing uprisings abroad, they are likely
to view demonstrators as enemies, akin to the Syrian military’s approach to domestic




Why did the Arab Spring fail? In 2011, the unprecedented mobilization of Arab citizens
demanding regime change generated a surge of optimism across the region and beyond.
Tunisian protesters’ efforts to change the system, lay claim to a share of the economic pie,
and regain their dignity, soiled by decades of government abuses, inspired sizeable copycat
protests in virtually every Arab-majority country. In six of these countries (Bahrain,
Libya, Egypt, Syria, Tunisia, and Yemen), demonstrations grew into popular uprisings
that overwhelmed the capacity of the domestic police forces, forcing the political regimes
in power to appeal for help from the military. Once called to the streets, soldiers’ response
to the assembled crowds dictated the trajectory of each country’s politics. The military’s
divergent responses determined how many civilians would lose their lives and what the
political landscape would look like for years to come. Only in Tunisia did the military
act with restraint, allowing a nonviolent political transition to take place. In Egypt, the
military ended a brief experiment with democratization after just one year, bringing the
country back under dictatorship. Most appallingly, Syria’s protests were met with the
full repressive force of the military, which drove thousands of formerly peaceful demon-
strators to join an armed insurgency that has devastated the country. In Bahrain, Libya,
and Yemen, military repression helped leaders remain in power, if only to be toppled
through foreign intervention. These narratives offer a clear answer to the failure of the
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Arab uprisings: the role of the military. In the next section, I summarize the dissertation’s
contribution to our understanding of military responses to popular uprisings, reviewing
the main arguments and sources of evidence. Next, I discuss the theory’s implications
for our understanding of democratization and civil-military relations. Finally, I conclude
with an outline of opportunities for future research on the role of military doctrine in
domestic politics.
7.1 Military Doctrine for Domestic Intervention
This dissertation is an investigation of the causal underpinnings of military intervention
in revolutions, viewed through the lens of the Arab Spring. Previous attempts to explain
military responses to revolution have focused on characteristics of the military, such as
professionalism, patronage or ethnicity. Instead, I find that the best explanation for mili-
tary behavior during revolutions is doctrine: the set of rules and understandings through
which military planners conceptualize and prepare for future engagements. Through
my fieldwork in Tunisia, qualitative case studies of the other Arab Spring uprisings, and
quantitative data analysis, I find that military doctrine determines whether soldiers view
demonstrators as enemies, and whether it is the appropriate role of the military to in-
tervene. To explain the historical divergence of military doctrines across the region, I
offer a novel theory of doctrinal development, rooted in the processes of institutional
development and organizational learning.
I have argued that military doctrine is essential to understanding military re-
sponses to popular uprisings and, as a result, revolutionary outcomes. In the security
studies literature, the concept of military doctrine has been central to theoretical under-
standings of combat performance, cohesion, and conflict outcomes. However, the role
of doctrine – i.e., the set of rules and understandings through which military planners
conceptualize and prepare for future engagements – has been missing from studies of
domestic military intervention. My view differs from existing explanations of military
200
responses, which point to the utilitarian interests of the officer corps to explain decision
making during mass protests. In the conventional view, popular uprisings confront sol-
diers with a binary choice to support either the status quo or the revolution. Weighing the
costs and benefits of each option, the officer corps instructs soldiers to defend the regime
or to defect in favor of the popular will. While it is undeniable that rational officers,
often master tacticians and strategic thinkers, make strategic calculations during political
crises, it is my contention that the organizational response to protests is driven primarily
by preexisting beliefs and values established prior to the uprising. Just as soldiers train
and prepare for future wars, so do they prepare for domestic interventions, and their plans
and preparations can play a decisive role in shaping the military response.
The dissertation’s central argument is twofold: first, that military doctrine shapes
soldiers’ responses to popular uprisings; and second, that doctrine evolves through long-
term historical processes. In particular, I argue that the origins of a military’s doctrine
trace back to the establishment of the national military, often during the colonial era. His-
torical factors such as the design of colonial institutions, soldiers’ role (if any) in securing
national independence, and the relationship between the military and the ruling political
order established in the early post-colonial period establish a protean doctrinal orientation
in the new national armed forces. Next, the military confronts two major influences on
its doctrine: domestic interventions, such as protest response, which challenge existing
ways of thinking and doing, and foreign military partnerships, which provide innovative
training and alternative operational models.
The conditions and processes of doctrinal development and innovation are central
to the historical case studies of the previous chapters. Often, the emergent doctrine of
an authoritarian military is conservative, and in their first interactions with society, most
armies use violence to defend the status quo. However, soldiers’ historical interactions
with the population sometimes demonstrate the value of political neutrality, encouraging
the military organization to develop a doctrinal orientation favoring restraint. Once a
201
military has established a doctrine of restraint, and soldiers have sufficient tactical pro-
fessionalism to reliable carry out orders, then senior officers are in a position to respond
neutrally to a popular uprising. The Tunisian army met these conditions in 2010, which
enabled its nonviolent response and eventual support for the revolution of dignity. In the
Egyptian revolution, a doctrine of direct intervention led the SCAF to force Mubarak from
office and seize power – at first indirectly, and from 2013, directly. Thus, both military-
society relations and foreign military partnerships can drive a process of doctrinal inno-
vation in the armed forces.
7.2 Implications
Military responses are critical to the outcomes of popular uprisings. Mass protests can
grow into revolutions, producing political transitions and even democratization, or turn
violent and devolve into civil war. To explain the broad variation in military responses,
this dissertation advances a novel theory of military doctrine for domestic security, which
guides soldiers’ behavior in moments of crisis. Although military doctrine is widely
accepted as a major cause of victory or defeat in war, the concept has been absent until
now from studies of military behavior in revolutions. Military doctrine can contribute to
our understanding of both democratization and civil-military relations under authoritar-
ianism. The literature on authoritarian repression has made great advances in explaining
the causes of repression and how political elites perceive threats to their rule. Yet much
remains unexplained in the dynamic process of authoritarian breakdown. My work dis-
aggregates the state as a unitary actor by differentiating between the regime’s and the
military’s incentives. Considered separately, the threat posed to the regime is different
from that to the military, yet the military is often the group that ultimately sets the course
of regime transition. The concept of military doctrine helps to explain military behavior
in this critical context.
According to the dissertation theory, military behavior during revolution is best
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understood through the lens of “structured contingency” (Karl 1990). In this view, elites
facing political upheaval have many options available to them, but their most likely re-
sponses are those with institutional precedents. While other explanations for military
responses have focused on the balance of institutions and material interests, such as
economic ties to the regime, and personal loyalties, I emphasize the prescriptive role of
doctrine in guiding officers’ decision making in critical moments. Similarly, Mahoney
(2001) argues that during critical junctures like revolutions, the choices made by political
actors are typically rooted in “antecedent historical conditions.” More concisely, in the
words of Bratton and van de Walle (1994, 45), “people can make their own history, even
if not under conditions of their own choosing.”
This dissertation highlights several historical factors, such as colonial legacies and
past interventions, which were central to the development of Arab civil-military relations.
My findings suggest that greater scholarly attention should be paid to the historical pro-
cesses that shape civil-military relations. At the same time, I find evidence that military
doctrine can and does change over time, especially in response to operational experience
and foreign influence. Therefore, my approach differs from structuralist theories of coup
propensity, which offer deterministic formulas for military loyalty. The framework of
structured contingency helps to account for the agency of individual decision makers
within the bounds of historical structures (i.e. military officers considering the appropri-
ate response to a popular uprising). My theory describes a dynamic process by which
the military updates its strategic orientation in response to their experiences and foreign
contacts.
The ultimate goal of this project has been to explain military decision making dur-
ing popular uprisings. Because the military is so critical to the process of democratization,
it is worth getting it right. In the years prior to the Arab Spring, civil-military relations in
the Middle East were a neglected subject of research (Barak and David 2010). As a result,
most scholarship on the role of Arab militaries in 2011 has relied on theory developed in
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other regions and contexts. While useful, these theories lacked attention to the unique
histories of Arab militaries. I hope that my attention to the specificities of the Middle
East context, like foreign military aid inflows due to the region’s geostrategic importance,
improve the scholarly understanding of Arab civil-military relations more broadly.
Another contribution of the study is to begin to disentangle how different causal
pathways have led to similarly disastrous outcomes in the Middle East. Since the Arab
Spring demonstrations reached their end, Libya, Syria, and Yemen have all been beset by
civil war. Observing this outcome from a 10,000-foot level, the same factors may appear
to operate in each case, whether tribalism, sectarianism, or religious fanaticism. Yet upon
closer inspection, the three armies responded differently to protesters, and for different
reasons. Had the international community better understood soldiers motivations in 2011,
perhaps the foreign interference in these conflicts might have been redesigned to pacify,
not escalate, the conflicts. For example, hadWestern powers understood the SyrianArmed
Forces’ longstanding doctrinal commitment to regime defense, they would not have so
quickly predicted the collapse of al-Asad’s regime. On the other hand, a recognition of
the deep divisions within the Libyan military might have helped NATO planners predict
the inevitable collapse of security as Gaddafi’s forces disintegrated.
Admitting the causal influence of historical events does not require a deterministic
fatalism. Instead, recognizing how historical inform contemporary patterns of behavior
is the first step to altering those patterns. For example, this study concludes that foreign
military training is less influential than institutional legacies and past experience in shap-
ing military responses to uprisings. If policymakers assume, as they sometimes do, that a
short stint in an American war college will radically alter foreign military officers’ behav-
ior, these programs are destined to underachieve. However, my empirical analysis also
indicates that, in the right circumstances, training can have a positive impact on military
doctrine. To achieve positive results, my findings show that Western military assistance
must be thorough, involving a high proportion of senior officers in the recipient military,
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and sustained for at least 25 years, the equivalent of a full generation of military officers.
In line with previous studies, I find no evidence that short-term programs have any effect
(Taylor 2014). This finding requires confirmation through further study; however, the
data suggest that foreign military training would be more effective if resources were
concentrated on a smaller number of recipients, instead of including as many partners
as possible. My results suggest that, if the study is confirmed, policy makers should favor
long-term training commitments to stable and permanent allies, rather than providing
limited aid to a larger number of partners.
A final contribution of this project is to shed a new light on the role of armed
forces in internal security. One simple reason for the neglect of internal security is that it
falls between the sub-fields of comparative politics and international relations within the
political science discipline. Another factor is Western-centrism: because the militaries
of North America and Europe play little or no role in internal security at home, the
topic is neglected by Western academics. In counterinsurgency contexts, such as Iraq
and Afghanistan, the Western military establishment and the academic field supporting
it have struggled to break out of a conceptual straitjacket, which holds that an army
is for warfighting, not domestic security. In the study of civil-military relations and
democratization, the same conceptual boundaries have been a stumbling block.
7.3 Extensions
A top priority for future research is to improve the available data on domestic interven-
tion by the military. Countless studies have enumerated and analyzed the causes and
consequences of coups d’état, but no existing data set systematically measures military
responses to protests and riots. The data collected for this dissertation provides a partial
solution, but it is limited by relying on mature campaigns from NAVCO (see chapter 6).
Recent data collection projects like ACLED are greatly expanding the availability of event
data for smaller-scale mobilization. Using fine-grained event data as a starting point for
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further data collection onmilitary responses will reduce concerns about possible selection
bias and also increase the statistical power of the analyses. In developing this dissertation
into a book project, I plan to take advantage of the latest advances in event reporting and
geospatial modeling to improve the statistical power of the analyses.
An additional extension to thisworkwould expand the qualitative analysis through
the use of archival sources. While my case study chapters incorporate archival materials
available online from US government agencies, they could be expanded through addi-
tional research in physical archives. In particular, the former colonial powers, Britain and
France, kept detailed records of their colonial administration of the Middle East. These
documents could help shed light on the effect of colonial era policies on the initial military
doctrines of postcolonial states.
In the course of this study, I often uncovered evidence that the military’s behavior
was shaped by soldiers’ perceptions of the demonstrators. Unfortunately, studies focused
on the military often give short shrift to the relationship between the military and the
popular opposition. Future work should apply the techniques of public opinion research
to the domain of military-society relations. Studying the interaction betweenmilitary and
civilian attitudes and beliefs could offer powerful insights into the interactions between
the two groups.
In light of my findings, scholarsmaywish to reconsider whether the same dynamic
process contributed to military behavior during the pacted negotiations of the third wave
in Latin America, or the rapid collapse of communism in the Soviet bloc. The assumption
in both of these literatures is that the military suddenly defected because of shifts in
their material interests, but the literature does little to explain the sources of this sudden
change. Stepan’s (1971; 1973; 1988) pioneering work on the Latin American transitions
underscores the power of military officers to enable or prevent democratization. Taking
an agent-focused approach, he demonstrates that when elites make the “right” choices,
they can help create positive political transformation. But an analysis of the structural
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conditions these officers face is a necessary complement to Stepan’s work. Future work
could build on his legacy of civil-military relations research by uncovering the causes
of the military’s historical evolution or the generational shifts of officers who shape the
institution over time.
The dissertation theory recognizes the importance of interactions between soldiers
and societies during periods of unrest in shaping future military behavior. However, the
evidence provided in the dissertation covers only one side of the story: the military’s
view of the population. From this project, I plan to develop a research agenda on the
mutual perceptions of the military and the population. A first effort in this direction
is underway with an ongoing study of public trust in authoritarian and democratizing
armies (Lotito and Miles 2018). Motivated by the finding that citizens’ perceptions of the
military condition their response to soldiers during revolutions, the working paper uses
survey data to discover the sources of variation in public attitudes toward the military.
In this dissertation, I find that the design ofmilitary institutions during the colonial
era can affect the organization’s behavior a century later. Unfortunately, as (Greitens
2016, 20) notes, the role of coercive institutions in repression is “assumed far more than…
analyzed.” In another research project, my coauthors and I are undertaking a compre-
hensive investigation of the colonial origins of coercive institutions in the Middle East
(Hartnett et al. 2018). The comparative politics literature has long relied on potentially
flawed assumptions about the institutions of state coercion. Although this dissertation
focuses on the role of the military during revolutionary moments, such moments are
extremely rare. In normal periods, and even in most popular uprisings, the military has
little or no role in political repression. Despite this, scholars have traditionally focused
on the military as their unit of analysis, even though it is domestic security institutions
such as the police and intelligence services that are tasked with the regime’s defense.
Relative to the internal security forces, the military has actually played a declining role
in the maintenance of Arab authoritarianism: the army is rarely deployed to the streets,
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except in rare moments of extraordinary mobilization, and coups have become increas-
ingly rare events in the Middle East. One goal of this research is to open the black box
of these other coercive institutions by studying their historical development before and
after independence.
A second contribution of the project is to challenge problematic assumptions about
the historical development of coercive institutions. Dominant political science theories
suggest that coercive institutions are established when an authoritarian leader comes to
power, and that authoritarian leaders have full autonomy in constructing those institu-
tions. Instead, we find that even revolutionary leaders inherit the institutional apparatus
of the state from the previous period, and cannot easily start over from a tabula rasa.
This is particularly true for leaders coming to power in the twentieth century, after major
state building processes took place. Contemporary authoritarian leaders rely on the pre-
determined resources and capabilities of the states they inherit. In conclusion, we argue,
the origins of modern coercive institutions should properly be located in the colonial era,
not in the authoritarian regimes of the postcolonial Middle East.
∗ ∗ ∗
Despite its surprises, the Arab Spring also revealed deep continuities in the politics
of the Middle East. Rather than asking why Middle East studies missed the Arab Spring
(Gause 2011), it may be more fruitful to ask how the existing literature on Arab author-
itarianism can help us explain these revolutionary moments. Following Brownlee et al.
(2014), I conclude that the Arab Spring, and revolutions in general, are best understood
not as spontaneous and unprecedented, but rather as deeply rooted in historical context.
The political and military elites who made headlines during the uprisings and throughout
the transitions were already fixures of the political scene decades earlier (e.g. Tunisia’s 91-
year-old President Essebsi, who entered politics in 1941). All of the politicians, activists,
officers, and functionaries acting during these turbulent times were guided by the context
of their political experience. Moreover, the fundamental role of coercive institutions in
208
revolution and regime change was well-researched prior to 2011 (Bellin 2004; Tilly and
Tarrow 2006). While the prospects for political development remain dim across much of
the Arab world, scholarly inquiry continues offer a pathway to understanding the power
structures inhibiting human progress.
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mil_repress: Military Repressive Episode(s)
Description: This variable measures the most repressive episode or activity perpetrated
by the military in response to campaign activity.
Coding rules: This variable looks at repression from the perspective of the opposition
campaign, not the state. Focusing on peak events, coders should measure the extent to
which the military acts to quell opposition. If the military does not respond, or responds
in a conciliatory manner, this variable is coded as “none.”
Coding:
-1=not applicable - internal security forces do not require backup - government
does not order military intervention - campaign size is too small to warrant intervention
0=none - few or no actions taken on the part of the military - appeasing or sur-
rendering to campaign - making statements of support for campaign’s demands - taking
action that signals intention to cooperate or negotiate with campaign - expressing inten-
tion to cooperate or showing support
1=mild repression - verbal or threatening action short of physical action - express
intent to engage in conflict or threaten - decline to cease ongoing conflict; maintain the
status quo during conflict
2=moderate repression - physical or violent action aimed at coercing campaign -
harassment and imprisonment of campaign members - no apparent intention to kill
230
3=extreme repression - physical action exhibiting intent to kill and violently si-
lence campaign - torture or severe violence (such as severe beatings), which could easily
kill someone - mass violence
-99=unknown
Case List: Popular Uprisings, 1950–2013
Campaign Country Year Success Mil. Violence
South Africa First Defiance Campaign South Africa 1952 No Extreme
East Gemany Worker Uprising East Germany 1953 No Extreme
Hungary Anti-Communist Hungary 1956 No None
Poznan Protests Poland 1956 No Extreme
South Korea Student Revolution South Korea 1960 Yes Extreme
Leftist rebels (URNG) Guatemala 1961 No Extreme
Czech Anti-Soviet Occupation Czechoslovakia 1967 No None
Anti-Khan Pakistan 1968 No Extreme
Anti-Tsiranana Campaign Madagascar 1972 Yes None
Greece Anti-Military Greece 1973 Yes Extreme
Carnation Revolution Portugal 1973 Yes None
Thai student protests Thailand 1973 Yes Extreme
Anti-Indira Campaign India 1974 Yes None
Democracy Movement China 1976 No Extreme
Argentina pro-democracy movement Argentina 1977 Yes Extreme
Iranian Revolution Iran 1977 Yes Extreme
Anti-Bhutto Pakistan 1977 Yes None
South Korea Anti-Junta South Korea 1979 No Extreme
Solidarity Poland 1980 Yes Extreme
Diretas ja Brazil 1983 No Mild
Anti-Pinochet Movement Chile 1983 Yes Extreme
People Power Philippines 1983 Yes None
Second Defiance Campaign South Africa 1984 Yes Extreme
Uruguay Anti-Military Uruguay 1984 Yes None
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Campaign Country Year Success Mil. Violence
Anti-Jaafar Sudan 1985 Yes None
Anti-National Governing Council (CNG) Haiti 1986 No Extreme
Anti-Zia al-Haq Pakistan 1986 No NA
Argentina coup plot Argentina 1987 Yes None
Bangladesh Anti-Ershad Bangladesh 1987 Yes Extreme
Anti-Noriega Panama 1987 No Extreme
South Korea Anti-Military South Korea 1987 Yes Mild
Burma pro-democracy movement Burma 1988 No Extreme
Bougainville Revolt Papua New Guinea 1988 No Extreme
Slovenia Anti-Communist Slovenia 1988 Yes None
Anti-Roh Tae Woo South Korea 1988 No None
Albania Anti-Communist Albania 1989 Yes Extreme
Bulgaria Anti-Communist Bulgaria 1989 Yes None
Tiananmen China 1989 No Extreme
Ivorian Pro-Democracy Cote d’Ivoire 1989 Yes None
Velvet Revolution Czechoslovakia 1989 Yes None
East Germany pro-dem movement East Germany 1989 No Moderate
Hungary pro-dem movement Hungary 1989 Yes None
Mali Anti-Military Mali 1990 Yes Extreme
The Stir Nepal 1990 Yes Extreme
Russia pro-dem movement Russia 1990 Yes Moderate
Zambia Anti-Single Party Zambia 1990 Yes None
Active Forces Madagascar 1991 Yes None
Anti-Eyadema Togo 1991 No Moderate
Thai pro-dem movement Thailand 1992 Yes Extreme
Nigeria Anti-Military Nigeria 1993 Yes Extreme
Anti-Suharto Indonesia 1996 Yes Mild
Anti-Milosevic Serbia 1996 Yes None
Anti-Fujimori Peru 2000 Yes Extreme
Second People Power Movement Philippines 2000 Yes None
Anti-Diouf Senegal 2000 Yes None
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Campaign Country Year Success Mil. Violence
People Power III Philippines 2001 No Extreme
Orange Revolution Ukraine 2001 No Moderate
Madagasar pro-democracy movement Madagascar 2002 Yes None
anti-coup Venezuelan campaign Venezuela 2002 Yes None
Rose Revolution Georgia 2003 Yes None
Awami League Protests Bangladesh 2004 Yes Moderate
Rebellion of the Forajidos Ecuador 2005 Yes None
Cedar Revolution Lebanon 2005 Yes Mild
Anti-Thaksin Thailand 2005 Yes None
Anti-Gnassingbe/Coup Crisis Togo 2005 No Extreme
Lebanon Political Crisis Lebanon 2006 Yes Mild
Anti-Calderon Mexico 2006 No Extreme
Nepalese Anti-government Nepal 2006 Yes Moderate
Anti-Mubarak Movement Egypt 2007 Yes Mild
Guinean Pro-Democracy Movement Guinea 2007 Yes Extreme
Saffron Revolution Myanmar 2007 No Extreme
Anti-Musharraf Campaign (Lawyer’s Movement) Pakistan 2007 Yes Moderate
Southern Yemen Secessionist Movement Yemen 2007 No Extreme
Frente Nacionalæde Resistencia Popular (FNRP) Honduras 2009 No Extreme
Green Revolution and Day of Rage Iran 2009 No Extreme
Red Shirt Campaign Thailand 2009 No Extreme
Maoist Anti-Government Protests Nepal 2010 Yes NA
Snow Revolution Russia 2010 No Moderate
Anti-Ben Ali Campaign (Jasmine Revolution) Tunisia 2010 Yes None
Anti-King Hamad Campaign Bahrain 2011 No Extreme
Syrian Civil Conflict Syria 2011 No Extreme
Anti-Ali Abdullah Saleh Yemen 2011 Yes Extreme
Let’s Save Togo (Anti-Gnassingbe) Togo 2012 No Moderate
Anti-Morsi Protests Egypt 2013 Yes Extreme
Anti-Erdogan Turkey 2013 No NA
Euromaiden Ukraine 2013 No None
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Robustness Checks
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Dependent Variable: Extreme Viol. Violence Violence Violence
Violent Independence 1.418∗ 1.425∗ 1.780∗
(2.26) (2.47) (2.01)
Regime-Military Ties 1.569∗ 1.373∗ 1.737
(2.39) (2.07) (1.85)
US Military Aid (25 yr) -0.977 -0.952 -1.442
(-1.87) (-1.78) (-1.63)
Military Size -0.553 -0.691∗ -0.776 -0.279
(-1.64) (-2.04) (-1.71) (-1.34)
Minority Rule 1.451 0.662 0.817
(1.48) (0.84) (0.79)
Military Budget -0.0367 0.286 0.301 0.0462









Constant -1.047 -0.437 -0.477
(-1.75) (-0.95) (-0.75)
Model Logit Logit Logit with RE Ordered Logit
Observations 86 86 86 86
t statistics in parentheses
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01
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